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A Letter From the Editor

People continue to ask me, “What is Sigma?” I then try to explain the journal’s
rich history and to list the BYU alumni who wrote articles in the distant past. I usually end the discussion with a plug for how working on the journal is a great resume
booster that will help improve a student’s writing. Looking back, I see that I have never
explained what Sigma is; I have only described what it was and how it can help students
further their personal goals. I would like to set the record straight and explain what
Sigma is to me.
Sigma, beyond the typed words and glossy paper, is a repository for student ideas
concerning topics in the fields of political and international studies. Those ideas are the
result of intense academic work, sleepless nights, and deep devotion to understanding
and improving our world. Every issue of Sigma is a collaborative effort that involves
over a dozen students trying to create a publication that can make a difference.
For many undergraduate students, college life is all about the hustle to and fro
from classes to work, to family, to volunteer, and so on; the idea of making a difference seems ephemeral, a shadow that we merely chase through college and do
not actually capture until we finally start our careers. I choose not to believe this.
BYU students can change the world today, and one way they can do it is by sharing
their unique ideas to the world. Sigma helps students do just that—it gives students
a voice and a platform to give their perspectives on what is happening throughout
their country and their world.
Because these students’ ideas matter, the Sigma staff seeks not only to publish students’ papers but also to help improve students’ writing. Our main goal is not just to
create a good journal; our mission is to give students the tools necessary to share their
ideas broadly for the rest of their lives. To me, this is what Sigma is. We help students
gain a powerful voice through their academic writing that can change the world.
Sincerely,
Alan Hickey
Editor-in-Chief
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Review of The Dispensable Nation
by Alan Hickey, Shanna Dungan, and Corey Cherrington

Not long ago, Vali Nasr released a revealing account of his time with the U.S.
Department of State as an advisor to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S.’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In his book the Dispensable Nation: American
Foreign Policy in Retreat, we learn that the Obama administration did not live up to its
potential in the realm of foreign policy. In fact, Nasr goes so far as to contend that the
current leadership of the United States has hindered the U.S.’s ability to enact effective policy decisions abroad and has weakened our nation’s world leadership role.
While Nasr’s book is descriptive about the situation surrounding U.S. relationships with countries in the Middle East, Nasr does not bring forth any new conclusions about international decision-making today. He does manage to give a unique
view on the issues with U.S. policies abroad by offering specific examples of what he
has experienced. Indeed, Nasr provides readers supporting evidence for the widespread claim that the U.S. presidency has failed to make informed decisions concerning foreign politics. He accomplishes this by discussing Holbrooke’s impeded actions
in the State Department, along with drawing attention to the executive branch’s
blindness to long-term outcomes for U.S. foreign policy. Although Nasr adds relevant
points to the current conversation on the efficacy of the State Department, he clouds
his arguments with meticulous attention to political detail and a sudden focus switch
from U.S. failures in the Middle East to worries about China. Despite these weaknesses, Nasr still accomplishes the mission he sets out on in his book—to call attention to actions (or rather inactions) by the U.S. government that are rendering an
“indispensable nation” a “dispensable” one.
One of the greatest strengths of Nasr’s book lies in the portrayal of Holbrooke’s
legacy of diplomacy throughout the Middle East. According to Nasr, Holbrooke worked
2
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tirelessly to create opportunities for diplomatic solutions to the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan rather than resorting first to military options. A great success of Holbrooke’s
diplomacy resulted in the signing of an economic treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan, allowing Afghanis to travel across Pakistan to sell their goods in Indian markets.
To accomplish this, Holbrooke and other diplomatic officers coordinated gathering the
representatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the same room and not letting them
leave until the deal was signed. Nasr quotes Holbrooke who said, “Don’t let them out
before they are done; don’t go in, but stay right outside in case they need technical help.”
The pressure Holbrooke put on Afghanistan and Pakistan to cooperate on an economic
deal paid off; the two countries signed the first treaty between them in decades.
Another strength of the book comes from Nasr’s critique of the executive
branch’s failure to enact foreign policy based on long-term planning. Nasr lambasts
President Obama’s changing stance in handling the conflicts in the Middle East. He
lashes out against the directions that America’s foreign policy has taken, from supporting military solutions to troop withdrawals in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Nasr
points out how the Obama administration was crippled because of its focus on maintaining public opinion in preparation for the 2012 elections rather than focusing on
actual, long-term solutions that might have mitigated conflict in the region. Many
of Holbrooke’s policy suggestions fell upon the deaf ears of the executive branch,
and the opportunities to diplomatically bring peace to the region slipped through
U.S. hands like sand. By examining the failures of the executive branch to implement
diplomatic solutions in the Middle East, Nasr reminds readers of the need for politicians and policy makers to have a “diplomacy-first” attitude rather than resorting to
military action or not acting at all.
One of the most apparent weaknesses in Nasr’s book is the incredibly overconsidered minutia of foreign policy strategy, giving it the air of a strategic playbook. Nasr may have been afraid that his foreign policy criticisms would be taken
too lightly or lost in the detailed initiatives and considerations of the State Department. As a result, he packs his work with cumbersome information and drawn out
guides to possible foreign actions and potential U.S. responses. Nasr focuses on
several countries in the Middle East and attempts to create a comprehensive political and cultural guide for each region—an admirable task but one that is far too
ambitious and lengthy for a single book. Each of his chapters could easily be broken
apart into separate volumes, each with the purpose of advising the State Department on feasible and appropriate actions in the various countries.
A second weakness lies in Nasr’s less comprehensive but alarmist views of
China. Almost the entirety of his book focuses on the woes of the Middle East and
only occasionally references China waiting patiently to the east. At the very end of
his work, he suddenly brings China on stage, pronounces it the villain with great
pomp, and then drags it off stage leaving the reader concerned but entirely unsure
as to why. When he discusses China in the last moments of his work, he references
3
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China’s economic rise as “not . . . as disruptive as that of Japan or Germany” but then
almost immediately describes China’s rise as militaristic, with the growing potential
for conflict. He continues to describe his concerns regarding China as the U.S.’s main
competition in the Middle East, but this does not match his earlier analysis of economic conditions in these regions. Nasr’s economic understanding throughout the
book appears limited and does not capture the full picture of the economic issues he
so briefly discusses.
In weighing the strengths and weaknesses of Nasr’s book, we find that Nasr’s
core message of the importance of seeking long-term, diplomatic solutions to the ills
that plague the Middle East shines through. Nasr’s elegy for Holbrooke captures the
vision of how diplomatic solutions are worth the effort to nail them down. Further,
his critique of the attitudes in the Obama administration illustrates how politics and
elections can dismember foreign policy initiatives that focus on long-term solutions
when staying in office is the main concern. Though readers may get a little lost in
Nasr’s discourse on U.S. foreign policy strategies and feel unsure about the economic
situation between China and the Middle East, the essence of Nasr’s narrative gives
readers a good foundation for understanding what matters most in U.S. foreign relations: diplomacy.
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Review of “Political Theory in the
Square: Protest, Representation, and
Subjectification”
by Lisa McGhie and Alan Hickey

As globalization takes hold, political movements and protests across the world
become more relevant to us as Americans. In their paper, “Political Theory in the
Square: Protest, Representation, and Subjectification,”1 Marina Prentoulis and Lasse
Thomassen2 analyze what such protests can teach us. The article, published in Contemporary Political Theory, is timely in our globalized situation where protests have
become something common. The article uses the movement Toma la Plaza in Spain
and the movement aganaktismenoi in Greece to show what the “occupy” movements
are trying to accomplish and how, in the end, these activities will not completely
change the hierarchal political structure that dominates our society today. The authors
submit that, though these movements fight for an egalitarian political structure, they
can only disrupt the political status quo, because vertical political structures are inevitable. Although the article does not give any normative pronouncement of whether
horizontal or vertical government structures are better for democracy, the article does
give great insight into the practical difficulties that protest movements face when trying to supplant vertical government structures.
The article makes it clear that the “occupy” protests are designed to protest
against the existing form of government, as they propose a different, more just form of
government. Protestors in these cases demand an equal voice in government, rather
than the distorted representative voice they currently have. Prentoulis and Thomassen explain that the movements seek governmental reform toward liberal democracy
in which the government’s power lies solely with the people. To the protestors, representative governments are merely a shadow of true democracy and limit the people’s
voice. This idea can be attributed to the fact that representatives act as trustees rather
than delegates who are subordinate completely to the people, thus distorting or even
5
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silencing the people’s voice entirely. Therefore, in the eyes of the people, the interests
of the representatives trump those of the general population.
Understanding the mission of the movements, one question remains: Should
governments have a horizontal and egalitarian structure or a vertical and hegemonic
structure? Throughout their article, the authors never give a conclusive answer to
this normative question. Rather, they explain that, even within protest movements
there exists some form of vertical structure—someone has to be a spokesperson. No
matter how hard movements try to form horizontal structures in their organizations to
provide for equality, they can never escape some form of vertical structure that helps
organize the movement to make it cohesive.
Though the authors never definitively answer the question about whether governments should have a horizontal or a vertical structure, they do make it clear that
the people’s ideals fall prey to reality. There is a big difference between the ideal philosophical world and the ideal structure in the real world. The authors explain well
how electing someone as a representative distorts the people’s voice. This problem
would not exist if representatives followed the voice of the people in every decision.
But, as Prentoulis and Thomassen clearly note, this is impossible since representatives have their own ideas and preferences, and because there is an epistemological
problem of knowing exactly what the masses want.
Even if a representative wants to act as a true delegate and do exactly as the
people would want, there is no way for him or her to be sure of what every person
wants. This same problem exists within the movements themselves, because in order
to form a cohesive, ideologically coherent body, movements must have leaders who
represent the voice of protestors. Therefore, the voice of the movement’s leaders may
not capture the full voice of the protestors they represent, leaving protest movements
subject to the flaws of vertical structures.
The Spanish and Greek protest movements offer interesting case studies, which
explain that the broad mission of these movements is to challenge hegemony and
vertical governmental structures. Though the authors never give an absolute answer
to the question about whether horizontal or vertical structures are better for governments, they do make it clear that the ideal of strict, horizontal governmental structures is impossible to attain. Overall, the article gives a practical explanation about
the difficulties protest movements face that seek to increase the “demo” portion of
democracy in governmental structures.
NOTES
1. Prentoulis, Marina and Lasse Thomassen. “Political Theory in the Square: Protest, Representation and Subjectification.”Contemporary Political Theory 12.3 (2013): 166–84. ProQuest. Web.
11 Mar. 2015.
2. Dr. Malina Prentoulis0 PhD, University of East Anglia; Dr. Lasse Thomassen, PhD, Queen Mary
University of London.
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The Iconography of the Turkish Lira
by David Covey

Turkey seems to forever be at a balancing point—between East and West, secular and Muslim, autocratic and liberal, ancient and modern. As a rising economic
power in a region plagued by turmoil, it has enormous strategic importance as both
a center of power and a model for others. Pulled in multiple directions by its diverse
population, few outcomes seem implausible for Turkey. In the coming decades, it
could become a model for Western integration as a full EU member, an Islamist state
seeking to regain Ottoman glory, and just about anything in between. With such
high stakes, the political battle to determine Turkey’s future direction is intense.
At the center of that political system for the last fifteen years has been the ruling
Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Once
Europe’s darling and Time’s “Person of the Year” for his push toward liberalization
and EU membership, Erdogan has lately been lumped with Vladimir Putin for
the heavy-handed nature by which he has consolidated power. Under Erdogan’s
leadership, Turkey’s direction has swung from one extreme to the other.
Understanding Erdogan and the AKP is at the heart of understanding Turkey
today. How has it sought to position itself in the eyes of Turkey’s voters? What has
it tried to signal to political players within and without its borders? This paper
seeks to shed some light on these questions through a careful examination of
the decisions the AKP made around the iconography of the Turkish lira in the
2009 emission.
Such decisions are easily overlooked, but they reveal important insights into
AKP’s strategy. As Erdogan said, “Money symbolizes power, prestige and independence, just like the flag or anthem” (Hurriyet 2010). Through its design, money
can subtly communicate powerful messages about national identity. Its value and
7
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ubiquity mean that those messages are widely felt. A political party could co-opt
this symbol to advance themes consistent with its own political positioning.
The 2009 currency was not the first time design had been used as a political
tool in Turkey. As part of his transformation of Turkish society, founding father
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk issued a new currency between 1937 and 1939 that would
represent the values of the state. A significant stylistic change was made: The currency would no longer be covered in Arabic script but would use the Latin alphabet.
As the Turkish people used the currency in their day-to-day lives, this change would
reinforce the need to learn the Latin alphabet to accurately make financial transactions.
Since this first emission, the design of the lira has undergone many changes that
give us insight into the issuing government of the time.
In addition to providing us insight into the AKP, this paper also seeks to answer
two questions from the literature on currency iconography. First, does the history of
the Turkish lira’s iconography fit the predicted trend of a shift from state actors and
materialism toward non-state actors and postmaterialism? Second, do the changes
really represent the achievement of state goals or are they simply the result of diffused norms? In the latter case, they would lack much explanatory power about the
AKP’s mindset.
Through a detailed categorization and analysis of the lira’s iconography, I find
that Turkey does indeed fit the trend toward individual actors and postmaterialism. This supports Hymans’ theory of norm diffusion in the pan-European area (2010).
However, unlike the Eastern European states he studies, the design change occurs quite
suddenly for Turkey rather than through a gradual progression.
This suggests a different mechanism may have been behind the design change.
Interestingly, the change in the lira’s iconography was closely correlated with the
rise of AKP, which was voted into power in 2002, just before the Turkish currency
reform movement started in 2003, and stayed in power through the final reform
phase of 2009. I argue that AKP sought to use the iconography of the lira as a tool to signal the party’s progressive intentions for both an international and domestic audience.
This conclusion partially supports Hymans’ world society theory (2010), finding that AKP’s desire to be accepted as part of the international community and
especially the EU was a contributing factor in causing the iconographic change.
However, the world society theory does not prove to be a sufficient explanation. Turkey had been trying to join the EU since 1959, yet the lira’s iconography
remained stubbornly state/materialist themed until 2009. In addition, AKP was
arguably more concerned with the domestic political payoffs of pursuing EU membership than achieving international respect. Due to these factors, I conclude the
state goals model is a more useful framework for understanding currency iconography, at least for Turkey. Turkey appears to be in Europe’s cultural orbit, but, like the
post-Soviet states in Cooper’s analysis (2014), is not fully riding the iconographic
tide of Western Europe.
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Iconographic Trends in the History of the Lira

Norm Diffusion or State Goals?
As mentioned briefly above, there are two main contrasting perspectives about
the process of changes in currency iconography. The first argument is advocated by
Hymans, who argues that the currency iconography of Western European states has
converged around certain norms (2004) and that Japan (2005) and Eastern European
states (2010) have also followed these norms. The chief cause of this norm diffusion is
the “states’ desire for legitimacy and recognition as normal members of the society of
states” (Hyman 2010: 98). This desire to participate in the popular trends of the day
leads the state to mimic the iconographic choices of its neighbors. Hawkins likewise
finds evidence of European norms influencing currency design choices in Tunisia,
due to the strong French influence (2010).
The second perspective focuses on how currency iconography is used to further
the goals of the state. Helleiner shows that the rise of national currencies was correlated with the rise of the nation-state, and outlines several different ways in which
currencies can serve as a tool for building a national identity (2003). These include
cultivating a collective memory, creating a shared economic language and community, and creating a sense of trust in the state when managed properly. Unwin and
Hewitt find support for this perspective in their analysis of East European currency,
in which they see states using depictions of past events and individuals to create a
sense of shared experience in their people (2001). Cooper confirms the importance
of state goals in currency design in his study of the newly formed post-Soviet states
and finds an emphasis on historical figures and state symbols rather than Hyman’s
predicted post-materialism (2014).
Which Images?
A common factor between the analysis of Cooper and Unwin and Hewitt is that
the main subject of analysis is the primary image on the front of the banknote (Cooper
2014: 6; Unwin and Hewitt 2001: 1013). In some cases, Cooper also considers other
significant images on the front of the note. The images on the back are not examined,
as they are assumed to support the theme of the primary front image and would not
provide additional insight (Unwin and Hewitt 2001: 1013). While this choice provides
consistency of analysis between a wide sample of banknotes as well as an easier
creation of a banknote database, it seems limiting when looking at the Turkish lira
over time.
Hymans expands upon this perspective to additionally consider other human
images on the back of the note (2004: 11). This is the model I will be using for my
analysis of the lira. Except for three notes in the first series of 1927, every lira note
since has depicted either the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, or the second head of state, Ismet Inönü, as the primary image on the front. If this were the only
image on the lira to consider, it would force the conclusion that essentially nothing
has changed in Turkish banknote design in the last century—a conclusion I would
9
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consider wildly inaccurate. In addition, despite the unchanging theme on the front of
the lira, the iconography on the back varies significantly, casting into doubt the aforementioned assumption by Unwin and Hewitt that these images consistently align
with the same theme of the primary front image.
I find much richer results by expanding my analysis to the images on the back of
the note. In the case of currencies with a similar structure to the lira (e.g., having the
same individual on the front side of nearly every note) it may be useful to consider
this expanded analysis for future research. This design choice is used in many currencies, including those of Brazil, China, and Thailand.
While I find variation between the themes on the front and the back of the lira,
I did not find such variation within images on the same side. The location and size
of these images change between emission series, making it difficult to compare notes
across time. For my analysis, I will consider the primary image on the back to represent the theme of that side.
Typology
Drawing on the previously mentioned literature, I consider several methods for categorizing the images on the lira in order to gain diverse perspectives on its iconography.
Hymans focuses his analysis on human figures, categorizing them into two spectrums: the locus of actorhood and the nature of goals (2004: 12). He breaks down
locus of actorhood into three categories: state, society/classes, and individuals.
“State” represents human figures with historical or mythological ties to the country;
“society/classes” represents the general masses, classes therein, or regional groups of
human actors; and “individuals” represents identifiable non-state actors, or diverse
persons. Nature of goals is broken down into three levels: traditionalist, materialist,
and postmaterialist. “Traditional” represents classical or antique imagery; “Materialist” represents economic or social endeavors; and “Postmaterialist” signifies cultural
pursuits Finally, Hymans looks at how the use of these categories changes over time.
I have used his chosen time periods from his most recent publication on the topic to
allow for consistency in comparison with the trends in Europe. These time periods
are bookended by major global turning points: the first from 1919–45 between the end
of WWI and the end of WWII, the second until the global explosion of 1968, the third
until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fourth until the present day (Hymans
2010: 101).
While the prevalence of human images in the currencies that Hymans analyzes
allows for a focus on said images, this pattern does not hold useful for all currencies. Cooper expands upon Hymans’ typology to consider other categories of images
beyond human figures, including manmade objects, events, natural, and a catchall
“other” category (6–7). In addition, he looks at the dimensions of gender and historical time periods (6, 8–9). In the case of the Turkish lira, I find that this typology adds
additional understanding, as the majority of the images on the back of the lira do not
depict human figures. For my analysis, I will look at the same categories.
10
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Table 1: Iconographic Choices*

State

Traditional

Materialist

Postmaterialist

State symbols in classi-

Historical heads of

Representatives of

sical gods (e.g., Athena,

statesman (e.g., George

Francis Scott Key,

cal/antique garb, clas‘Columbia’) or purely
ornamental figures.

Society/
Classes

Washington, Douglas
MacArthur).

‘official culture’ (e.g.,
Edward Teller).

Classical/antique imag-

Imagery of real world

Imagery of real-world

or region representative

region representatives

region representatives

‘Industry’, ‘commerce.’

in the fields).

ery of mass, class, sector mass, class, sector or
(e.g., allegorical figures

at work (e.g., farmers

mass, class, sector or
(e.g., kids playing
baseball).

Historical non-state

Historical non-state

Historical non-state

cal/antique era or

significant social or

nificant contributions to

actors from classiIndividual

state, generals, other

representations of

individual-level vir-

tues (e.g., Aristotle, St
Paul, ‘Faith’).

actors who made

economic contributions
(e.g., Margaret Sanger,
Henry Ford).

*From Table 1 in Hymans 2010

actors who made sig-

the sciences or the arts

and letters (e.g., Albert
Einstein, Charles Ives,
Herman Melville).

Where a currency was reissued with the same denomination and basic design,
I do not count the currency twice in my database. All information on dates and
images has been taken from the database of the Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey (2014).
Hymans’ Methodology: Human Images, Front and Back
On the front of the lira, I find an overwhelming state/materialist theme throughout the history of the lira. As mentioned, either Atatürk or Inönü is depicted on the
front of nearly every note. Looking at the back of the currency gives variety to the dataset. While the sample size is small due to the majority of images being non-human,
we can still draw some interesting conclusions. There has been a shift from society/
materialist images, to state/traditional images, and to non-state individuals/postmaterialist images on the back of the currency.
Hymans’ Methodology: Adjusted (2009 highlighted)
However, a problem with the above analysis is that Hymans has chosen cutoffs
for time periods that do not give an accurate understanding of the lira. When the
1990–2009 period is combined, as in the previous table, it appears that there has been
a gradual shift toward depicting non-state individuals and postmaterialist goals,
with state/materialist themes still characterized in the dominant images.
11
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Table 2: Actors (Hymans)
Epoch of
Currency
Issue

State

Society

Individual

Total N

1919–45

15
(88%)

2
(12%)

0
(0%)

17
(100%)

1946–68

19
(83%)

4
(17%)

0
(0%)

23
(100%)

1969–89

12
(86%)

0
(0%)

2
(14%)

14
(100%)

1990–present

21
(78%)

0
(0%)

6
(22%)

27
(100%)

Total N

67
(83%)

6
(7%)

8
(10%)

81
(100%)

Table 3: Goals (Hymans)
Epoch of
Currency
Issue

Traditional

Materialist

Postmaterialist

Total N

1919–45

0
(0%)

17
(100%)

0
(0%)

17
(100%)

1946–68

0
(0%)

22
(96%)

1
(4%)

23
(100%)

1969–89

3
(21%)

10
(71%)

1
(8%)

14
(100%)

1990–present

0
(0%)

20
(74%)

7
(26%)

27
(100%)

Total N

3
(4%)

69
(85%)

9
(11%)

81
(100%)

However, this has not been the case and such a conclusion would be inaccurate.
In the period from 1990–2008 there was a shift back toward state and materialist goals
from the traditionalism of the previous period, and then in 2009 there was a dramatic
shift toward individual and post-materialist themes, which shared the currency.
Comparison to European Trends
With the aforementioned adjustments to Hymans’ methodology, I find evidence
that Turkey has made a recent switch to the pattern Hymans predicted. In comparison
to Eastern and Western Europe, Turkey’s iconography is very close to representing
the standard percentages of notes that promote individual/postmaterialist themes.
It is interesting to note that the manner in which Turkey changed its currency
iconography was not the gradual transition over decades that occurred throughout
12
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Table 4: Actors (Hymans Adjusted)
Epoch of
Currency Issue

State

Society

Individual

Total N

1919–45

15
(88%)

2
(12%)

0
(0%)

17
(100%)

1946–68
1969–89
1990–2008
2009–present
Total N

19

(83%)
12

(86%)
15

(100%)
6

(50%)
67

(83%)

4

(17%)
0

(0%)
0

(0%)
0

(0%)
6

(7%)

0

(0%)
2

(14%)
0

(0%)
6

(50%)
8

(10%)

23

(100%)
14

(100%)
15

(100%)
12

(50%)
81

(100%)

Table 5: Goals (Hymans Adjusted)
Epoch of
Currency Issue
1919–45
1946–68
1969–89
1990–2008
2009–present

Traditional
0

(0%)
0

(0%)
3

Materialist
17

(100%)
22

(96%)
10

Postmaterialist
0

(0%)
1

(4%)
1

Total N
17

(100%)
23

(100%)
14

(21%)

(71%)

(8%)

(100%)

0

14

1

27

(0%)

(93%)

(7%)

0

6

6

(0%)

(50%)

(50%)

(100%)
12

(100%)

the rest of Europe. Instead, Turkey appeared to return toward materialist/state motifs
in the 1990s until a dramatic shift was made in 1999. While the end result is in line
with Hymans’ theory of European norm diffusion, the process of how they got there
is less obvious.
From my perspective, it seems that a norm diffusion process would happen
gradually, with years of soft cultural influence changing perspectives among the populace and the state. From the data, I find little evidence of such a process occurring
in Turkey, suggesting that another force, namely state goals, may have been more
influential over the redesign process.
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Figure 1: Depictions of Non-State Individuals

Figure 2: Depictions of Postmaterialism

*First EU 15 and Next EU 15 data was originally provided in Hymans 2010 for the years 1990–
2009. This data has been assumed to remain constant between the two time periods for the sake
of this analysis.

Adjusted Cooper Methodology—Front and Back
Cooper’s methodology for categorization offers an additional perspective on the
imagery of the lira banknotes. I made an adjustment to his methodology in considering both sides of the note. While human figures are obviously the dominant category
for the front side of the lira, man-made objects are the most common category for the
back side and deserve a closer examination.
In Table 7, I have further divided the types of man-made objects identified by
Cooper into the two categories already examined with Hymans’ methodology in
order to gain more insight into the previous analysis: society and state. I find that
state-associated iconography proves to be the most common in the history of the lira.
However, after the first period, society-associated iconography is depicted nearly
as often. It makes up 50%, 33%, and 60% of the images over the next three periods
respectively. These results reflect a move away from state iconography in the lira after
1945, but not necessarily toward individual actors or postmaterialist goals.
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Table 6: Figure Types (Cooper)
Human
Figures

Man-Made
Objects

Events

Natural

Other

Front

64
(97%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

2
(3%)

0
(0%)

Back

17
(26%)

36
(55%)

0
(0%)

11
(17%)

2
(3%)

Combined

81
(61%)

36
(27%)

0
(0%)

13
(10%)

2
(2%)

Table 7: Figure Themes (Cooper)
Society

State

Relig.

Cultural

Industry

Agri.

Transp.

Military

Gov.

Total N

1919–45

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

2
(20%)

4
(40%)

4
(40%)

10
(100%)

1946–68

0.5
(4%)

4
(31%)

1
(8%)

0
(0%)

1
(8%)

4.5
(35%)

2
(15%)

13
(100%)

1969–89

0
(0%)

1
(33%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

2
(66%)

3
(100%)

1990–
2009

0
(0%)

3
(30%)

3
(30%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

1.5
(15%)

2.5
(25%)

10
(100%)

Total N

0.5
(1%)

8
(22%)

4
(11%)

0
(0%)

3
(8%)

10
(28%)

12.5
(35%)

36
(100%)

Nonhuman objects can be more difficult to conclusively categorize on a traditional, materialist and postmaterialist spectrum. Devising a methodology that would
allow for consistent coding of these types of images in a way that could be compared
with Hymans’ results would be an area for further research.

The State-Driven Redesign Process

As seen in the above analysis, Turkey’s 2009 currency redesign fits well into the
postmaterialist trend predicted by Hymans. But the question remains: What was
the mechanism by which this shift occurred? Was it through a process of norm diffusion from Western Europe as Hymans has suggested, or was it related to state goals as
Helleiner, Cooper, and Unwin-Hewitt would counter? As mentioned previously, the
sudden shift toward postmaterialism in 2009 casts doubt on the diffusion theory and
Hyman’s predictions. In this section, I will seek to further show that the postmaterialist
redesign was driven more by the state’s goals than diffusion.
I find parallels between the 2009 lira redesign in Turkey and Mwangi’s analysis
of African currency in the early nineteenth century. Mwangi shows the images chosen
for the Kenyan banknotes were primarily a reflection of the “social self-imagination of
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dominant classes” (2002: 58). In Kenya, banknote imagery changed with transformations in the philosophy of the ruling party. With rising nationalist discontent among the
African population, the romanticized landscapes of Africa and depictions of the “noble
savage” were not politically helpful (52). These images were changed to instead depict
cash crops, such as cotton and tea, that emphasized the economic success derived from
cooperation between the British and native Africans (55).
Mwangi mentions that norms around colonialism were changing on a global
level, which certainly may have played a role in influencing the shift away from
paternalistic imagery. However, from his analysis it seems clear that the change was
primarily an attempt by the state to repair its disintegrating legitimacy and to bolster
its chances for political survival rather than to align itself with international trends.
In examining the circumstances around the 2009 lira redesign, I believe that the decisions around the iconography were made for similar reasons.
Penrose cautions against automatically assuming that the state is in complete
control of currency design (2011: 431‒32), so I will seek to make the causal link as
clear as possible with the information available.
The currency redesign process in Turkey was part of the larger initiative of
planning and managing the transition from the pre-2000s hyper-inflated Turkish
lira to the new Turkish lira. Beyond the detrimental effects of high inflation, the
high-denomination itself was causing a multitude of problems. The abundance of
zeros made it easy for people to make mistakes in calculating prices, discouraging
economic transactions denominated in the lira. Accounting with the lira became an
especially large burden, with some software unable to process the large numbers
(Bayir 2010: 7).
As for the nation-building power of the currency, the Turkish Central Bank specifically points out that “large denominations ruined Turkish Lira’s credibility by
weakening people’s attitude towards national currency” (Bayir 2010: 5). If no one
wants to use the money, they will not pay attention to what themes it depicts; in
fact, the low credibility of the currency might negatively affect the perception of the
images thereon. Portrayed on a weak, poorly esteemed currency, Atatürk and his
Figure 3: Turkey’s Inflation Rate (Annual Change on CPI)
legacy could be impinged by association. Presiding over a rising economy and growing regional power, the Turkish state wanted to create a stable, trustworthy currency
that matched Turkey’s vision for itself.
The first step was to get inflation under control and stabilize the currency; otherwise, the redenomination would be worthless in a few years and trust in future redenomination attempts would be severely damaged. With signs of slowing inflation
in 2003, AKP passed the Law on Currency Reform in January 2004, which outlined
a two-phase process to redenominate and redesign the currency (Bayir 2010: 10). The
16

COVEY
first phase would remove six zeros and rename the currency the “New Turkish Lira”
and be completed 1 January 2005. The second phase would drop the prefix “new” on
1 January 2009.
To manage the process, a steering committee was formed with representatives
from the Turkish Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Trade,
State Institute of Statistics, Treasury, Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency, and
Capital Markets Board (Bayir 2010: 12). The leadership of the Ministry of Finance
and Ministry of Industry and Trade are appointed directly by the prime minister and
the president (Grand National Assembly 2010: 53). The State Institute of Statistics is
governed under the prime minister, the Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency
is under the president, and the Capital Markets Board is under the Ministry of Finance.
The Central Bank is nominally independent from the government, but its true independence is considered questionable as its governors are all appointed by the parliament
(Gökbudak 1996). By controlling the presidency and parliament from 2002 onward,
AKP leadership had the ability to influence every member of the steering committee in
decision making regarding the new currency.
The 2005 transition was a relatively smooth one, and the populace quickly adjusted
to the New Turkish Lira (Bayir 2010). To maintain a sense of continuity between the currencies and provide for easier recognition of the banknotes, denominations with the
same purchasing power were produced in the same colors and designs, except with
six zeros removed from the denomination. However, the steering committee ultimately
wanted to make a clean break with the images associated with past hyperinflation and
prepared a redesign of the banknotes and coins as part of the second phase.
The process behind the redesign suggests that creating new postmaterialist
images was not considered as the main goal of the project; the redesign was part of a
much larger process to continue to control inflation and redenominate the currency.
The primary purpose behind the project seems to have been restoring trust in the
currency itself, rather than restoring trust in the government or promoting AKP’s
perspective to the populace.
That said, AKP could have chosen any number of images for the currency. The
easiest solution would have been to stick with the same images and themes that people recognized. However, when the opportunity presented itself, AKP moved to use
new iconography that would bolster its legitimacy, just as the Kenyan government had
done in Mwangi’s case study. The fact that it chose to make a break from the dominant
state/materialist imagery of the past eighty years in favor of individual/postmaterialist themes merits further investigation into AKP’s interests.

AKP’s Political Calculus

To understand AKP’s interest in redesigning the currency, it is first necessary to
understand the party’s history. AKP was founded in 2002 from the remnants of the main
conservative Islamist party. That party had been outlawed by the judiciary for violating
Turkey’s constitutional commitment to secular rule. This disbanding of Islamist parties
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was not a unique occurrence in Turkey; it was the fourth time some form of AKP had
been forced to dissolve and reincarnate itself as a new party. Earlier Islamist parties
had been banned in 1971, overthrown by a coup in 1980, overthrown by another coup
in 1998, and then banned again in 2001 (Taspinar 2012). The strategy of the leaders of
the disbanded party would be to form a new party with essentially the same Islamist
goals, which would then be outlawed a few years later, restarting the cycle.
However, new AKP leadership decided to pursue a more pragmatic route. Rather
than readopt the conservative Islamist stances of the past, AKP leadership made a conscious choice to present themselves as something different. AKP leadership carefully
espoused secularism as their governing rule, arguing that “Islam is not an institution
of the state but rather a social compass for society” (Tol 2011). Erdogan has said, “We
are not an Islamic party and we also refuse labels such as Muslim-democrat” (Taspinar
2012). While the party leadership has deep roots in its Islamist predecessors (Erdogan
once spent time in prison for publicly reading a poem promoting Islam), it strategically positioned itself as a Turkish version of Germany’s Christian Democrats (RahighAghsan 2011).
Nevertheless, the secularist elements of the state, known as the Kemalists, were
deeply suspicious of AKPs true intentions. With power bases in the judiciary and
the military, they represented an ever-present threat to the party’s political survival
through the possible instigation of an investigation or a coup. For AKP to remain in
power, it would have to appease the Kemalists by appearing sincere in its new liberal
leanings. As a result, AKP decided to adopt a liberal, pro-Western platform that primarily focused on economic growth (Saatçioglu 2010). The party chose a light bulb as its
symbol, signifying a commitment to scientific progress and modernization.
Perfectly aligned with this strategy was a new willingness by the European Union
to consider Turkey as a potential member (Akçapar 2007). At first glance, membership
in the EU would seem to be the goal of the Kemalists, AKP’s political opponents. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the spiritual leader of that movement, worked to turn the remnants of the decaying Ottoman Empire into a modernized Western state (BBC 2014).
He carefully studied Western European governments and used them as his model for
what Turkey was to become. He instituted secular reforms, such as allowing the use of
alcohol, banning headscarves in public, switching from an Islamic calendar and writing
system to a more Western calendar and script, and abolishing the caliph. Membership
in the EU would represent the fulfillment of Atatürk’s ultimate goal of transforming Turkey into a recognized European state and seem to be the goal of the opposing
Kemalists, not AKP.
Yet despite how counterintuitive it seemed at first glance, a pro-EU stance by AKP
actually benefited the party in several ways. First, it established their credibility as
supporters of liberal, secular policy (Içener and Çagliyan 2011). This credibility delegitimized the accusations of the opposition by demonstrating that AKP really was pursuing pro-Western policy. Second, EU reforms presented the possibility of weakening
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the power of the military and judiciary, AKP’s enemies in the Turkish state (Taspinar
2012). AKP could push for EU reforms without appearing to directly undercut them.
Finally, EU membership gave hope for religious freedom reforms that were important
to orthodox Muslims, such as the right for women to wear headscarves in public (Saatçioglu 2010).
AKP latched on to the opportunity and made pursuing EU membership the central pillar of its platform. To the public, AKP leaders were effusive in their enthusiasm
for the project. Erdogan declared that EU membership was the greatest project ever
after the founding of the republic (Içener and Çagliyan 2011). Reforms began in earnest and Turkey made significant progress toward future accession (Siitonen 2008).
It was in this environment that the first phase of the currency redesign began. AKP
had a clear interest in signaling its progressive intentions to both its domestic audience—for its political survival—and its international audience—for the purpose of successfully gaining EU membership. New currency iconography that imitated European
individual and postmaterialist norms could help accomplish that goal in the eyes of
both audiences.
The dramatically different redesign allowed AKP to disassociate itself from previous Islamist governments. A clean break from past eras was symbolized by the iconographic break from eighty years of state actors and materialist themes. The redesign
also served as an attempt to subtly manipulate the Turkish people’s perception of the
party and its values. If AKP’s public image were European, its political enemies would
have a higher credibility barrier to overcome in making a public case for another ban
of the party. In the past, it was not difficult to argue that a party that defined itself as
Islamist should be banned for violating secularist principles as, by its nature, Islamist
rule conflicted with secularism. But in its newest iteration as a party, AKP was crafting
a different image altogether. The currency redesign was additional evidence of a progressive agenda that the public would remember when hearing secularist arguments
in favor of a ban or coup.
The domestic audience proved even more important midway through the redesign
process. Enthusiasm for EU membership died down in the second half of the decade
for the Turkish populace as a whole (Pew 2008), as roadblocks were put in the way
of Turkey’s accession by several EU states (Captagay 2013). While loudly protesting
such injustice, AKP executives officially continued to push for progress in the accession process (Akçapar 2007). However, membership looked increasingly unlikely and
this stance likely represented another attempt to signal progressiveness rather than a
legitimate hope for progress.
The likelihood of a military coup was greatly diminished in the aftermath of the
Ergenekon trials, which controversially jailed key military officials on accusations of
terrorism and treason (Saatçioglu 2010). The marginalization of this threat could have
reduced AKPs need to signal a progressive platform. However, the danger of a judicial
ban on anti-secular grounds was still present. In 2008, AKP was put on trial by the judi19
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ciary to determine whether the party had violated secularist principles, and narrowly
escaped a ban by a single vote (Tait 2008a). Despite a consolidation of power, as late as
2008 AKP still needed to prove its progressive credentials. The following section will
examine how they used iconography to do so.

The 2009 Redesign Examined

Front Side
A high regard for Atatürk has always been reflected on the Turkish banknotes,
upon which he has nearly always been the most prominent feature since the beginning of the republic. Even on the few notes where there is no portrait, a gray wolf—
the symbolic representation of the revered founder (Armstrong 1935)—is depicted
instead. Upon Atatürk’s death in 1938, the next Turkish president, Ismet Inönü,
gradually replaced the founding father’s image with his own over several issuances. During the first printing, the Inönü notes were half Inönü and half Atatürk;
later printings replaced him completely. This was not necessarily a power play as
the change was stipulated in the Turkish constitution—every new Turkish president was to have his face printed on the banknotes. But the gradual manner of
the replacement is telling, almost as if the Turkish government could not quite let
Atatürk go.
After Inönü’s government lost power in 1950, the next prime minister, Adnan
Menderes, changed the image back to that of Atatürk. This was a way for Menderes to
borrow from the popularity of Atatürk in order to strengthen the legitimacy of his own
government. There has been no change of the policy since then. The mere thought of it
would seem borderline blasphemous.
In the 2009 redesign, Atatürk remains on the notes as the champion of the Turkish state. It seems that the Turkish banknote designers have continuously struggled
to choose which portraits of Atatürk they like best—young, middle-aged, or elderly.
Up until 2009, he had been variously depicted at all three ages. Indeed, the 2009 edition designers decided to eliminate the difficult choice between Atatürks by including
a portrait of Atatürk at all three ages. On the 5 and 10 lira notes, we see Atatürk as a
young revolutionary; on the 20 and 50 lira notes we see him in his middle years as
president and reformer; and on the 100 and 200 lira notes, he is the elder statesman.
In comparison to the rather stern expressions he wore in the past, the 2009 version of
Atatürk seems more accommodating than fierce.
Back Side
It was not until 1981 that another recognizable historical figure besides Inönü
or Atatürk was depicted on the lira. In that emission, the figures depicted included
the writer of the Turkish national anthem and three Ottoman national heroes from the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While the use of images of human figures was
unique for the lira, the message of nationalism was nothing new. The notes were
commissioned after an unpopular military coup and may have been an attempt to
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Figure 4: 2009 Emission: Front, all denominations

Figure 5: 1989 Emission: Stern Atatürk on the 50000 lira

recall the Turkish glory days and bolster the state’s legitimacy. However, after the
emission of these notes, the lira returned to depicting nonhuman figures for the next
twenty-five years.
The 2009 redesign brought human figures back onto the lira. However, the people
chosen communicate a different theme than the nationalist heroes of the 1980s notes.
There is still the sense of Turkish nationalism, but now the feeling is much more modern, artistic, and progressive.
From the 5 lira to 200 lira notes, the occupations of the individuals depicted are as
follows: scientist, mathematician, architect, novelist, musician, and poet (Bayir 2010).
Symbols of their work are portrayed around their heads: DNA structures, computer
code, architectural blueprints, books, and music notes. Besides Atatürk, there are now
no longer any political or military figures on the lira—human or nonhuman.
Tellingly, the depicted individuals were pioneers in their field who advanced
science or the arts but still retained their Islamic identity. Fatma Aliye was the
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first female novelist in the Islamic world. The luxuriously mustachioed Ahmet
Kemaleddin was the first architect to combine European Art Nouveau and Ottoman styles to create the architecture of the new republic. Aydin Sayili was one of
the first prominent Islamic scientists in a culture that had often been unfriendly to
the discipline.
The message communicated by the choices of these images is clear: Turkey was
looking toward a future in which its people are at the forefront of scientific discovery and artistic style. The images feel very European and even Renaissance-like in
their veneration of these goals. The union of Islamic values with progressive pursuits
that these individuals represent is the exact identity that the light bulb-branded AKP
wanted for itself.
Figure 6: 2009 Emission: Back, all denominations

The images were generally well-received by the Turkish public, though Kemalists protested some of the choices. The individuals chosen were considered by some
to be obscure, with one politician claiming that 90 percent of the people in the street
would not recognize the figures (Tait 2008b). Another Kemalist said, “I don’t trust the
motives. . . . They will infiltrate through the currency names or images that at first
look harmless but the next step will be to introduce gradually more conservative figures until you get people who negate the values of the republic” (Tait 2008b).
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The choice of Aliye was especially criticized, as more prominent feminist figures in
Turkish history had been passed over. This was probably not accidental. The most famous Turkish feminists were closely associated with secularism, while the lesser-known
Aliye supported traditional family roles (Tait 2008). While the occupations of the individuals chosen by AKP were progressive, the party carefully picked people who had
also been faithful Muslims. If this meant choosing less recognizable figures, so be it.

Conclusion

In this analysis, I find that Turkey has converged toward Western European
iconography in its depiction of non-state individuals and postmaterialist themes.
Because the government was seeking to gain approval of the international community for EU membership at the time, I do find some evidence for the influence of the
“world society” on the iconographic choices (Hymans 2010). However, a closer look
at the motivations of the ruling AKP party more strongly confirms the conclusion
made by Helleiner, Cooper, and Unwin and Hewitt: The state is the ultimate determinants of iconography and makes changes in order to achieve its goals. AKP sought to
signal its progressive intentions in its currency redesign. Adopting this strategy was
necessary in the first years of the redesign process in order to ensure the party’s political survival, an outcome that was fundamentally more important to AKP than how
it was perceived by the EU. It also allowed AKP to advance its vision for the Turkish
nation and manipulate public opinion in its direction.
Currency iconography may be an insightful window through which we can
understand the positioning of the government in power. Design changes can indicate
how governments in other countries would like to be seen, how they define national
identity and whom they hold as role models.
Some countries may have those questions largely settled. Turkey is not one of
them. The battle to determine the answers is pivotal, as the direction that Turkey
chooses will have significant consequences throughout the region. What AKP has
done is stamp its vision of Turkish society onto something that is used by most of its
citizens every day, and that stamp will remain in the foreseeable future. Changing
currency design is a costly and lengthy process; without a crisis, it may be difficult for
future governments to justify it. In a sense, AKP bought itself at least a decade’s worth
of highly visible advertisements to promote its vision of what Turkey should be. That
is a valuable win in a high stakes ideological battle.
Ironically, Erdogan may now be pushing the country in a different direction than
the progressive Turkey the lira was redesigned to portray. Looking back, he may
regret missing a golden opportunity to replace Atatürk’s face on the lira with his own.
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Trust and Scandal: A Tale of Two
Theories
by James Martherus

“I am not a crook.” Those five words are burned into the nation’s memory. President Nixon was under investigation after five men were arrested trying to break
into the Watergate office complex, where the Democratic National Committee was
headquartered. Evidence was found that the burglary was funded using money from
Nixon’s re-election campaign. This led to cover-ups at high levels within the FBI, CIA,
and the White House. Nixon was implicated in these cover-ups and was eventually
charged with obstruction of justice, abuse of authority, and defiance of committee
subpoenas. It was then that Nixon uttered the infamous phrase, “I am not a crook.”
He was not the first public official to be involved in a major scandal, and he
would not be the last. Just over twenty years later, President Clinton was involved
in at least one affair, with intern Monica Lewinsky. Again, the nation was rocked as
Clinton was impeached on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.
The State of Utah has recently experienced its own scandal. Attorney General
John Swallow took office in January 2013 and almost immediately came under investigation by the FBI (Gehrke 2013a). The FBI investigated whether Swallow had conspired to help an indicted businessman, Jeremy Johnson, avoid a lawsuit by the FTC
(Carlton 2013). The investigation did not lead to any charges against Swallow, but it
did provoke further inquiry by the lieutenant governor’s office and the Utah House
(Gehrke 2013b; HR9001) about various alleged misconducts including violation of
campaign laws.
Swallow resigned as Utah’s attorney general in November of that year (Roche
and Romboy 2013) and was arrested on various state charges (Crofts 2014). Swallow
maintains his innocence, but whether the accusations are true or not, Utah has been
rocked by the news. These events provide a unique opportunity to study the effects
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of political scandal on public opinion. Specifically, I present two findings. First, political
scandals negatively affect trust in politicians but not in government institutions. Second, demographics like religion and party identification affect perception of the guilt
of the parties involved, because individuals are less likely to believe someone like them
could be involved in a scandal.

Theory

In the 1960s and early 70s, the public trusted the government at levels that seem
laughable today. Pew Research found in 1964 that 77 percent of respondents felt they
could trust the government “always” or “most of the time.” Since 1964, trust in government has experienced a steady decline, reaching a low of 20 percent in 2014 (Pew 2014).
This decline in trust is not unique to the U.S., but a phenomenon observed in virtually
all Western democracies (Dalton 2004; Putnam et al. 2000).
Political scientists have recently tried to explain this phenomenon. The literature
proposes many theories, most of which focus on the perceptions that government
wastes too much, is inefficient, or chooses to spend on the wrong things (Nye et al.
1997; Chanley et al. 2000; Keele 2007; Miller and Borrelli 1991). A smaller group of
researchers have studied the effects of political “scandals” on public trust in government. Two theories have emerged as a result of this research: one theory suggests
that scandals can negatively affect public confidence in government institutions (i.e.,
Congress, the Supreme Court, etc.), while the other suggests that scandals have a
large effect on confidence in the individuals involved in them but not on the institutions themselves.
Shaun Bowler and Jeffrey Karp support the first theory, suggesting that scandals
have an effect on the public’s attitudes toward institutions and the political process
(2004). They are not alone; many other studies have suggested that corruption can
have negative repercussions, not only for public confidence and trust but also for the
outcome of elections (see e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Banducci and Karp 1994;
Clausen et al. 2011).
Other academics have questioned whether scandal really affects the perception
of institutions and find that scandals only affect the individual politicians involved
(Clarke et al. 1998; Lanoue and Headrick 1994). For example, Jürgen Maier found that
political scandals contribute to a decline of political support for candidates but not a
loss of confidence in government institutions (2011). Diminished trust in individual
politicians has been observed after Watergate (Yaffee 1999), Iran-Contra (Krosnick and
Kinder 1990), and other major scandals, with the notable exception of the ClintonLewinsky scandal (Zaller 1998). The idea that scandals do not really affect trust in the
democratic process and government institutions has grown more and more popular in
recent years. One of the most recent studies in this area attempts to explain this by making a counterintuitive claim: Scandals may have had a larger impact on public trust in
institutions at one point, but the growing frequency of political scandals has caused us
to be less affected by them (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012).
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Some research suggests that even for the individuals involved, scandals do not
have a huge effect. For example, Stephen Bennet found that during the ClintonLewinsky scandal, approval ratings for President Clinton suffered an initial drop but
then stayed relatively high. Further, most individuals did not believe the scandal was
serious enough to warrant his removal from office (2002; see also Zaller 1998).
I am interested in further explaining the effect of scandal on public trust in government officials and institutions. Specifically, I am interested in studying which of the two
above theories are more correct. The current literature fails to account for important
variables like religion. Utah is unique in that most of its inhabitants are members of
one church: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Recently, Utah’s Attorney
General John Swallow was involved in a political scandal, where he was accused of
accepting bribes, tampering with evidence, and misusing public funds. Swallow also
held a leadership position in the Church, providing a unique opportunity to study how
religion affects public confidence in government when a scandal has occurred. I asked
whether participants have heard of the John Swallow scandal and then measure the
levels of public confidence among those who have followed the scandal and those who
have not. I also controlled for participants’ religion and activity in that religion to see
if religion has an effect on public perception of scandals involving those of their own
faith. As a secondary research goal, I plan to study how different demographic factors
affect how we view government scandals.
Many people tend to trust religious individuals more than nonreligious individuals (Tan 2008). Furthermore, people tend to feel more warmly about people who share
their religion than about people from other religions (Putnam 2010). When we trust
someone more deeply, a breach of that trust is more devastating. Therefore, those who
share John Swallow’s religion will be more likely to lose trust in politicians/government in general after hearing that John Swallow, a prominent member of their church,
may have participated in corrupt activities than would an individual who does not
share a religion with John Swallow.
Further, we tend to trust those who are more like us politically (Lambert et al.
1986), and we find it hard to believe that “our team” would do something unethical.
Therefore, those who identify as Republican will be less likely to believe that John Swallow is guilty than those who identify as Democrats.
Considering the above, I have two hypotheses of interest. First, I expect to find
that a government scandal will cause individuals to lose trust in individual politicians but not in government institutions. Second, I expect to find that those who are
similar to John Swallow (religion, ideology, race, etc.) are less likely to believe that he
is guilty of corruption.

Methods

The data used in this analysis were gathered during the Utah Colleges Exit
Poll (hereafter UCEP). The UCEP is conducted biannually on Election Day. About
six hundred undergraduate students volunteer as pollsters and are sent to over one
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hundred polling locations throughout the state of Utah. The sample for the poll
is drawn by statistics majors and uses a stratified, multimode design. The sample
contains four strata, one for each congressional district. Within each stratum, we
clustered on voting districts and polling places. In addition to the pollsters located
at polling locations, we also collected data from mail-in and early voters through
online and telephone surveys. The poll accurately predicted Utah’s major races. For
example, in the fourth congressional district, Mia Love garnered 50.0% of the vote,
while Doug Owens received 46.8% of the vote. The UCEP called the race for Mia
Love with 50.6% to Doug Owens’ 47.0%.
All of the survey questions used in this paper are replicated from either a reputable
survey research firm (i.e., Pew research) or the Utah Voter Poll. The Utah Voter Poll has
a long history of accurate survey results in Utah. The Appendix includes the full text of
all questions used in this paper.
Using the data from the UCEP, I ran various statistical tests. I first used T-tests and
crosstabs to conduct preliminary analysis and then ran simple linear regressions. All
regressions were run using robust standard errors to account for possible heteroskedasticity and using proper weighting techniques. I dropped observations that had been
marked invalid or missing as well as the “don’t know” responses, which were analyzed
separately. My models included various control variables such as age, gender, race,
party identification, and ideology. Some models also included a knowledge index. The
knowledge index was constructed by asking four political knowledge questions and
adding up the number of questions the respondent answered correctly. The purpose
of the knowledge index was to gauge a respondent’s general political interest. Presumably, individuals who follow politics more closely would be more likely to be affected
by a government scandal.

Analysis/Results

The first thing to note about our results is John Swallow’s favorability rating.
Respondents were asked to rate various politicians on a scale from 1 to 5. Consistent
with what we would expect given the literature (see e.g., McAllister 2000; Hetherington
1999), John Swallow’s favorability rating was incredibly low, with over 54 percent rating him at only 1 out of 5 and an average score of about 1.5. Compare this with the way
Utah voters feel about President Barack Obama, who is hardly a popular figure in Utah.
The president received an average score of 2.3, meaning these voters hold even more
negative views about Swallow than they do about the president.
This low approval rating is likely related to the fact that almost all voters had
heard something about Swallow’s scandal. More than 90 percent of Utah voters claim
to have heard, read, or seen something about a scandal involving the former attorney general. Unfortunately, the high level of awareness on this issue made it difficult
to prove my hypotheses, because there were not enough respondents who had not
heard about the scandal to produce a satisfactory level of variance. I now discuss each
of my hypotheses in detail.
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My first hypothesis was that government scandals would cause a loss of trust in
the politicians involved, but not in government institutions. My analysis largely supports this hypothesis. To measure the loss of trust in Swallow, I used his favorability
rating. Those who had not heard of the scandal gave him an average of 2.6 on the favorability scale, while those who had heard about the scandal gave him an average rating
of 1.6. Regression analysis produces this same finding, even controlling for religion,
race, party identification, and ideology. Table one shows the results of this regression.
This regression clearly shows that having knowledge of a government scandal
negatively impacts how the public views the individuals involved. Although not part
Table 1: Effect of scandal on John Swallow’s favorability
Dependent variable: Favorability rating from 1 to 5

Regressor
Heard about scandal

-.94**
(.129)

Religion Index

-.04*
(.018)

White

-.28**
(.094)

Republican

.16**
(.040)

Liberal

-.07**
(.026)

Female

.02
(.042)

Income

-.02
(.011)

Married

-.02
(.054)

Education Level

-.03
(.024)

Intercept

2.82**
(.254)

Regression summary statistics
–
R2

.12

R2

.12

SER

.90

n

2927

Notes: Dependent variable is the respondents rating of John Swallow on a scale from 1 to 5 (see
appendix for full question wording). Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference
and activity in that religion. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses
under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level.
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of my research, it is also interesting to note which of the demographic factors affected
Swallow’s favorability. Some factors, like party identification and ideology, we would
expect. Others, like race and religion, are more interesting.
The other part of my first hypothesis was that scandals would not significantly
affect levels of trust in government institutions. The data I collected mostly supports
this part of the hypothesis. We asked respondents two questions. The first asked how
much they trusted the federal, state, and local government to do the right thing. The
second asked them to rate their level of confidence in various Utah government offices,
including the office of the attorney general. My hypothesis would suggest that knowledge of the Swallow scandal should not significantly affect levels of trust or confidence
in these two questions. Tables two and three show the results of these two questions.
This first set of regressions is inconclusive as far as my hypothesis is concerned.
Surprisingly, knowledge of the scandal had no significant effect on levels of confidence in the attorney general’s office but did have quite a large effect on levels
Table 2: Effect of scandal on confidence in government offices
Dependent variable: Confidence in government offices

Regressor

Office of the
Utah Attorney
General

Office of the
Utah Governor

Heard about scandal

-.08
(.070)

.20**
(.068)

Religion Index

-.06**
(.018)

-.08**
(.014)

Female

-.0005
(.037)

-.04
(.032)

Republican

.13**
(.033)

.29**
(.033)

Liberal

-.07**
(.026)

-.06**
(.022)

Intercept

2.64**
(.162)

3.15**
(.160)

Regression summary
statistics
–
R2

.09

.24

R2

.09

.28

SER

.81

.73

n

3277

3346

Notes: Dependent variable is confidence in various government offices (name of office at top of
each column) on a five-point scale. Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference
and activity in that religion. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses
under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level.
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of confidence in the Utah governor’s office. Those who had followed the scandal
actually rated the governor’s office higher than those who had not. Possibly, those
who had followed the scandal approved of the way the governor’s office had dealt
with the scandal by launching an extensive investigation. Other factors that affected
confidence levels included religion, party identification, and ideology. This is unsurprising; Latter-day Saints (LDS) conservative Republicans control Utah, so LDS conservative Republicans are more likely to have confidence in Utah’s government.
This second set of regressions gives substantial evidence against the theory
that government scandals cause a loss of trust in government institutions. For all
Table 3: Effect of religion (and other demographics) on trust in different levels
of government
Dependent variable: How often do you think you can you trust the
following organizations to do what is right?

Regressor

Federal
Government

State
Government

Local
Government

Heard about scandal

-.06
(.040)

.01
(.046)

-.05
(.051)

Religion Index

.01
(.0093)

-.04**
(.012)

-.05**
(.013)

Female

-.06**
(.022)

-.12**
(.028)

-.13**
(.030)

Republican

-.15**
(.022)

.09**
(.025)

.04
(.026)

Liberal

.12**
(.015)

-.04**
(.017)

-.02
(.019)

White

-.12*
(.042)

.02
(.051

-.03
(.062)

Knowledge Index

-.08
(.053)

-.16*
(.067)

-.03
(.081)

Intercept

1.59**
(.115)

2.15**
(.134)

2.12**
(.158)

Regression summary statistics
–
R2

.25

.08

.04

R2

.25

.09

.04

SER

.49

.58

.63

n

3332

2586

3347

Notes: Dependent variable is how often you think you can trust the given organizations. Full question text given in the appendix. Religion index refers to an index plotting religious preference and
activity in that religion. Knowledge Index refers to an index of four political knowledge questions where knowledge index is equal to the percentage of questions they answered correctly.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients.
Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1% significance level.
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three levels of government, knowledge of the Swallow scandal had no statistically
significant effect on levels of trust. Interestingly, the factors that do affect levels of
trust vary across the levels of government. For example, religion affected levels of trust
in the state government but not the federal government. Local government seems
to be a unique case. Surprisingly, neither party identification nor ideology had an
effect on an individual’s trust in local government. This can probably be attributed
to the fact that local governments tend to enjoy high levels of trust and satisfaction
or the fact that many respondents probably know some of the people in their local
government personally. Overall, my analysis of the data supports the hypothesis
that government scandals negatively affect the politicians involved in them but not
the government in general.
Table 4: Effect of religion (and other demographics) on whether or not an individual
believes John Swallow has done something illegal or unethical
Dependent variable: John Swallow has done something illegal, unethical, or neither
Regressor
Religion Index

-.06*
(.028)

Female

.18**
(.065)

Age

-.002
(.002)

Republican

.17**
(.062)

Liberal

-.12**
(.044)

White

-.28*
(.139)

Education Level

-.03
(.035)

Married

.11
(.088)

Income Level

-.05**
(.016)

Regression summary statistics
Pseudo R2
Wald’s

.06

Chi2

116.30

n

2685

Notes: Dependent variable is whether the respondent thought John Swallow had done something illegal, unethical, or neither (see appendix for full question wording). Religion index
refers to an index plotting religious preference and activity in that religion. Standard errors are
given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. Coefficients are significant at the *5%, **1%
significance level.
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My second hypothesis was that those who are more similar to Swallow demographically would be more likely to believe that he is innocent of the charges brought
against him. The analysis partially supports this hypothesis. Data analysis reveals
that some demographics matter and some do not. Gender and religion, for example,
seem to make a significant difference. Age, education level, and marital status, however, had no significant effect. Table four displays the results of this analysis.
There are a few things that should be noted about these results. As the Pseudo R2
measure indicates, this model is not very predictive. This is unsurprising given that
there are myriad other considerations one may have when deciding whether they
think John Swallow is guilty. In order to make a more predictive model, we would
need to collect additional information from these respondents.
Another point of interest is religion. Active LDS tend to be more likely to believe
Swallow is innocent. Perhaps this is because Swallow was an active LDS and served
as a bishop for a time.
In conclusion, my second hypothesis was partially correct. There is some evidence to support the idea that we tend to trust those who are similar to us more than
those who are different. However, some similarities like education level or marital
status seem to have no effect. Further exploration of this phenomenon is necessary,
but I propose one theory as to why this might be the case. Some demographics tend
to measure similarities that are based on identity. We identify as a democrat or republican and feel a sort of kinship with those who identify as we do. The same phenomenon occurs within religion, perhaps even more so. However, we tend to not feel a
strong bond with someone just because they happen to be married or to have the
same level of education as us. Therefore, these types of identifiers understandably
have little effect on how much we trust someone.

Limitations

While the Utah Colleges Exit Poll was a considerably accurate poll, there are still
some limitations to its use as a representative sample of Utah voters. It is well known,
for example, that midterm election voters are significantly different from general election voters. Midterm election voters tend to be older, whiter, more educated, and
more partisan (Wattenberg and Brians 2002). Our results are weighted more heavily
toward those groups.
Another limitation to using this data is the low number of respondents who
responded that they had not heard about accusations involving Swallow. We had
planned on doing much of our analysis between those who had heard of the scandal
and those who had not; however, over 90 percent of voters claimed to have heard of
the scandal. One possible explanation for this extremely high percentage is that voters in midterm elections tend to be more politically active than those in general elections. There may be an even stronger bias toward informed voters in Utah, as voter
turnout was a mere 30 percent. This would suggest that only the most dedicated and
careful voters actually voted. Another possible explanation is that respondents did
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not want to acknowledge ignorance. Essentially, because so few respondents claimed
to have not heard about the Swallow scandal, we could not effectively compare the
two groups.
The Utah Colleges Exit Poll also suffers from some nonresponse error. Student
pollsters are instructed to gather as much data as possible from nonrespondents (i.e.,
race, approximate age, gender) in order to check for nonresponse error. We have
weighted the results to reflect any error, but some small error is inevitable.
There is some evidence to suggest that asking someone if they have heard about
the Swallow scandal is not a perfect substitute for getting a respondent’s opinion
before and after a scandal has occurred. It is possible that people who said they had
heard about the scandal really had not and vice versa. For example, I conducted a
t-test to see if the mean confidence level in the Utah attorney general’s office was
lower than the mean confidence level in Utah’s Child Protective Services (CPS). In
theory, CPS may be used as a control since they have not been involved in any major
scandals recently and they are relatively unknown like the attorney general’s office.
The t-test found a statistically significant difference between the two means, with the
attorney general’s office scoring lower than CPS. However, the difference was only a
tenth of a point, and I do not believe this difference alone constitutes enough evidence
to disprove the hypothesis that scandals affect the trust in the individual rather than
the office itself.
Finally, while the question wording we used was a replication of questions used
in Gallup and Pew research studies, further study suggests there are better methods
for asking about trust in government. Specifically, Timothy Cooke and Paul Gronke
have developed a measure they claim is much more accurate than those used in most
studies. They suggest using a scale from zero to ten where zero is very strong distrust
of government to do the right thing, ten is very strong trust in government to do the
right thing, and five is neither trust nor distrust in the government (2005). In future
research, I will use these measures to more accurately describe trust in government
among respondents.

Conclusion

Political scandals have been around for a long time and show no signs of ceasing.
In fact, as the world advances technologically, our ability to uncover these scandals
may increase, exposing us to scandals and corruption with even greater frequency.
In light of this possibility, perhaps it is comforting to know that scandals do not substantially affect the government’s ability to function or the people’s general trust in
that ability. When we uncover scandals, we can throw those involved out of office and
try again. On the other hand, could a higher volume of government scandals begin
to erode the public trust? This paper has studied the effects of a single scandal but
may not be applicable to locations that experience scandals fairly regularly. Further
research should be done to determine the effects of multiple scandals.
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APPENDIX
Full Text of Survey Questions
Have you heard, read, or seen anything about accusations involving former Attorney General
John Swallow?
Yes
No
How much of the time do you think you can trust the following organizations to do what is
right? (Only some of the time, most of the time, just about always, don’t know)
Deseret News
The Salt Lake Tribune
Federal Government
State Government
Local Government
How much confidence do you have in each of the following government offices? (Not at all,
Not very much, Some, A great deal, Don’t know)
Office of the Utah Attorney General
Office of the Utah Governor
Child Protective Services
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As you may know, the media have reported several accusations about the activities of former
Attorney General John Swallow. Based on what you have heard or read, which of the following statements best described your view of what John Swallow might have done?
John Swallow has done something illegal.
John Swallow has done nothing illegal, but has done something unethical.
John Swallow has done nothing unethical.
Don’t know
On a scale of one to five, one being negative and five being positive, please rank your feelings
on the following individuals: (1–5, Don’t know)
John Swallow
Barack Obama
Etc.
Note: The following four questions were used to create the political knowledge index.
What percentage vote of the U.S. House and Senate is needed to override a Presidential veto?
A majority
Two-thirds
Three-fourths
Unanimous
For how many years is a United States Senator elected—that is how many years are there in
one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?
2 years
4 years
6 years
8 years
Which of the following groups claimed responsibility for recent beheadings in Iraq?
ISIS
UNICEF
Al Qaeda
Don’t know
Please indicate which office Joe Biden currently holds:
U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Vice President of the U.S.
Speaker of the U.S. House
U.S. Senate Majority Leader
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Research Project: Children in
Agriculture
by Rachel Milliron

Introduction

The concept of the “American dream” lures many immigrants to the U.S. each
year. Patterns of immigration to the U.S. throughout history may be categorized into
waves, including major waves from Asia, Europe, and Latin America (Nelli 1987:
200–01). American industries have welcomed and capitalized from the influx of
cheap labor in the workforce. The agricultural industry employs many immigrants,
and, more specifically, child immigrants or children of immigrants (Human Rights
Watch 2014a). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 exempts minors in agricultural
jobs from the maximum-hour and the minimum-age requirements that apply to
other working minors (Human Rights Watch 2014a: 642–54). This means children
work upwards of ten hours a day in dangerous conditions on farms. These dangers
include the risk of exposure to pesticide, heat illness, injuries, life-long disabilities,
nicotine poisoning (in the case of children working on tobacco farms), and death.
These dangers apply not only to immigrants but also to citizen minors. Human
Rights Watch reports that 75 percent of the deaths from work-related injuries of
children under the age of sixteen occurred in the agricultural industry in 2012 (2014a).
In the time leading up to the passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the debate
centered on the manufacturing and mining industries, though President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and other advocates often mentioned the “ancient atrocity” that was child
labor (Roosevelt 1938, 2: 275).
These factors pose the question of why the agricultural industry has not undergone as extensive a child labor reform as other areas of industry that have reformed
and offer a wider variety of protections to minors. Also, some states have more robust
protections for agricultural workers than other states despite being in the same coun41

SIGMA
try. I argue that the lack of rhetoric on and the exclusion of agriculture in the child
labor debate was a result of the traditional norm that agriculture represented in
American culture in the first half of the twentieth century. I further argue that the current lack of reform in this sector is due to the continued need for unskilled labor in the
agricultural sector and the partisan divide in ideological views surrounding farming.
The paper will begin with a literature view, analyzing existing theories on the
topic, and then will discuss the current significance and need of child labor reform
in agriculture. The paper will then examine the evidence relating to my argument.
First, I will examine the historical factors that surrounded the passing of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and identify why agriculture was largely excluded from
reform. Second, I will discuss the differences between family and corporate farms.
Third, I will compare current child labor laws and analyze why some states observe
heavier restrictions on agricultural labor than others. The paper will conclude with
an analysis of the limitations of my argument and suggestions for further research.

Current Significance and Literature Review

Current Significance
The labor that children perform in the agricultural sector is hazardous. In 2013,
Human Rights Watch published a report on children working on tobacco fields in
the United States. They interviewed 141 child workers, ranging in age from seven
to seventeen (Human Rights Watch 2014b). They reported that nearly three-quarters
of the children told HRW about serious symptoms they experience while working.
The symptoms included vomiting, nausea, headaches, dizziness, loss of appetite, difficulty breathing, skin rashes, and eye and mouth irritation. One thirteen-year-old
girl said, “I would barely eat anything because I wouldn’t get hungry. . . . Sometimes
I felt like I need to throw up. . . . I felt like I was going to faint. I would stop and just
hold myself up with the tobacco plant” (Human Rights Watch 2014b, 3). The United
States Department of Agriculture reported that in 2009 youth under the age of ten
incurred 4,111 injuries, while youth ages 10–15 incurred 6,912 injuries (Child Labor
in Agriculture: 2–3). Agriculture has an average of 21.3 deaths per 100,000 full-time
youth workers in the U.S., meaning it is the industry with the second highest fatality
rate for youth workers (3). All industries combined have an average of 3.6 deaths per
100,000 youth workers.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reports that machineryrelated injuries, motor-vehicle injuries, and job-related homicides are the leading cause
of adolescent job deaths (Blosser 2000). Between 1998 and 2007, 178 transportationrelated deaths among workers ages 15–17 occurred, as well as 34 fall-related deaths, 45
assault-related deaths, and 70 equipment-related deaths (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2010). Along with agriculture, mining and construction reported the
highest deaths per 100,000 full-time employees for young workers (36.5 and 10.9,
respectively). PBS reported on a statistic from the Association of Farmworker Opportunity Programs concerning youth farmworkers. Half of the youth that regularly
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engage in farm work do not graduate from high school (PBS 2004). These numbers
highlight some of the issues related not only to child labor in agriculture but child
labor in generally hazardous industries.
The lack of protection to children performing dangerous agricultural jobs is an
important and significant topic to explore. It is a question for which human-rights
activists are currently demanding answers. The implications of the problem represent
social and physical consequences. Understanding the answer to this question will
help to properly address possible failures in federal and state law to protect children
in the agricultural industry. Specifically, understanding the contributing factors to
this difference of restrictions between industries may hold many policy implications.
Legislators will better understand how to provide policy reforms on children’s role
in agriculture if they understand the variables that influence the different industries.
Literature Review
Carolyn M. Moehling (1999) examines the effect of state restrictions and the withdrawal of children from the labor market. She uses data from three federal censuses
of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century to perform a test of the effect of
minimum-age limits in the manufacturing industry on children’s occupational choices
(72). Overall, she finds that the imposition of age restrictions had little statistical effect
on the decline of child labor in the first half of the twentieth century, and state labor
laws regarding children were a consequence of social change rather than an initiator. Her tests exclude agricultural households because she identifies agriculture as an
untargeted area of the child labor movement in the early 1900s (84). The lack of incorporation of children from agricultural households and similar variables means her
conclusions cannot be inferred onto the agricultural labor sector. However, her results
are fascinating when considering the direction of the causal relationships between
variables in the analysis of my hypotheses.
A 1989 health-screening project of over 90 percent of children in a Californian
farming town revealed that more than two-thirds of children needed a medical referral (Villarejo 2003: 186). This was found to be positively associated with the level of
poverty in the town. Villarejo discusses the age distribution of hired farm workers and
finds most of them are between the ages of eighteen and forty-four. He used this to
explain the larger number of children and women in farming communities (177). From
his finding, we discover a basis for the idea that children are a viable source of labor in
agriculture due to their sheer number. Similarly, we find that the amount of illness
in children who are farm workers is a serious cause of concern that deserves attention.
Daniel T. Lichter and David L. Brown (2011) found that interdependence between
rural and urban areas helps rural areas move ahead and advance in a way similar to
their urban counterparts. They also noted studies that found that there is a declining
share of all rural employment in the agricultural sector. Lichter and Brown examined
the notion that rural America is regarded as “backwater” society. This backwater view
is a misconstrued attempt to explain the cultural conservatism that may be found
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more commonly in rural communities. However, this view declines as the level of
interdependence between rural and urban areas increases. It is this type of explanation that gives credence to the idea of a partisan divide in agricultural policy. Lichter
and Brown find the legitimacy of such explanations decreases with interdependence,
which may mean a decrease in the possible partisan divide regarding agricultural
policy. With the acknowledgement that rural areas, at least in a cultural perceptive,
are usually associated with right-wing, conservative attitudes, the partisan argument
will be explored later on in this paper.
Anne B.W. Effland (2005) wrote about how traditional ideals concerning agriculture affected child-labor reform. She identifies the root of the American agrarian
ideal as resting in the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson (285). Jefferson believed agriculture
was the best basis for democratic citizenship, because men who worked their own
land had independence and virtue. Effland argues that this historic ideology is what
drove public perception of agriculture and agricultural workers in the early half of
the twentieth century. Effland identifies three ideas that stem from this ideological
system that are still prevalent in the American public conception of agriculture today:
economic, political, and social fundamentalism.
Economic fundamentalism asserts that agricultural production is the basis of
all wealth, making its wellbeing critical to the wellbeing of the entire economy.
Social fundamentalism asserts that farming is an occupation that naturally fosters a moral life, making the protection of a viable farm economy important to
the moral state of the nation. Political fundamentalism asserts that farming produces self-sufficient, therefore independent, citizens capable of participating in
true democratic government, making the preservation of a family farm system
important to the maintenance of American democracy. (85)
These three ideas will be important when considering the current state of agricultural
reform in the U.S. in regards to child labor in agriculture. They are important when
considering the exclusion of agriculture from labor reform, because they imply there
was no perceived necessity of such labor reform for agricultural child workers at the
time of the development and passing of the FLSA.

Theoretical Arguments

I hypothesize that the traditional values associated with rural communities and
the continued need for unskilled human labor in agriculture are the main causal
effects of why the agricultural industry does not have stricter labor laws regarding
children. Rural communities that rely on agriculture will more naturally accept child
labor, especially in communities where family-owned farms are still prominent and/
or numerous. Children will be viewed as contributing to the community effort of producing agricultural goods and, therefore, will be required to work harder in comparison to children living in suburban or urban communities. This will be done to help
their family make ends meet and to help produce their community’s livelihood. The
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demand on financially stable farms increases as imports from foreign farms increase,
putting weaker American farms out of business and putting the strain of demand on
still-existing farms. However, with the advancement of society and the growth of the
population in the U.S., farmers are using more pesticides and working longer hours
in order to produce enough products to meet the demand. This adversely affects children farmworkers, because it exposes them to pesticides and longer working hours,
both of which negatively affect their health and well-being.
American society has seen much technological advancement that has revolutionized industries. Jobs that required cheap labor in the past and that were ideal for
children are now run by machines or facilitated by an assembly line and machine combination. The agricultural industry did not benefit from these technological advancements in the same way and still depends heavily on human labor. Much of the labor
on farms does not require particular skill, making children good candidates for the job;
and as immigration to the U.S. continues, especially from Latin American countries,
immigrants and their children prove to be a commodity in the form of cheap labor.

Evidence

This part of the paper will focus on historical process tracing, examining evidence
relating to the exclusion of child agricultural labor from the regulations imposed by
the FLSA. Overall, I find evidence supporting the three pervasive ideas of fundamentalism identified by Effland as contributing to the lack of rhetoric and consideration
of labor reform in agriculture. The large amount of children working drew national
attention. The National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) conducted field investigations and studied legal statutes related to child labor and published their findings.
This raised public consciousness, especially among religious organizations, college
groups, and women’s organizations (Stadum 1995: 34). Public awareness led to pressure on the government, which was blocked in its reform attempts by the Supreme
Court, who declared restrictions on child labor “unconstitutional” (Grossman 1978).
Eventually, President Roosevelt managed to bypass Congress and the Supreme Court
when he signed the FLSA. Largely exempt from the FLSA were children working in
agriculture, because agriculture was seen as a necessary way of life.
The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Progressive Movement at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century served as a catalyst to the events leading to the FLSA
(United States Department of Labor). Rapid industrialization in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century introduced many social and economic problems to the U.S.
(The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project). The Progressive Movement began as a social
movement but later developed into a political movement. Adherents to the movement
were generally educated, lived in cities, and shared a belief that the government could
be used as a tool for change. During this time period, there was a massive influx of
immigrants who flooded the industrial market and the school system (United States
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Department of Labor). Officials desired to instill upon these immigrant children
traditional American values and beliefs to avoid foreign radical ideas prominent
in Europe (Bodnar 1985: 190). However, this was met with opposition by the immigrant parents, because they depended on their children’s wages to make ends meet.
This led to a war of ideologies and ultimately led to legislation mandating schooling. Children, when possible, chose work outside of school or left school when
they could, because they understood their greater duty to contribute to their family
structure (193).
The 1900 census showed that two million children worked in mines, mills, fields,
stores, factories, and on city streets (The National Archives and Records Administration). It was this statistic that ultimately sparked the American child-labor reform
movement. In 1904, a group of men and women concerned with the state of child
labor formed the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) in New York (The
National Child Labor Committee). In 1907, an Act of Congress chartered the group,
making it possible to push ahead with advocacy. The NCLC hired Lewis Hine in 1908
to travel and photograph working children. The photographs were used to “awaken
the consciousness of the nation.”
The record of the sixth annual conference of the NCLC shows the dialogue of
the committee focused on education as the only harmed aspect of the lives of child
farm workers. In discussing the situation of child migrant workers in Baltimore,
Miss Anna Herkner, assistant chief of the Maryland Bureau of Statistics and Information, stated that the children of Polish immigrants “work in canneries and on
farms. . . . The child labor law in Maryland permits them to work . . . until the middle
of October. It is usually November . . . [when] they begin going south. . . . We have
now children—many cases I know—who have never been to school” (Johnson 1910:
236). The chairman of the Committee on Child Labor in Home Industries and Street
Trades, Edward N. Clopper, said in his committee’s discussion (while describing
the ineffectiveness of Kentucky’s mandatory education law), “The rural schools are
open for six months, and as most roads are in very bad condition in the spring, the
session begins in July and ends some time in January.” He continued, “Farmers who
raise tobacco and other crops need the children, who are consequently deprived of
schooling. . . . We are going to try at this session of the legislature to improve the
compulsory education law with respect to rural districts” (Johnson 1910: 236–37).
The focus on the lack of education among child laborers over health concerns
was due to the fact that the American public and the advocates for child-labor
reform did not believe farm work was detrimental to a child’s health but was to
the child’s education. In fact, later on at the conference, while discussing children
laboring in tobacco fields, it was stated that children laboring in tobacco fields did
not experience labor that was “detrimental to their health, but the great wrong is
that during the period of childhood, they are practically deprived of an opportunity
for education” (Johnson 1910: 237).
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Photo 1. Photograph of Bibb Mill No. 1, Macon, GA, by Lewis Hine for the
National Child Labor Committee, 19 January 1909

Source: www.ourdocuments.gov. Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916 (1916). Accessed 15
December 2014. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=59

These discussions at the sixth conference highlight the three ideological fundamentalisms discussed by Effland. Clopper’s comment about how farmers needed
child labor shows the idea that child labor was necessary for economic survival for
farms and agricultural. The focus on education and the lack of belief that farm work is
detrimental to children’s health highlights the political and social ideological aspects
of society at the time. It was only due to the possibility of the child not being educated
that agricultural labor was even called into question. As previously discussed, education was viewed as necessary to producing contributing American citizens.
The conference proceedings and discussions provide ample evidence in favor of
John Bodnar’s assertion that the distilment of American values and beliefs was public officials and advocates’ primary focus (1985: 190). Many of the child laborers are
described by nationality, especially with regard to families’ tendencies to pull their
children from school. When discussing the Kentucky tobacco example, the unidentified moderator states, “A great many children do not go to school at all. These children in Kentucky are pure American stock; they are not foreigners . . . and these little
boys and girls are growing up in ignorance” (Johnson 1910: 237). With this mindset—
the Americanization of foreign immigrant children and the salvation from ignorance
of American and foreign children alike—the NCLC pushed forward with its agenda,
and in 1912, the Children’s Bureau was established. The bureau “investigated and
reported on matters related to the health and welfare of children” (United States
Department of Labor Chapter 1). With the Children’s Bureau now in play, the NCLC
pushed for child labor reform and compulsory education 1910–20 (The National
Child Labor Committee).
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The 1918 Supreme Court Ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart proved to be a large
legal blow to reformists when the court ruled that any federal restrictions banning
child labor were unconstitutional (The National Child Labor Committee). The case
was the result of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act (Kelly 1968: 320). This act was
passed in 1916 after a long effort from the NCLC and banned articles from being sold
in interstate commerce that were made by child labor (The National Archives and
Records Administration). More specifically, the law banned selling products from any
shop, cannery, or factory that had child employees under the age of fourteen, “from
any mine that employed children under the age of 16,” and from any sort of facility
where children under the age of sixteen worked for over eight hours a day or overnight. The legal basis for the law was the ability of the federal government to govern
interstate commerce with the purpose of regulating child labor. The court held the
law unconstitutional on the grounds that it overstepped the government’s power.
The ruling was a close vote with four of the nine justices voting the law constitutional
(Oyez Scholars, ITT Chicago-Kent College of Law 2014a).
The court’s opposition to regulating child labor marked the beginning of a twodecade struggle to pass restrictions on child labor. In the aftermath of Hammer v.
Dagenhart, Congress proposed a constitutional amendment to allow it the power
to restrict and regulate child labor (NARA). This amendment carried the name of
“The Child Labor Amendment.” Opponents of the amendment used multiple lines
of reasoning to oppose its passage. Opponents’ charges ranged from traditional
states’ rights arguments against increases in the power of the federal government
to accusations that the amendment was a communist-inspired plot to subvert the
Constitution (NARA). However, Hammer v. Dagenhart had to do with the manufacturing industry, as the defendant was the owner of mill, trying to defend his perceived right to employ his fourteen-year-old son despite the restriction laid down
by the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act (Oyez Scholars, ITT Chicago-Kent College of
Law 2014a). The case makes no reference to agricultural laborers; in fact, the KeatingOwen Child Labor Act also does not make reference to agricultural child laborers.
The wording in the bill prohibiting child laborers under the age of sixteen is: “any
mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated in the United
States” (NARA). Here we see that agricultural work was largely left out of the reform
debate (other than terms of education) and left out of landmark legislation to the
child-labor reform movement.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Hammer v. Dagenhart bears some
consideration. In it, he states that the question is not really whether or not Congress
has, or should have, the power to regulate commerce. He states that child labor is
“evil.” He also states:
But I had thought that the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist
in some cases was for the consideration of Congress alone, and that this Court
always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of policy
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or morals. It is not for this Court to pronounce when prohibition is necessary to
regulation—if it ever may be necessary—to say that it is permissible as against
strong drink, but not as against the product of ruined lives. (Legal Information
Institute, Cornell University Law School)
The rhetoric surrounding child labor changed somewhere between the sixth conference of the NCLC in 1910 and the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in 1918. The
descriptions of child labor had tended toward the side of describing the practice as
evil. They use the word “evil” in the minutes of the sixth conference of the NCLC,
but by 1918, the wording had gone from a group of activists promoting their cause to
entering the very dialogue of the Supreme Court. Despite the influence of activists in
labor reform, there was still a lack of perceived need for reform in agriculture beyond
mandatory school attendance laws.
Despite the setback of the loss of Hammer v. Dagenhart, labor reform advocates
pushed forward. A decade after, the U.S. economy fell and the Great Depression hit.
In 1933, President Roosevelt came into office and with him the promise of the New
Deal. President Roosevelt developed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
which united businesses in an effort to create stability (Grossman 1978). Part of the
agreement was that businesses would not hire youth under the age of sixteen, with
some exceptions. It was expected that “patriotic Americans” would only buy from
participating businesses. President Roosevelt, in his notes to a speech given before
Congress, wrote that if child labor could be eliminated, then more Americans could
have employment (Roosevelt 1938: vol. 2, p. 205). Again, agricultural child laborers
were left out of the dialogue.
The public papers of President Roosevelt reflect the ongoing battle regarding
child labor in the beginning of his presidency. In agreement with the public perception of child labor, on 9 July 1933, Roosevelt hailed the abolishment of child labor in
the cotton industry, saying, “This ancient atrocity went out in a day” (Roosevelt 1938:
vol. 2, p. 275). In a nod to the educational concerns of labor reform activists, the president addressed Vassar College in August 1933 and told the students about the children
he had met who were just “little bits and things,” and how they had told him that
employment kept them out of school (Roosevelt 1938: vol. 2, p. 341).
President Roosevelt’s stance on child labor remained consistent throughout his
presidency despite the Supreme Court’s decision to repeal the NIRA in 1935 (Grossman 1978). Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States challenged the provision in the
NIRA that the president could approve “fair codes of competition” for industries;
the court ruled in favor of Schechter Poultry Corp., 9-0 (Oyez Scholars, ITT ChicagoKent College of Law 2014b). In addition to this ruling, the state invalidated federal
and state labor laws (Grossman 1978).
Change occurred in 1937 when Justice Owen Roberts voted with the four man
liberal minority of the court in favor of Elsie Parrish in West Coast Hotel Company
v. Parrish (Grossman 1978). She was suing for back wages as the hotel had paid her
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less than the state of Washington’s minimum wage. This ruling helped to stem the
tide of change that President Roosevelt threatened on the court for its uncooperativeness in Depression-era reform. Grossman identifies this switch as a turning point in
American legal history and American social history because “it marked a new legal
attitude toward labor standards.” This decision encouraged labor reform advocates
to develop something that the Supreme Court would not throw out.
President Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins began developing such a
bill in 1933 upon her apportionment (Grossman 1978). When the Supreme Court shot
down the NIRA in 1935, Secretary Perkins had Department of Labor lawyers write
two wage-hour and child-labor bills that had a chance of withstanding Supreme Court
review. One of the bills was a general fair-labor standards act. The bill took nearly four
years to complete. The bill got lost for a while in Congress by opponents to labor reform,
but President Roosevelt grew angry. Child labor, he said, “has a serious effect on buying
power” (Grossman 1978). The bill, after revisions, went before Congress again in 1938
and, with a significant struggle, passed through and on to the president to be signed.
The FLSA prohibited child labor in manufacturing and mining industries for
children under the age of sixteen (United States Department of Labor, Chapter 2, p.
4). Children aged fourteen and fifteen were allowed employment in occupations in
industries other than manufacturing or mining if the Secretary of Labor deemed that
the employment did not interfere with schooling. If the child was working on the
family farm, then there was no age restriction set. “Children working on farms owned
or operated by a parent are completely exempt from Federal agricultural child labor
provisions” (4).
Agriculture was almost entirely excluded from the debate on child labor reform.
As previously discussed, the educational concerns of American and immigrant children drove restrictions to ensure the children received schooling. However, the restrictions set in the FLSA with regard to child labor in agriculture are the same restrictions
that apply at the federal level (with later amendments).
Contemporary Child Labor Reform
The United States Department of Labor web site states that farms are a commonly accepted ideal setting to raise children: “Growing up on the family farm,
learning the value of hard work in the fresh air, is still viewed by many as the perfect childhood. Federal and State child labor laws . . . reflect this benefit” (United
States Department of Labor). This statement provides the justification for why
minors who work in agriculture are exempt from restrictions that apply to minors
working in other industries: romanticized American agriculture.
Despite this traditional justification for agricultural exemptions, only 10 percent of migrant farm workers graduate high school (National Farm Worker Ministry). The United States Department of Labor reports similarly alarming statistics. Of
minor teens who work in agriculture, “fewer than half [47 percent] were attending
school at a grade level corresponding to their age, 15 percent were in school but
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behind in grade [levels], and 37 percent were drop-outs who did not have a high
school diploma” (United States Department of Labor, Chapter 5, p. 54).
In 2011, the Department of Labor proposed changes to the agricultural labor
laws that would restrict minors under that age of sixteen and eighteen; these
changes were withdrawn in 2012, a move widely criticized as an attempt to gain
favor and votes for the Obama administration from farmers and Republicans during the 2012 reelection (American Horse Council 2012). The American Horse Council, an agricultural interest group in Washington, opposed the change, citing the
prevention of “young people from becoming involved in agriculture, and would
negatively impact family farms and ranches.” Perhaps the biggest voice against the
change came in the form of the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), which is
a large lobbyist group dedicated to preserving the rights of large, corporate farms
down to small, family farms (Shearn 2012). The AFBF opposed the Department
of Labor’s proposed changes, stating that the decision to withdraw the proposed
changes was a “positive step” and any changes going forward must “not infringe
on the traditional rights of family farms and not unnecessarily restrict the ability of
young people to work in agriculture. As DOL’s proposed rule stands currently, that
is not the case” (American Farm Bureau Federation 2012). The voices against child
labor reform in agriculture on Capitol Hill often have large resources to push their
agenda (Fang 2012), as seen with the withdrawal of the proposed changes in 2012.
Any attempts at reform always exempt family farms from the legal restrictions
proposed. In the 1930s, when the FLSA was passed, the number of farms in the U.S.
Graph 1

Source: Plumer, Brad. 2012. After a seventy-year drop, small farms make a (small) comeback. Washington Post, October 2. Accessed 16 December 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2012/10/02/after-a-70-year-drop-farming-makes-a-small-comeback/.
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had experienced a small growth, moving from the lower half of 7 million total farms
to nearly 8 million farms (Plumer 2012).
The 1930s increase in farms, combined with traditional American ideology, may
well have contributed to the exclusion of stricter laws regarding minors working in
agriculture in the FLSA. As families during the Great Depression worked hard to make
ends meet, children may have been seen as a necessary part contributing to their family’s livelihood.
This line of reasoning leads to the question of whether or not the rise of corporations and commercial farming in the agricultural sector has grown significantly enough
in prevalence to warrant a massive reform of child-labor laws. To answer this question, I will turn to numbers provided by the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). The Economic Research Service for the USDA reports that in 2011, family
farms represented 97.6 percent of all U.S. farms (MacDonald 2014). These family farms
output 85 percent of all U.S. farm production.
Family-owned farms make up the majority of farming in the U.S., but the question remains of how many are working under corporations, and how many employ
minors that are not related to them. “Another 11.5 percent of U.S. farms, with 38.4
percent of production, are owned and operated by a family, but rely extensively on
labor provided by hired workers, contract workers, and other operators and their
families” (MacDonald 2014). The USDA’s web site identifies that nonfamily farms
represent 2.4 percent of the total number of farms in the U.S., making a number of
fifty-three thousand.
Though all of these statistics suggest that the number of children adversely affected
by the lack of stricter restrictions in child labor in the agricultural sector is minimal, lack
of reform may come down to the partisan divide in American politics and the continued need for unskilled labor in farming. The USDA’s web site states:
Agricultural production also usually requires localized knowledge, flexibility, and
the ability to quickly adapt to changes in the production environment . . . families
have been able to adjust their labor to the seasonality of farm production and to
reallocate their labor to other tasks on and off the farm to accommodate unexpected variability in agricultural production needs. (MacDonald 2014)
The localized knowledge mentioned and the flexibility and adaptability all indicate the
need for human labor. This is why family-owned farms are so prevalent in agriculture.
The USDA also acknowledged nonfamily farm corporations and businesses are often
formed on a model that closely resembles the family-farm model.
This information could imply the reason child labor reform in agriculture has
not been achieved is because the issue is not a prevalent one, as most farms are family operated. The National Center for Farmworker Health, Inc. cites that there is no
official data compiled that documents the number of children under the age of twelve
working on farms. Overall, the lack of statistics regarding children in agriculture is
frustrating at best. Human Rights Watch reports, “No one knows exactly how many
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children under the age of 18 are working in US agriculture” (Human Rights Watch
2010: 16). Of the numbers available, the United States Department of Labor does provide the following statistics, recreated in Table 1. The table details the percentage of
children of farmworkers and the percentage of those children who also participate in
farm work.
Table 1: Children of Farmworkers

Source: United States Department of Labor. 2000b. Chapter 5. Youth Employment in Agriculture. 2000. United States Department of Labor. Accessed 14 November 2014. http://www.bls.
gov/opub/rylf/pdf/chapter5.pdf.

A source of information more readily available is that of state child-labor laws.
Using the Department of Labor’s web site, I compiled a map (See Table 2) detailing
which states had laws higher than federal restrictions regarding the minimum age for
employment during school hours. These states are filled in as blue on the map. The
federal age during school hours is sixteen. The states with laws lower than the federal
restriction for employment during school hours are filled in as yellow on the map. Of
the blue states, New Mexico is the only state that has not imposed a maximum on the
number of days a minor may work in agriculture in a week (United States Department of Labor 2013).
I compared this map to the Electoral College results of the 2012 presidential election. Interestingly, the states that have imposed restriction higher than the federal levels were all Democratic-majorities or undecided. The states that have standards lower
than the federal voted republican or were undecided. The notable exceptions here
are Illinois (President Obama’s home state) and Massachusetts. Massachusetts allows
fourteen-year-olds to complete farm work with small hand tools and small tractors
if they have completed a required vocational training and can provide certification.
53

SIGMA
Nevada and North Dakota require no such vocational training for fourteen-year-olds
(United States Department of Labor 2013).
Table 2: Child Labor Laws in Agriculture

Source: United States Department of Labor. 2013. Wage and Hour Division (WHD). December.
Accessed 14 November 2014. http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/agriemp2.htm#. Map created
at http://diymaps.net/

This result provides a little basis for the partisan argument. Turning to the language used by republicans versus democrats in congressional debates sheds further
light on the issue. Two notable examples are Representative Tom Lantos (a democrat
from California) and Senator John Thune (a republican from South Dakota). In 1999,
Lantos argued against child fieldwork and raised the issue of reform in connection to
his bill the Young American Workers’ Bill of Rights Act. Some notable extracts from
his remarks are:
Children who work in agriculture often do so at the expense of their education . . . children working in agriculture receive less protection than children
working in other industries because of many outdated and outmoded exceptions included in our laws . . . As many as 800,000 children work in agriculture
in this country, picking the fruits and vegetables that end up in our grocery
stores, either as fresh or processed fruits and vegetables. (Cong. Rec. 1999: p.
145, pt. 20: 29066)
Here, the same sorts of concerns that were raised during the Progressive Movement
are brought to light again, namely education, the sheer number of workers, and the
hazard of the labor.
In contrast, Thune uses different language to illustrate his point. Some notable
extracts from his remarks are follows:
There seems to be a parallel universe to think that all of these various regulations and restrictions they would impose on young people working in agricul54
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ture wouldn’t undermine the very fabric, the very nature, the very foundation of
American agriculture . . . Farming and ranching is inherently a family enterprise.
Young people have contributed for generations in helping that family farm or
ranch operation survive and prosper . . . It is amazing to me, and incomprehensible, to think that bureaucrats in Washington, DC, could tell family farmers and
ranchers how to run their operations with the kind of detail and the incredible
prescription of these regulations and the very activities they would curtail for
young people. (Cong. Rec. 2012: p. 158, pt. 27: S895-S898)
The language used by Thune is reminiscent of the language that opponents to “The
Child Labor Amendment” used when they argued that the amendment promoted big
government and even communist ideology. Though he does not make any reference
to communism or Marxist ideals, Thune does imply that imposing further restrictions
on child labor in agriculture would be overstepping the bounds of the government, as
well as undermining American traditional values.

Strengths and Limitations

Defendants of continued child labor in the agrarian sector cite traditional childhood values as their main defense. Despite officials naming this argument, it may
not be true in terms of majority public opinion today. Instead, it may just serve as a
political argument federal politicians perpetuate on to the public. One further area of
exploration with regard to this topic should be a public opinion survey of a random
sample that attempts to measure the public view of child labor in the agricultural sector. Another further area of study should be whether the model that family-owned
farms use and perpetuate in commercial and corporate farming is the main reason
for poor treatment of child wage laborers who come from outside the owner’s family.
One of the benefits of a qualitative analysis is the ability to examine substantive
details. However, in this case, a quantitative analysis would be beneficial to measure
the effect of the factors identified through qualitative analysis and their significance
on labor policy. In order to test these hypotheses, I originally planned to perform a
cross-county analysis of two farming communities within the United States. However, I found the numbers needed to measure the dependent variable (the number
of children working in agriculture) do not exist. There are estimates but no definitive numbers of how many children are employed on farms. Instead, I turned to a
qualitative analysis of the historical factors affecting the child labor reform in other
industries and in federal law.
The evidence for the exclusion of agriculture at the time of the FLSA is stronger
than the evidence regarding the continued lack of reform in contemporary society.
This is due in part to the need of more in-depth research of congressional debates
surrounding proposed changes. This, combined with a cross-analysis of the speaker’s
ties to agricultural interests in their home state, would provide a better picture of
whether there are partisan ties or whether there is more support for reform from
states with smaller agricultural outputs.
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An alternative explanation not explored in this paper is the idea that the issue is
“out of sight” and, therefore, “out of mind.” Farming occurs on private property and
receives relatively little press. The public does not see the conditions youth workers
face, and other topics take the spotlight of media attention. For example, a perceived
influx in unaccompanied minors crossing the U.S.–Mexico border is a much more
discussed issue in Washington than a small number of youth worker deaths, even
though those deaths could be those of such minors. Because the problem occurs in
remote areas, it may be considered more of an abstract issue in a system with more
pressing problems.

Conclusion

This research helps us to understand why agriculture has not experienced the
extensive labor reform that other industries experienced earlier in the twentieth century. Human Rights Watch interviewed over a hundred minors working on tobacco
farms (Human Rights Watch, Tobacco’s Hidden Children, 2014). These interviews
serve as evidence that the children in agriculture are exposed to working conditions
that possibly violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN General Assembly 1989). However, the U.S. has not ratified this treaty, meaning there is no clear
venue to internationally pressure the conditions under which children work in agriculture in the United States. Understanding the variables that have affected the lack
of restriction of children in agriculture will provide a better pathway to understanding how to reform legislation. Though there are numerous limitations to my analysis,
including weak evidence for both of my arguments, the evidence provided in this
paper serves as a building block toward a better understanding of the important elements and aspects of child labor reform in the United States.
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United States—Chile Bilateral Free
Trade Act
by Jake Berlin

Introduction

Since the formation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947,
world trade has increased exponentially, leading to unprecedented economic growth
and prosperity throughout the world. The elimination of nontariff barriers (NTB’s) and
the reduction of tariffs throughout the world have allowed world trade and wealth to
flow effectively from one country to another guided by the “invisible hand” of economic liberalism. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which led to the creation
of a formal World Trade Organization (WTO), was seen by many as evidence pointing
to continued progress toward trade liberalization throughout the world. In contrast to
previous decades, recent developments have stalled further rounds of negotiation at
the WTO, casting doubt on the ability of the WTO to effectively continue the reduction
of trade barriers.
Lack of progress on a global scale has prompted many countries, such as the U.S.,
to turn to bilateral free-trade agreements to achieve their goals of trade liberalization. Indeed, the last several decades have seen a proliferation of bilateral free-trade
agreements. Data from the WTO database lists 221 bilateral free-trade agreements
that are currently in force, the vast majority of which have been signed within the last
fifteen years (WTO.org). Scholarly opinions are mixed about the implications of such
deals on the overall growth of world trade. Some scholars emphasize that bilateral
and regional deals are a viable second-best option to multilateral negotiations and
that such deals often promote successful negotiations at the WTO (Griswold 2003).
Other scholars argue that bilateral/regional deals divert trade, distract from multilateral deals, and often involve countries with asymmetrical bargaining power, thereby
allowing the more powerful industrialized states to manipulate such deals to their
advantage (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2003).
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Overview of the U.S.–Chile FTA

One of the first bilateral agreements that involved the U.S. was the 2003 U.S.–
Chile Free Trade Agreement, which was signed on 6 June 2003 (Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative). The agreement included provisions on a wide variety of topics dealing
with trade in goods and services. The key element of the agreement was the elimination of all tariffs on goods traded between the U.S. and Chile. Eighty-five percent of
the tariffs on industrial and manufactured goods were eliminated immediately, and the
rest were phased out within a period of four years (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2003). The agreement also covered agricultural products such as fresh fruit
and wine. Seventy-five percent of U.S. farm exports to Chile became tariff free within
four years after the agreement was signed, and the rest were to become duty-free
within twelve years of the signing. Ninety-five percent of Chilean exports to the U.S.
also received tariff-free status with the signing of the agreement, with the remaining
5 percent of goods scheduled to become tariff free within a period of twelve years
(Hornbeck 2003: 2).
Other important, and some of the most controversial, aspects of the agreement
are provisions concerning environmental and labor-standards issues. The agreement encourages increased cooperation between the U.S. and Chile on these matters,
including several joint environmental projects on topics ranging from wildlife protection to finding safer alternatives for environmentally hazardous chemicals (Office of
the U.S. trade representative 2002). The agreement also calls for upholding the existing regulations in each country and for abiding by ILO (International Labor Organization) standards. Despite these provisions, labor rights advocates from the Labor
Advisory Committee (LAC) and other labor-rights groups criticized the agreement
for not having sufficient enforcement powers and for being a “big step backwards”
from the labor rights provisions in the U.S.–Jordan Free Trade Agreement that was
signed in 2000 (Bolle 2003: 3).
The negotiation of the U.S.–Chile FTA was an extensive process lasting over two
years.1 On 29 November 2000, President George W. Bush notified Congress about his
desires to negotiate an FTA with Chile, and negotiations began on 6 December 2000
(Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Fact Sheet 2002). There were fourteen negotiating rounds that culminated in June 2003, when the agreement was signed in Miami,
Florida, by Robert Zoellick, U.S. trade representative, and Chilean Foreign Minister
Soledad Alvear (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2003). The agreement was
signed by President Bush on 3 September 2003, after passing the House on 24 July
2003 and the Senate on 31 July 2003 (Govtrack.us). The bill entered into effect on 1
January 2004 (Hornbeck 2003). Voting in both the House and the Senate reflected a
partisan divide. In the House, the bill passed with a vote of 270-156 and, of those who
opposed the bill, 128 were Democrats (Govtrack.us). In the Senate, the bill passed
65-32 (with three senators who abstained from voting), and once again twenty-four
of the opposing votes came from Democratic senators (Govtrack.us). 2
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In 2002, Congress passed the Bi-Partisan Trade Promotion Authority Act effectively granting fast-track authority to President Bush, which allowed him (or his representatives) to directly negotiate trade deals with foreign countries whenever he felt
that a tariff “had a negative effect on the U.S. economy” (Congress 2002). The passing
of the 2002 Trade Act was vital to the completion of the U.S.–Chile FTA because it consolidated negotiating power within the executive branch. Without fast-track authority, it is likely that the U.S.–Chile FTA never would have come to fruition. The 2002
Trade Act also marked an important compromise between Democrats and Republicans on the inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in trade agreements,
which set the stage for many of the political battles involved in the U.S.–Chile FTA.

Why a U.S.–Chile FTA?

Economics and politics have always been intricately related, and this statement is
true with regard to the complex global economy that has developed in the twentyfirst century. Although the U.S.–Chile FTA certainly has significant economic implications, the overall economic benefit to the U.S. is merely another drop of water in
the vast ocean of the economy of the United States. The estimated economic benefit of the FTA is $4.2 billion dollars—an impressive figure when measured in absolute terms, but one which equates to only about .04 percent of U.S. economic output
(Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Fact Sheet 2002: 10). Pure economics fail to
explain why the U.S. would invest such a considerable amount of time and effort into
an FTA with Chile, especially in the face of opposition from labor, environmental, and
anti-globalization groups, and the occurrence of other important political developments such as the War on Terror and the Doha round of negotiations at the WTO.
There were other countries far more important to the U.S. in terms of overall trade,3
and in order to fully understand the motivations behind the agreement, one must
examine the political side of the issue.
In Richard Feinberg’s article “The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade
Arrangements,” Feinberg highlights four political motivations for the U.S. to pursue
FTAs: 1) to open markets for U.S. traders and investors (“asymmetric reciprocity”),
2) to serve as a precedent or catalyst for wider trade agreements, 3) to reward and
support countries for Democratic and market-oriented reform, and 4) to strengthen
strategic partnerships (2003: 1020). The rationale behind the U.S.–Chile FTA is best
understood by examining these political motivations rather than focusing on the economic benefits offered by a bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Chile.4
The political reasoning for the U.S.–Chile FTA coincides neatly with the first
three motivations listed by Feinberg. The second motivation, to use FTAs as a template and catalyst for wider trade agreements, is especially applicable in this case. The
U.S.–Chile FTA went hand in hand with the Bush administration’s focus on increasing trade liberalization and forming a hemisphere-wide FTA. The lucrative dream of
a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) was one of Bush’s primary economic
and foreign policy goals, and many viewed the U.S.–Chile FTA as a possible pre61
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cursor to a much larger regional agreement (Becker 2002). In addition, the deal was
struck at the beginning of the Doha round of WTO negotiations, sending a message to
other countries that the U.S. was willing to pursue free trade through bilateral deals
if foreign countries were unwilling to cooperate at a global level.
At the start of Bush’s presidency in 2001, the only U.S. FTA in force (apart from
the NAFTA agreement) was with the economically unimportant but politically salient
Israel. At the end of the year, an FTA with Jordan was signed. Once again, the economic benefits of the treaty were marginal, but the potential national security benefits
were substantial due to Jordan’s strategic location in the Middle East. The U.S.–Chile
FTA follows the pattern of other bilateral trade deals signed by the U.S. by virtue of
the fact that it was signed as much for political reasons as economic ones.
In summary, several factors help explain the rationale behind the FTA with Chile,
namely: President Bush’s desire to establish an FTAA in the Western Hemisphere
while simultaneously applying pressure to advance the Doha round of negotiations
at the WTO, U.S. desire to support liberal democracy and market reform in Latin
America, and, to a lesser extent, U.S. exporters’ interest in gaining access to a growing
Chilean market and consumers’ desires for cheaper Chilean imports. These factors
generated a sufficiently strong consensus in favor of the agreement allowing for its
passage in spite of opposition from interest groups. This paper will attempt to examine each of these factors in greater detail in order to explain the political struggles and
decision-making processes that culminated in the U.S.–Chile FTA.

Political Support for the U.S.–Chile FTA

The roots of the U.S.–Chile bilateral free-trade act run deep. As early as 1991,
U.S. and Chilean officials initiated a discussion concerning a free-trade agreement
between the two countries (Blustein 2002). In 1995, there was a congressional hearing on whether to include Chile in the landmark NAFTA agreement signed between
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico (House Ways and Means Committee). The NAFTA
proposition never really gained steam, and for several years there was little progress
toward a bilateral deal involving the U.S. and Chile. In order to understand the delay
in reaching a free-trade agreement with Chile, one must examine the domestic political struggles between Congress and the executive branch and the importance of presidential trade promotion authority. Important changes in the international economic
environment also increased support for the passage of the U.S. Chile Free Trade Act.
President Bush was not unique or original in his desires to promote trade
between the U.S. and Latin America. It was President Clinton who first had aspirations of forming a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (Bhagwati 1997), but those
aspirations were shattered when Congress refused to grant him fast-track negotiating
authority. Charlene Barshefsky, the U.S. trade representative under Clinton, remarked
that he was “empty-handed” in Latin American trade negotiations without fast-track
authority (Bhagwati 1997). Interestingly, it was congressional Democrats who failed
to support Clinton in his desire for fast-track authority due to their concerns that
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Clinton’s proposed trade deals would not provide, “adequate protection for workers
and the environment” (Broder 1998). His efforts were also limited by partisan opposition exacerbated by the fact that Republicans had taken control of both the House and
the Senate in the “Republican Revolution” of 1994. Ultimately, Congress’ refusal to
grant President Clinton trade-promotion authority stymied his efforts to conclude a
free trade agreement with Chile (Feinberg 2003: 21).
The Republican electoral victory in 2000 and the ascension of George W. Bush to
the presidency reopened the door for continued progress toward an FTA with Chile.
Bush was elected on a platform that included the goal of expanding free trade multilaterally as well as regionally, and many of Bush’s first important foreign policy initiatives were aimed at expanding free trade and American political influence. Writer
Paul Blustein highlights the importance of a U.S.–Chile FTA for the Bush administration’s foreign-policy objectives, explaining that despite the small economic benefits
offered by bilateral deals, “the administration is aggressively pursuing them nonetheless as a device for cementing ties with certain nations and as part of an overall
strategy aimed at lowering trade barriers worldwide” (2002).
This strategy was known as “competitive liberalization.” The basic logic behind
the strategy was that by signing bilateral or regional agreements, the U.S. would
put pressure on other countries to engage in trade negotiations and the reduction of
trade barriers if they wanted to remain competitive with exports to the lucrative U.S.
market (Feinberg 2003). This strategy became especially important as negotiations at
the Doha round of WTO talks bogged down over concerns about intellectual property rights and agricultural products. U.S. leaders hoped to increase their bargaining
advantage at the WTO by establishing more limited regional and bilateral agreements,
and the U.S.–Chile FTA was seen as an important stepping-stone in this process.
The overall success of the NAFTA agreement prompted U.S. leaders like Bush
and Zoellick to push toward their dream of forging a Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA) that would encompass virtually all of the countries in the Western
Hemisphere (with the obvious exception of Cuba). The economic gains from such an
agreement would be staggering and would provide the U.S. with even closer political
ties (and possibly increased control through economic leverage) with its Latin American neighbors. Similar to Clinton’s aspirations, the creation of an FTAA constituted
one of Bush’s foremost economic goals. In remarks he gave to the Organization of
American States prior to a summit meeting in Quebec, Bush declared:
We must affirm our commitment to complete negotiations on the free trade area
of the Americas by January, 2005. Nothing we do [at the trade meeting] in Quebec will be more important or have a greater long-term impact. It will make our
hemisphere the largest free trade area in the world, encompassing 34 countries
and 800 million people. (Gpo.gov 2001)
To accomplish this important foreign policy objective, Bush appointed Zoellick as the
U.S. Trade representative. Zoellick had been involved in previous trade negotiations
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with Chile during the first Bush administration, and this experience made him an ideal
candidate to work on reaching a trade agreement with Chile (Blustein 2002). After his
appointment, Zoellick immediately began working to hammer out free trade deals
with several countries (including Chile) in hopes that these deals would pave the way
toward an FTAA.
In his first State of the Union address, President Bush declared, “Give me the
strong hand of presidential trade promotion authority . . . and do so quickly” (Sek
2003: 5). On 6 August 2002, his wish was granted by the Trade Act of 2002 after a narrow 215-212 vote in the House and a 64-34 vote in the Senate that took place on 26
July (Sek 2003). Prior votes on provisions to the language of the bill concerning labor
and environmental standards were hotly contested in the House with strong partisan
divisions. Democrats wanted to ensure that labor and environmental concerns would
not be ignored in trade negotiations, and the necessary number of votes could not be
obtained until Republicans agreed to enshrine these provisions in the bill granting
presidential trade-promotion authority. After receiving trade-promotion authority,
negotiations proceeded at an accelerated pace and were concluded on 11 December
2002 (Hornbeck 2003).
The shocking events of 9/11 and the ensuing wars with Iraq and Afghanistan
caused U.S. foreign policy priorities to shift dramatically. In general, there was little Latin American support for the wars, and progress toward an FTAA stalled. The
U.S. hinted at delaying the passing of the U.S.–Chile FTA in order to prod Chilean
officials into supporting the War on Terror (Blustein 2003). Bush and Zoellick were
determined not to lose their chance at forming an American free-trade area. And, “in
an attempt to re-insert itself in regional trade circles, the administration consented
to sign the agreement” (Angrisani 2003: 83). The U.S.–Chile FTA may be viewed as a
preliminary stepping stone toward the greater goal of creating an FTAA, and there
was hope that the agreement would serve as a template for future trade deals and as
a catalyst to spur progress in the Doha round trade talks.
From an economic perspective, the rationale for the agreement comes from the
fact that Chile had (and continues to have) one of the fastest-growing and most highly
developed economies in all of Latin America, and the agreement allowed U.S. exporters greater access to this market. It also provided U.S. consumers with lower prices on
key Chilean exports such as copper, wine, and agricultural products (Hornbeck 2003:
8). Furthermore, there was concern that if an FTA with Chile was not established, U.S.
firms would fail to compete effectively in the Chilean market with firms from Canada,
Mexico, or other Latin American countries—all of whom already had free-trade agreements in place with Chile (Hornbeck 2003: 2). Although, as I have mentioned previously, the economic benefits of the U.S.–Chile FTA were only of secondary importance.
From an ideological perspective, the U.S.–Chile FTA may also be viewed as a statement by the U.S. in support of democracy and economic liberalism. Since the dark days
of the dictator Augusto Pinochet, Chile had made great strides in establishing a gener64
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ally fair and representative Democratic government and in opening herself to world
markets. The Chilean government pursued policies to promote export-led growth and
to protect the property rights and civil liberties of Chilean citizens. Chile also had demonstrated sound macroeconomic management, and many U.S. officials viewed Chile
as “a model for Latin America” and other developing countries throughout the world
(Mares and Aravena 2001: xv preface).5 At a time when the U.S. was actively promoting and defending the ideals of political and economic liberty, the agreement may be
understood as a message to the world that the U.S. was willing to reward developing
countries that made social and economic progress by following the guiding principles
of American political and economic ideology.
FTAs with larger countries such as Argentina or Brazil would have allowed the
U.S. to reap larger economic benefits, but, once again, political motives trumped economic ones. The conservative nature of the Chilean government from both a political
and economic standpoint made it an appealing candidate for a free-trade agreement
especially when contrasted with other Latin American countries such as Argentina,
which had suffered disastrous inflation throughout much of the 1990s. The Chilean
government was also more willing to engage the U.S. in trade talks than other leftleaning governments.6
In his remarks during the signing ceremony of the U.S.–Chile FTA, President Bush
elaborated on the supposed connection between free trade and the spread of democracy, saying, “The growth of economic freedom and ownership in developing countries creates the habits of liberty and creates the pressure for democracy and political
reform” (Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 2003). He also stated repeatedly
that the economic benefits associated with free trade, including job creation, cheaper
imports, and increased living standards for citizens of all the nations involved. While
scholars and policy makers may debate whether bilateral FTAs really bring about such
benefits, it is important to note that the Bush administration believed in the benefits of
free trade and pursued policies in accordance with that belief.

Political Opposition to the Agreement

The opposition to the U.S.–Chile FTA was championed by various environmentaland labor-rights groups who felt that the agreement failed to impose sufficient environmental and labor standards. One of the most prominent of these groups, and one that
characterizes the sentiments shared by various other individuals and groups in opposition to the U.S.–Chile FTA, was Citizens Trade Campaign, a group originally founded
in opposition to the NAFTA agreement that seeks to establish “social and environmental justice in trade policy” (citizenstrade.org). In general, organizations like Citizens
Trade Campaign oppose FTAs due to their belief that such agreements lead to resource
depletion, competitive deregulation, increased inequality, and the unfair exploitation
of labor.
Environmentalists raised fears that the agreement would force Chile to rely
even more on the exportation of nonrenewable natural resources such as copper and
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other minerals in order to generate wealth. Exports such as copper, fish, and lumber
constitute a very large percentage of Chilean GDP, and those opposed to the agreement argued that it would exacerbate Chile’s dependence on such products, leading
to the eventual depletion of precious natural resources. Labor standards were also
a point of contention, and labor-rights groups voiced concerns that the U.S.–Chile
FTA would increase the already substantial income gap between the richest Chileans
and the average Chilean citizen. Labor unions (primarily the AFL-CIO) also argued
that the agreement should contain stricter provisions regarding labor standards that
would eliminate the possibility of either the U.S. or Chile lowering their standards in
order to gain comparative advantage (Hornbeck 2003: 13).
In reality, concerns about the labor standards provisions of the U.S.–Chile FTA
lacked a strong foundation due to the fact that Chile had a strong record of compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO) standards and had made great
strides in increasing protection and benefits for workers. Many of those opposed to
the agreement recognized this, but their greatest concern was that while the looser
terms of the agreement may have been sufficient for Chile, the agreement would not
work as a template for future deals with other Latin American countries that had a
much shakier track record of upholding adequate labor standards (Hornbeck 2003: 17).
Interest groups and labor unions generally had little influence over the actual
negotiating process. The Trade Act of 2002 had consolidated negotiating power within
the executive branch and specifically within the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Positions within the trade office are given by appointment rather than by direct
election, thus insulating the members of the trade office from the influence of interest
groups. Furthermore, the typical difficulties presented by collective action logic were
mitigated by the 2002 Trade Act. Bush and Zoellick had little reason to worry about a
negative response from several relatively small groups throughout the country given
the fact that they represented the interests of a much broader constituency. Plus, in
Bush’s opinion, the potential economic gains of an FTAA dwarfed environmental or
labor rights concerns, and the U.S.–Chile FTA was a key step in achieving his longterm trade policy goals. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. public attention
was fixed firmly on the Middle East and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
negotiation of the U.S.–Chile FTA was merely a side note to the upheavals of the time,
which frustrated any attempts at arousing widespread public opposition to the agreement. Lack of public concern and most importantly the central negotiating power of
the executive branch allowed negotiations to proceed fairly smoothly and without
much interference from the interest groups opposed to the agreement.
After the agreement was signed, pro-environmental and pro-labor groups
turned their efforts toward Congress, yet once again their success was only marginal.
Congressional Republicans overwhelmingly supported Bush and the FTA, as can be
seen by the voting records in both the House and the Senate (Govtrack.us). And by
granting Bush fast-track negotiating authority, many Democrats had already voiced
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their support of free trade expansion in general, and the fiercest political battles had
already been fought. Politicians from both parties were backed on this issue by the
multitude of American Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and export-oriented
firms which formed a key part of the constituencies of most congressman. Fears about
environmental degradation and labor exploitation were assuaged by Chile’s strong
record of progress in both areas and by their commitment to abide by international
standards. All of these factors combined led to a relatively easy passage of the U.S.–
Chile FTA.
The opposition’s greatest success came from their ability to force the U.S. Trade
Office to recognize that the specific provisions of the agreement could not serve as
a framework for future FTA’s with other Latin American countries. Various members of Congress voiced this opinion arguing that the loose terms of the agreement
were likely sufficient for Chile but would be unacceptable for many other developing countries (Congressional Record 2003). Advocates of the agreement were compelled to compromise on this issue in order to receive the necessary votes for the
agreement to pass the House and the Senate.

Evaluating the Effects of the U.S.–Chile FTA

It has now been more than a decade since the U.S.–Chile FTA entered into force,
and by next year, the full effects of all tariff reductions should be felt according to a
study performed by the United States International Trade Commission (Hornberg
2003). An in-depth analysis of the effects of the agreement lies beyond the scope of
this paper, but a brief examination of some of the political and economic repercussions
of the agreement is warranted. From 2003 to 2012, U.S. exports to Chile increased by
a staggering 600 percent, and Chile went from being the thirty-fifth largest export
market for the U.S. to being the nineteenth largest export market (White House Press
Secretary 2013). Chilean exports to the U.S. have also increased by nearly 150 percent over the same time period. The unemployment rate in Chile was slightly below
8.5 percent in January 2004 and is currently hovering around 6 percent (National
Institute of Statistics, Chile). The unemployment rate in the U.S. was 5.7 percent in
January 2004 and was at 5.7 percent in January 2015 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Considering that trade with Chile constitutes a very small portion of the total U.S.
economic output, it is unsurprising that the U.S.–Chile FTA has had little impact on
U.S. employment rates. Judging by the large increases in total trade between the two
countries and the reduction of unemployment in Chile, it appears the agreement has
delivered many of the expected economic benefits without damaging job prospects
for Chilean workers.
The Chilean mining industry, which provides the bulk of Chilean export revenues,
has enjoyed continued strong growth, leading to possibilities for the expansion of mines
in some areas. But expansion creates a risk of additional of environmental degradation.
Concerns have been raised over water depletion in northern Chile, which is home to
some of the world’s largest copper reserves as well as the world’s driest desert—the
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Atacama (Jarroud 2013). It is difficult to draw a direct causal link between the U.S.–Chile
FTA and environmental problems in Chile considering all of Chile’s environmental concerns existed before the agreement was signed. Furthermore, Chile has signed FTAs with
a number of countries, including Canada and the EU, so any environmental problems
due to trade-based economic expansion can only be partially due to the U.S.–Chile FTA.
A study published in 2011 compared Chilean labor laws with those in the
U.S. and found that “Chile currently imposes more labor regulations in some
areas (e.g., termination and severance pay, minimum wages and overtime), while
other aspects of labor law (i.e., unemployment compensation) seem to be similar
to that of the U.S.” (Pattison and Mogab 2011). Chile has also worked to ensure
that its fruit export industry complies with GLOBALG.A.P. certification standards
to ensure fair treatment of labor, but some concerns over the rights of seasonal
workers persist (Bain 2010). Based on these findings, concerns over the potential
exploitation of workers in Chile due to economic pressures appear vastly overexaggerated and insignificant. Overall, evidence suggests that the U.S.–Chile FTA
has had marginal economic effects in the U.S. and produced substantial economic
benefits in Chile. Activists’ concerns about the environment and labor standards
also appear to have been largely avoided.

Conclusion

The U.S.–Chile Bilateral FTA came about primarily due to the Bush administration’s hope that it would serve as a precursor to an FTAA, which would increase the
economic welfare of the country and provide the U.S. enhanced leverage to bargain at
the WTO. In addition, the agreement can be viewed as a move by the U.S. to promote
and reward the spread of democracy and liberal economic principles throughout the
world. The trade promotion authority granted by the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 allowed
officials in the U.S. Trade Office to negotiate much more effectively and severely
restricted the effectiveness of interest groups opposed to the agreement. The dramatic events of 9/11 relegated the U.S.–Chile FTA to the background of U.S. public
consciousness, which further limited interest groups’ ability to mobilize widespread
public opposition to the agreement and enhanced the centralized negotiating power
of President Bush and U.S. Trade Office representatives. Congressional Republicans
strongly supported the agreement due to the potential economic gains it provided,
and many Democrats pledged their support as well after their concerns over labor and
environmental standards were assuaged.
The passing of the U.S.–Chile FTA clearly shows how domestic political developments influence international trade flows and the global economy in general.
Many realist and neoliberal theories of Intellectual Property Enforcement (IPE)
treat states as unitary actors that act out of their own self-interest. While these theories may be helpful for understanding the overall structure of the world economy,
they neglect the influence of domestic political factors on specific policy decisions.
Scholars of international political economy should always take into account these
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domestic factors and how they shape the complex global economy as they analyze
international economic developments.
NOTES

1. Previous talks about a bilateral FTA with Chile or even including Chile in the NAFTA agreement
took place during the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration.

2. Due to Congress’s granting of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to Bush in 2002, the U.S.–

Chile was treated as a Congressional Executive Agreement (CEA) rather than as a formal

treaty. CEAs are subject to a straight up and down vote in the Senate rather than a two-third
majority. For more information, see page 78 of the Congressional Research Service report on
treaties and international agreements cited in the references list.

3. At the time the agreement was being negotiated, Chile was the U.S.’s thirty-fourth largest
export destination and thirty-sixth largest import contributor (Hornbeck 2003: 8).

4. Some would argue that preferential FTAs actually have negative economic consequences. For
a further discussion of this topic, see Bhagwati, Jagdish. Termites in the Trading System: How
Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade. Oxford University Press, 2008.

5. For a more detailed analysis of Chile’s economic reforms see pages 3–8 of John Hornbeck’s
CRS report for Congress cited in the works cited list.

6. In all honesty, Chile probably did more to initiate trade negotiations than either the Clinton
or the Bush administrations, but this paper focuses on the FTA from the U.S. perspective. See
Feinberg 2003: 1025.
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An Analysis of the Predictive
Ability of Political Psychological
Theory: A Case Study of President
Clinton’s Behavior in Bosnia
by Madeline Ary

Introduction

Why does the U.S. sometimes choose to intervene in international conflicts? Can
the political decisions of a leader be profiled? In order to address these questions, this
study analyzes the case study of the Bosnian civil war and the decisions President Bill
Clinton made to escalate intervention measures in the region until the Dayton Peace
Accords in 1995. To accomplish this analysis, the psychological theory of international
relations, specifically operational code theory, will be applied. Overall, this analysis
concludes that the psychological and instrumental beliefs held by President Clinton
had an impact on U.S. foreign policy pertaining to Bosnia.
Psychological theorists Brian Ripley and R.C. Snyder theorize that we cannot
assume states have “well-defined interests” as presupposed in realist theory. Rather,
we must look to the “beliefs, values, and goals of decision-making elites, who act as the
state in foreign policy” (Ripley 1993: 466). They believe understanding this ethical “psychological theory” is crucial to comprehending U.S. foreign policy. Political psychology
theory is driven by Kenneth Waltz’s “first level of analysis,” meaning the individual
person. This level of analysis does not take into account national and international factors, with the exception of assessing how broader factors might have an effect directly
on the psychology of the individual (Waltz 1959: 19).
Waltz’s political psychology theory encompasses a number of smaller theories,
which include cognitive process, decision making, and political cognition theory. In
the middle of the twentieth century, many academics focused primarily on discovering
particular personality traits of political leaders in order to predict their foreign policy
decisions. Later, the focus of studies shifted to “perception, cognition, and information
processing” (Shapiro 1973: 124). Similarly, this analysis will follow the guidelines of
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process, tracing President Clinton’s decisions concerning U.S. interference in Bosnia
using a synthesis of political psychology theories.
The operational code analysis theory is an outgrowth of perception, cognition,
and information processing from contemporary psychological theory (Schafer and
Walker 2006). This theory will be emphasized to explain foreign policy choices by
analyzing the “operational code” of the president. An operational code is an approach
to studying political leaders’ sets of political beliefs embedded in their personalities
that then shape their notions for correct strategy and tactics (George 1980: 486; Post
2003: 216). Alexander George, a renowned scholar, developed an operational code for
political psychology in 1969. This code is composed of a set of ten research questions
divided into two categories: instrumental belief and philosophical belief (Walker
1990: 409). The philosophical beliefs refer to “those [beliefs] that provide information
about the subject’s beliefs regarding the nature of politics and other actors in the political universe” (Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 33). Instrumental beliefs are those
beliefs that describe how the leader believes one should act to achieve political goals
(Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 4). President Clinton’s decisions regarding Bosnia
will be analyzed using these questions, which is similar to the format employed by
Walker, Schafer, and Young in their book Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis.
George’s operational code includes the following research questions:
Philosophical Beliefs
1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially
one of harmony or of conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values
and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score
and in what respects to the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development?
What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?
Instrumental Beliefs
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
Schafer, Walker, and Young’s operational code analysis used data derived from
sixteen speeches given by Clinton during his presidency (quoted in Post 2003: 324).
However, because these authors used the president’s speeches to derive the operational
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code, they could not necessarily control for rhetorical devices like exaggeration, intentionally obscure language, etc. More importantly, it is almost impossible for anyone to
accurately ascertain what motivates someone else, as they cannot literally read minds.
However, even with these limitations, their operational code is thorough, and it draws
some conclusions that seem to fit with this analysis of the data on the Bosnian crisis.
According to this theory, it should be possible to draw a straight line, or correlation, between the operational code of President Clinton and U.S. foreign policy during
the Bosnian conflict and the consequent Dayton Peace Accords. In other words, the
personal beliefs of the president should have a direct effect on the choices the administration makes and the ultimate outcome. Assuming this is the case, these hypotheses
should be true:
Hypothesis 1: U.S. foreign policy undertaken during this period reflect Clinton’s
philosophical beliefs.
Hypothesis 2: Clinton’s instrumental beliefs are demonstrated by the way the administration enacted these policies.
If enough evidence in favor of these hypotheses can be determined, such that we
fail to reject these hypotheses, then it can be concluded that President Clinton’s operational code did in fact predict much of the outcomes of his foreign policy.
The objective of this analysis is to explain the U.S. reaction to the Bosnian civil war
through the lens of operational code analysis theory. If the answers to George’s research
questions are reflective to the reality seen in the Bosnian crisis, then we can conclude
that Clinton’s administration behaved according to the predictions of psychological
theory in spite of pressures from the domestic and international levels of analysis.
To analyze Clinton’s operational code, his code must be defined. Clinton demonstrates a positive perspective about policy-making and its environment, a sense of
optimism about achieving political goals, and a desire to work cooperatively in accomplishing goals and problem solving. He also has a tendency to emphasize rewards
rather than punishment, and he has a general reluctance to engage in risky behavior
(Hook 2012: 92). This operational code of conduct will now be addressed in the scope
of the two previously stated hypotheses. In the first, Clinton’s philosophical beliefs—as
demarcated by Walker, Schafer, and Young—will be analyzed to determine whether
these beliefs fit with the political psychology theory in reference to the action taken
with U.S. foreign policy in Bosnia. In the second, Clinton’s instrumental beliefs will be
analyzed in a similar manner.

Hypothesis 1: U.S. foreign policy measures undertaken during the
Bosnian crisis reflect Clinton’s philosophical beliefs until the Dayton
Peace Accords.

Clinton’s philosophical beliefs include the following ideas: the nature of the political universe is exceptionally friendly, there are extremely optimistic prospects for realization of political values, and the ability of the U.S. to predict the political future is
very low. Additionally, Clinton’s own ability to control historical development is high,
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others’ abilities to control historical development is very low, and chance has an average role in the determination of future events (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003:
325). Each of the listed philosophical beliefs need to be analyzed individually to
determine whether the events leading up to the Dayton Accords reflect Clinton’s
philosophical beliefs.
Philosophical Belief 1: The nature of the political universe is extremely friendly.
If the political universe is extremely friendly, we should expect to see the Clinton administration often engaged with, relied on, and trusted the international community to help accomplish its political goals. This was the case during the Bosnian
crisis. The administration’s first moves regarding Bosnia were conducted through the
United Nations (“The War in Bosnia”). As the UN attempted to broker peace, it did so
through coalition intervention and international agreements. U.S. actions reflected a
real sense of optimism in spite of the carnage found within the region. In 1995, the war
in former Yugoslavia, which had been raging for more than two years, had escalated
from infighting to genocide. There did not seem to be an imminent end to the violence
Clinton openly recognized as “ethnic genocide” (Clinton 2004: 424). The administration
never acted unilaterally in Bosnia; rather, the administration always ensured that when
it took action, it did so with the help of the other nations in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
In 1995, when the administration first succeeded in enacting Clinton’s professed
desire to “oppose the ethnic cleansing more vigorously” (Clinton 2004: 424), it composed the “Endgame Strategy,” which was designed to find a way to permanently end
the war in Yugoslavia. This strategy included pushing for a “realistic diplomatic settlement this year” (Berger 1995). It was accomplished through combining diplomatic
efforts with a sustained NATO–controlled airstrike on Serbia. The Clinton administration chose to trust NATO with this venture, despite the fact that the alliance had
not been tested before in a war scenario. NATO’s ability to predominate was by no
means certain. NATO’s ability to conduct such an attack was called into question by its
supreme military commander, despite its obvious technological and numerical superiority. General Wesley Clark’s account of the war in Serbia and Kosovo suggests that
NATO’s success was not due to effective strategy or superior fire power but luck (Betts
2001). The administration demonstrated considerable trust in the ability of international efforts when it chose to act with the other NATO states (predominantly the UK
and France) rather than acting unilaterally. It did this regardless of the clear debacle of
international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, which is most vividly illustrated by the
failure of the Dutch peacekeeping troops in Srebrenica to protect the local population
against incoming Serbian troops (Daalder 1998). Clinton described his decision to act in
a coalition as a strategy to avoid repeating the mistakes in Vietnam (Baer 1995).
Although the U.S. consistently took a leadership position in these efforts (particularly in regards to the creation and implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords),
the U.S. used international coalitions such as the International Implementation Force
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(IFOR) when troops were needed to maintain peace in Bosnia. Americans made up
only one quarter of the troops in IFOR (Chollet 2005: 180–81). These examples of international collaborations demonstrate that the Clinton administration relied heavily on
international efforts.
Philosophical Belief 2: The opportunity for Clinton’s political values to be realized in the world
is extremely optimistic.
If the Clinton administration enacted foreign policy during the Bosnian crisis
which reflected this belief, we should see that the administration undertook major
efforts to promote western values like democracy, self-determination, and international
peace. When we take into account the enormous effort the administration eventually
put into ensuring peace in Bosnia and the rest of former Yugoslavia, this seems to be the
case. However, the U.S. took three years to take any significant action. This suggests
that optimism for the ability of the U.S. to realize its political values was actually
not that high.
In 1992, Clinton campaigned on the platform that he would take more action in
Bosnia than the Bush administration had (“The War in Bosnia”). However, as soon
as Clinton took office, the administration moved at a “glacial pace” to do anything
to stop the fighting (Schulzinger 1959: 330). The first U.S. action attempted to engage
the United Nations in doing more. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright ultimately failed to secure the Security Council’s approval of making certain cities in
former Yugoslavia “safe zones.” When the Clinton administration failed to initially
secure NATO’s support for Clinton’s “Lift and Strike” policy—a policy that called
for the end of the weapons sanction against the Yugoslav states and the deployment of an air strike—efforts stalled for two years. The administration was clearly
unwilling to act unilaterally. This delay demonstrates a sense of U.S.-wide negativity in regard to Bosnia, which does not reflect Clinton’s philosophical belief about
the ability to realize political values. After the world witnessed the horrors of the
massacre at Srebrenica—an atrocity where over four thousand men and boys were
shot and thousands of women and girls were brutally raped and some killed—the
Clinton administration finally secured approval from congress and NATO to act in
Bosnia. It was this fateful action that eventually brought Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic to the table at the Dayton Peace Accords (Clark 2001: 67–68). In this case,
it seems evident that Clinton’s philosophical belief was not the primary driving
force for U.S. foreign policy.
Philosophical Belief 3: The ability of the U.S. to predict the political future is very low.
If U.S. foreign policy from this period reflects this belief, we should see the
U.S. emphasizing tactics that protect it from the repercussions of backfire from its
intervention efforts. This is only sometimes the case. The consistent U.S. attempts to
engage the international communities in its efforts in Bosnia can be seen as a form of
self-protection. For instance, with the U.S. backed by a variety of nations, blame for
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failed policies would be defused among these states rather than shouldered by the
U.S. alone.
It makes considerable sense that the Clinton administration first chose to involve
the UN rather than take immediate unilateral action. Beyond simply believing that multilateral engagement was a better choice than unilateral engagement, Clinton also demonstrated a streak of true pragmatism. The decision to wait for international approval
before action demonstrates that the administration was more gun-shy of potential
failure than it was gung-ho about its professed desire to stop the genocide. President
Clinton began to fear that “ethnic hatreds between Serbs and Muslims ran so deep that
outside intervention would not solve the problem” (Schulzinger 1959: 330). This fear
contributed to what was ultimately termed the “muddle through” approach, meaning the series of indecisive and “half-hearted” actions undertaken by the U.S. prior to
Srebrenica (Daalder).
In this case, psychology was not the only determinant of what the U.S. ultimately
did. Domestic politics played a major role. The administration had a contrarian congress and a reluctant Department of Defense to deal with (Schultz 2003). The Department of Defense was concerned about “protracted occupation or guerrilla warfare.”
These two factors, combined with popular sentiment against intervention, made the
administration reluctant to act decisively (“The War in Bosnia”).
When the Srebrenica massacre occurred, U.S. policy regarding Bosnia changed
almost overnight. Professed beliefs of the U.S. and international community about the
intolerability of genocide seemed to overpower the fear of protracted conflict. Within
a few days of the massacre, NATO met and concluded that it would ramp up its “dual
key” policy where the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO shared responsibility to conduct airstrikes against key Serbian military points. It was this effort in combination with a joint Croatian–Bosnian ground operation and the diplomatic endeavors
of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke that eventually brought about a
ceasefire and the realization of Clinton’s dream—the Dayton Peace Accords (“The War
in Bosnia”). Through this timeline, we see Clinton’s belief that the U.S. cannot predict
future events predominated in the behavior of the U.S. regarding foreign policy until
other circumstances compelled this cautionary tendency to be subsumed.
Philosophical Belief 4: Clinton’s own ability to control the path of history (historical development) is very high while the ability of others to do so is very low.
Clinton perceived his ability to affect change in the world considerably larger
than the ability of other people in power. If this belief is reflected in U.S. foreign
policy during the Bosnia civil war, then we should see the U.S. being more willing
to act as a leader or to act unilaterally. We should expect to see this, because the U.S.
would believe that it could succeed where others failed. While we certainly saw the
U.S. taking a leadership role, we rarely saw it acting in any unilateral sense during
the crises. Therefore, the results of this philosophical belief’s bearing on U.S. foreign
policy are mixed.
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The U.S. consistently acted as the leader of foreign efforts during the Bosnian crisis. For example, Clinton was the first to propose the “Lift and Strike” policy to NATO
(Schulzinger 1959: 330). The U.S. also composed the “Endgame Strategy,” which was
enacted to great effect after the Srebrenica massacre (Berger). In particular, the U.S. led
the creation of a “contact group,” which outlined the parameters for the future of Bosnia and eventually served as a foundation for the negotiations undertaken at the Dayton Accords (“The War in Bosnia”). Of course, the peace accords themselves are the best
example of U.S. leadership in the conflict, but even the accords had international backing; the UN circulated the final document in the General Assembly and the Security
Council (Bosnia and Herzegovina—UNMIBH).
U.S. actions were not undertaken unilaterally. Even when the U.S. acted more decisively, it did so only with the approval of NATO. Therefore, though Clinton believed in
the ability of the U.S. to accomplish more change than other states, the administration
still insisted on working as a leader in the international community rather than as an
independent actor.
Philosophical Belief 5: Chance has an average role in the determination of future events.
If the administration acted according to this particular philosophical belief of
President Clinton, then it would have taken a middle-road approach. It would not
refrain from international affairs, such as a rational actor would, if it believed there
was a chance for absolute control. Neither would it commit all possible efforts, such as
a rational actor would, if it believed chance had no role in determining future events.
As previously demonstrated, the U.S. did in fact take this middle path for the first three
years of the Clinton administration.
This path proved largely ineffective and contributed to some intensely bitter feelings from those left in the wake of violence. One embittered reporter wrote, “Western
attempts to end the war have gone around in circles, drifting from threats to new peace
proposals as the killing has continued,” (Chollet 2005: 60). Another biting criticism
leveled at the U.S. during this period came from the newly elected French President
Jacques Chirac, who said decisive U.S. military intervention was the only way Western
credibility could be restored in Bosnia (Whitney). It seems likely that for the first half of
U.S. policy regarding Bosnia (the pre-Srebrenica period), the U.S. was acting as though
chance had an average role in determining future events. The U.S. did take decisive
action, but it is difficult to tell whether this meant the position on chance changed or
simply that the stakes were high enough now that the risk was worth it.

Hypothesis 2: Clinton’s instrumental beliefs are demonstrated by the way
the administration enacted its policies.

Clinton’s instrumental beliefs, as identified by Walker, Schafer, and Young, include
the following: goals should be determined through cooperation with other powerful
entities and goals should be pursued cooperatively. Also, because Clinton faced an
average amount of risk in the world, actions should almost always be pursued coop78
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eratively rather than confrontationally. Clinton’s propensity to shift between action and
rhetoric is at an average level, and he is much more likely to employ rewards, make
promises, and appeal for help than resist helping, threatening, or punishing. The following is a step-by-step analysis of how well U.S. foreign policy during the Bosnian
crisis reflects these instrumental beliefs. Instrumental beliefs are implicitly expressed in
the above descriptions of U.S. actions during the Bosnian period and will have a briefer
analysis in the following section to avoid redundancy.
Instrumental Belief 1: Goals should be determined through cooperation with other powerful
entities.
If U.S. foreign policy during this period operated under this instrumental belief,
then we would expect to see the U.S. addressing other powerful international and
domestic entities whenever a decision was to be made. The U.S. could also be observed
adjusting its position on what actions should be taken to reflect the opinion of the group
rather than just its own perspective. Evidence indicates this was both true and not true
for the Clinton administration’s actions regarding Bosnia.
This belief was true in the sense that the U.S. did not engage in anything more than
the few interventions, which NATO and the UN both approved prior to engagement.
These included sanctions, a strategy to protect UN safe zones, and the deployment of
peacekeeping troops (“The War in Bosnia”). However, it was not true because the official rhetoric of the Clinton administration continued to push for more intervention than
the international community was initially willing to give. For example, Albright often
spoke in the UN about the need to use more force against the Serbs (Schulzinger 1959:
330). However, she had “little influence on the overall administration policy” (“The War
in Bosnia”). From all of these ideas, it seems likely that the decisions the administration
made were shaped largely by forces outside of the instrumental beliefs of Bill Clinton.
Instrumental Belief 2: Goals should be pursued cooperatively.
If this instrumental belief is pertinent, then we would expect to see the U.S. take
actions with the cooperation of international and domestic entities and shun unilateral
behavior. This is definitely the case, as demonstrated in detail from the previous analysis
of philosophical beliefs. As discussed earlier, the U.S. had international approval and
help from international forces for all significant actions taken in the region.
Instrumental Belief 3: The role of risk in the outcomes of world politics is at average levels.
Average levels of risk means that Clinton thought risk did not play a major role in
the outcomes of his policies. Instead, he believed the world was risky but only to the
degree reported by the average person. He was neither flippant nor paranoid about
risk. If the U.S. acted according to the assumption that risk is at average levels, then we
should expect to see the U.S. take a middle-of-the-road policy toward risk minimization—it would not be so risk averse that it would refuse to take action, neither would it
be so risk prone as to jump into full-scale involvement without taking time to consider
all options and conduct precautionary measures.
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This is, in fact, the case. The U.S. did not sit entirely out of the proceedings by
reverting to the isolationism that characterized the Great Depression, nor did it jump
in full force. The muddle-through policy is the best example of the U.S. position of
not taking enormous risks. When President Clinton spoke in front of the UN General
Assembly in 1994 during the heat of the conflict yet before full NATO engagement,
his words were cautionary. He said, “If the parties of that conflict take the hard steps
needed to make a real peace, the international community including the United States
must be ready to help in its effective implementation.” Here, he is willing to take action
but only if certain conditions are met. This corroborates the cautionary nature of U.S.
policy regarding Bosnia before and after Srebrenica (the U.S. still did not commit more
than twenty thousand troops, requiring that the others were supplied by the member
nations of NATO).
Instrumental Belief 4: Clinton’s propensity to shift between action and rhetoric is at average levels.
President Clinton was willing to use rhetoric as a tool of affecting change to the
same degree as he was willing to act to affect change. If this instrumental belief had
overall bearing on U.S. foreign policy, we should expect to see action taken to stop the
fighting during the Bosnian crisis. Speeches given frequently in a variety of venues
around the world also catalyze change. Evidence supports this belief that Clinton’s
rhetoric and action shifted at average levels. A variety of U.S. actions undertaken during the crisis are well catalogued throughout this paper. Additionally, President Clinton
and Madeleine Albright both gave a number of speeches and wrote several documents
with references to what should happen in Bosnia. Albright’s efforts were of particular
note and were previously mentioned. While Clinton’s rhetoric tended to breeze over
Bosnia, Albright emphasized it (“The War in Bosnia”). Thus, there existed a fair mix
between action and rhetoric, just as our prediction suggests there should be if this
instrumental belief were reflected in the actions of the administration.
Instrumental Belief 5: Clinton highly prefers rewards, promises and appeals to resisting appeals, threats, and punishment.
If this is the case, then we should see the U.S. tried a variety of “pulling” measures
before reverting to coercion. However, the Clinton administration did resort to a good
deal of coercive measures regarding the situation in Bosnia. This may have resulted
because by the time Clinton took office, a policy of coercive measures (sanctions in this
case) was already in place; or, it may simply be because this particular instrumental
belief did not translate into U.S. foreign policy. All of the major U.S. actions taken up
until the Dayton Accords were fairly coercive. First, the U.S. imposed weapons sanctions. Then, the U.S. began to undermine Milosevic’s efforts to starve whatever Bosnians could not be reached by other forms of attack by enacting a night airdrop policy.
Soon the UN proclaimed a no-fly zone over Serbia and Bosnia, enforced by the U.S.
Air Force in Operation Deny Flight. When the U.S. efforts to enact the “Lift and Strike”
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policy initially failed, the UN and NATO initiated the “dual key” strategy to protect UN
proclaimed safe zones. Finally, with the formation of Contact Group (a UN endeavor
headed by the U.S.), plans were drafted for peace and airstrikes were increased. Serbian
leader Slobodan Milosevic said, “It was your [NATO’s] bombs and your missiles, your
high technology that defeated us. . . . We Serbs never had a chance against you” (Clark
2001: 67–68). All of these actions were ultimately designed to be coercive.
It was only with the organization of the Dayton Accords that the promises/reward
aspect of Clinton’s instrumental belief came into play. With the successful completion
of the Dayton Accords, the U.S. promised to supply troops, to secure the region, and to
ensure a definitive end to the fighting. The conclusion can be reached that in the case
of the Bosnian civil war, Clinton employed measures based more on punishment and
coercion than reward and promises.

Operational Code Assessment

The operational code analysis predicts that Clinton’s operational code will largely
correspond with U.S. foreign policy during the Bosnian crisis. Table 1 illustrates a
dichotomous decision based on this analysis of how well the philosophical and instrumental beliefs predicted Clinton’s actions and U.S. foreign policy decisions leading up
to the Dayton Peace Accords. The operational code is divided by the specified beliefs
that have been analyzed with a total tally at the end of the table. In accordance with the
previous analysis, “Yes” means this portion of the operation code accurately predicted
U.S. foreign policy behavior in Bosnia. “Mixed” means it predicted some aspects but
not others. “No” means it did not predict any of the outcomes.
According to the table, the operational code theory accurately predicted the
majority of U.S. foreign policy decisions made during this period. However, it was
imperfect. In two cases, it failed to predict what occurred, and in two other cases it
only predicted a portion of the outcomes.
Table 1
Operational Code

Yes

Philosophical Belief 1

X

Mixed

Philosophical Belief 2
Philosophical Belief 3

X
X

Philosophical Belief 4
Philosophical Belief 5

X
X

Instrumental Belief 1

X

Instrumental Belief 2

X

Instrumental Belief 3

X

Instrumental Belief 4

X

Instrumental Belief 5
Operational Code Match

No

X
6

2
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It is crucial to remember that this is only one model of operational code analysis.
Other schools of thought contend that operational codes are comprised more of principled and causal beliefs rather than philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Instrumental
and casual beliefs are arguably the same. They are both beliefs about what is the best
method for an individual to achieve a particular political end (Hook 2012: 93; Schafer,
Walker, and Young 2003: 4). However, principled and philosophical beliefs are not the
same. Principled beliefs are beliefs about “the virtues and limitations of human nature,
the proper roles of governments, and the national and global problems that are of greatest concern” (Hook 2012: 93). They are normative beliefs about the way the world should
be. Philosophical beliefs are about the way the world is, not the way it should be (Schafer, Walker, and Young 2003: 33). Therefore, Schafer, Walker, and Young’s model has the
disadvantage of not clarifying the political goals of the leader in the way the model that
uses principled (normative) beliefs does. Under this first model, all we know about the
leader is what that leader believes the world is like and how the leader tries to achieve
political ends. Schafer, Walker, and Young’s model despite its disadvantages synthesizes
the operation code theory with political psychology theory and is best applied to this
particular case study, although other methods could have been used.

Conclusion

The discrepancy between theory and reality is likely due to a number of factors.
Here we have only looked at the individual level of analysis. This almost entirely
ignores the impact of national and international pressures on decision making, the second and third levels of analysis, respectively. Yet, because psychological theory failed to
explain everything, a deeper analysis including variability in the level of analyses may
provide a more extensive and complete explanation.
Domestic pressures were mentioned on several occasions as having a direct
impact on policy making. For example, at times, Congress was opposed to military
interventions and the Department of Defense was reluctant to engage in Bosnia
because they feared entering into another protracted conflict like Vietnam. Opinion
polls also indicated that U.S. citizens were not keen on the idea of intervening in Bosnia (“The War in Bosnia”).
International factors also played a major role in the outcomes. NATO initially
refused to act in the way Clinton had hoped, causing a two-year delay in implementing
his “Lift and Strike” policy (Schlesinger 1959: 330). Although compromise measures
were eventually reached, they ultimately did little to mitigate the rising conflict. Perhaps if the president had taken totalitarian control over the country and full reign in the
international realm, the operational code could have predicted every decision he made,
but that would be impractical and overly idealistic. As it is, however, these pressures
prevent that from being the case. Waltz reminds us that a “single factor” cannot account
for the outcome when multiple factors are always at play (Waltz 1959).
Despite the limitations of this qualitative analysis, the operational code analysis used explains a large portion of Clinton’s behavior during the Bosnian crisis. This
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indicates that the president’s upbringing, life experiences, and other factors—used to
formulate the operational code—can have an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy
(Post 2003: 216).
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Conflicting Thoughts: The Effect
of Information on Support for an
Increase in the Federal Minimum
Wage Level
by Joshua Cooper and Alejandra Gimenez

In March 2014, President Obama urged Congress to approve a minimum wage
hike from $7.25 to $10.10. As expected, a debate sparked from both sides of the aisle
about whether it should be increased at all and if the proposed jump was too large.
Following this debate, a flurry of public opinion polls entered the field to measure
how Americans felt on this issue. Research firms from the Washington Post to Pew
fielded basic surveys asking how Americans felt about the potential wage hike. However, none of them looked at how the levels of information about the minimum wage
increase affected survey responses. We fill this hole by conducting a field experiment
through the Utah Colleges Exit Poll that varies the information given to the respondent. We presented respondents with either positive information, negative information, or both categories of information. In our study, we found respondents are
significantly affected by “negative” and “combined” sets of information.

Discussion of the Literature

The Strength of “Bad”
When presented with positive and negative information, people are affected
much more by the negative than the positive (Baumeister et al.). Further, negative or
“bad” information is processed more thoroughly and deeply than positive or “good”
information. The authors also look at the effects of good and bad events. Unsurprisingly, they find that bad events wear off slower than good events (326). When put into
a financial context, they find that losing money caused greater distress than winning
the same amount of money. Put differently, people are “more upset about losing $50
than [they] are happy about gaining $50” (326). Likewise, we expect similar results,
given that we are testing our theories on a monetary topic.
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Information as a Game Changer
In this experiment, we isolate the effects of information on respondent opinion.
James N. Druckman (2004) employed a similar technique using positive and negative information to study the shifting response rates when positive versus negative
information is presented. In his work, he tests both equivalency-framing effects and
issue-framing effects; equivalency framing presents the same information in different
lights, such as job loss versus job gain for the same event, while issue framing offers
two contrasting ideas, such as free speech versus public safety. Our experiment will
employ equivalency-framing effects by using positive and negative information
that are logically equivalent.
Martin Gilens (2001) conducted further research on the effects of different
kinds of information on political opinions. He finds that policy-based facts have an
important effect on political judgments, particularly in individuals with the highest
levels of general political knowledge. Gilens shows that citizens with low levels of
general political knowledge are less affected by policy-specific, relevant facts. He
theorizes that more political knowledge allows a voter to take new political facts
and evaluate them in context. Gilens also suggests that his research does not contradict research about cues that allow voters to vote according to those preferences, but
he says it shows that, at least for more politically knowledgeable members of the
public, the effect of raw facts is substantial. The minimum wage policy we are testing is far more relevant to the average person than the policies Gilens used (such as
foreign aid), and we hypothesize that our information will affect voters more since
the threshold of political knowledge about minimum wage is likely to be lower.
Matthew S. Levendusky (2011) argues that information has a relatively low but
real effect on differences in voters’ opinions and behavior. He uses matching algorithms in an attempt to control for other variables and to make his study as if the level
of information were randomly assigned. He then uses panel data to eliminate other
variables, which may lead to omitted variable bias. Levendusky contends that his
methods show that most research on the effect of information and politics has grossly
overestimated the effect of political information when controlling for other factors
in the correct way. Our research relates to his, because we assigned information
(although a small amount) randomly among voters and noted its implications. While
we recognized providing information may not have drastic effects, we believed we
would still see some sort of outcome when respondents receive information.
The Expected Effect of Partisan Leanings
Beyond information itself, partisanship also plays a large role in respondent selection. As may be expected, conservatives and liberals react differently to social and economic policies. In the literature, scholars find that conservative voters support policies
and leaders who create legislation that reduces tax rates (Swank and Swank 1993). In a
different light, voters also reward conservative leaders when tax rates are cut, regardless of the party of the person responsible (Lowry et al. 1998).
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James (2011) uses field and laboratory experiments to assess the effects of cues
about good and bad performance for local government officials. He finds the cues raise
or lower a citizen’s perception of performance and satisfaction with government officials
in the expected manner based on whether it is a good cue or a bad cue. Likewise, here we
are giving the voter a good cue, a bad cue, or both cues, and we expect to see positive,
negative, and mixed shifts because of these cues.
Many respondents will face a moral dilemma of sorts when we give them both
positive and negative information about raising the minimum wage. Brishen Rogers ascertains that minimum-wage laws create a level of social equality, an idea
internally accepted by most people (2014). Respondents may strongly oppose
raising the minimum wage on principle, but they do not want to seem unfair and
opposed to social justice by opposing a raise in the minimum-wage level. This
research suggests a person’s moral compass may override their personal political
beliefs in order to benefit society. From this, we gather that people will respond differently in such a way that they try to help society in whatever way that may be for
each set treatment.

The Setting of the Experiment: The Utah Colleges Exit Poll

To test our ideas, we conducted a survey experiment on the 2014 Utah Colleges
Exit Poll. The poll is a survey given to randomly selected voters as they leave their
voting station on Election Day. The questionnaire asked about their vote choice and
demographics, along with some issue-position questions. The sample is a stratified
random sample based on Utah’s four congressional districts. In 2014, early voting
was expected to be higher than ever, pronounced by the fact that both Cache and
Davis counties were using all or almost-all vote-by-mail systems. In order to create
an accurate sample that surveyed early voters who would not be at the polls on
Election Day, the Exit Poll sent postcards to a random subset of early voters and
invited them to take an online version of the poll. The Exit Poll also operated a
phone bank the week before the election to get responses from randomly selected
early voters who had not yet completed the online version of the survey. In total,
22,118 people responded to the Exit Poll in some form.
In order to fit as many questions as possible into the medium of the Exit Poll
survey, the questionnaire was broken down further. There were three colored forms
(blue, green, and yellow), each with a different set of questions. Respondents were
randomly given one of the three colors, so any variation among respondents is arbitrary. Our experiment was fielded on the yellow form, with each treatment swapped
out evenly and randomly among the yellow forms.
We used a 2x2 experimental design in which respondents were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions. As the base of each question stem, all respondents
were told what the current minimum wage was. The information that followed
then varied according to each condition. For the complete text of the questions, see
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Appendix A. We had 4,178 respondents, which gave us about one thousand respondents in each condition.
• Control: Did not provide any additional information. The control simply
asked the respondent whether or not they support a raise in the minimum
wage level.
• Positive Treatment (T1): Indicated that the minimum wage raise would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans.
• Negative Treatment (T2): Indicated that the minimum wage raise would eliminate 500,000 jobs.
• Combined Treatment (T3): Included both the positive and negative information.
We expected that, relative to the control, respondents given the positive treatment
would be more likely to support the increase in minimum wage, and respondents given
the negative treatment would be more likely oppose the increased minimum wage. For
those given the combined treatment with both the positive and negative information,
we expected the majority to still support the wage raise, because the respondents were
told it would help people and inherently be for the greater good (Rogers 2014). We also
expected more respondents would select the “do not know” option, since they were
being asked to choose between what is considered a “good” and “bad” thing.
In each of these situations, we expected social desirability to play a large role. While
the respondents’ answers to the questionnaires and the respondents themselves are
never connected to each other, the respondents still feel as though they should or should
not put a certain answer simply because that is what is expected of them (Rogers 2014).
In the positive treatment, people would feel inclined to favor the measure, because they
would not want to appear as if they do not want people to earn more money. In the negative treatment, we expected people to be swayed by the “bad” aspects of taking away
jobs and show less support (Baumeister et al.). In combined treatment, we expected
respondents to be caught between both of these competing theories. At this point, they
would opt for the “do not know” option at a higher rate than the previous two treatments, so they would not have to make a choice either way.

Modeling the Effect of the Information on Support for the Wage Increase

In order to analyze the results of our experiment, we used both a simple linear model and a multinomial probit model. We used the linear model for the initial
results discussion, and the multinomial probit for latter results and predictions.
To begin our analysis, we ran a basic OLS regression to look at the simple effects
of each treatment (see Figure 1). We did not include controls due to the experimental
nature of the study, since the randomization should control for variation among the
treatment groups. We found that the negative treatment had the strongest effect in
relation to the control; on average, the negative treatment is expected to decrease support by 16 percent. The combined treatment also strongly decreased support, though
not as strongly at 12 percent.
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Overall, the effect of our treatments on voters was not the same as what we
expected in our hypothesis. While we expected the positive treatment to significantly
increase the rate at which people would likely support the wage raise, it did not
have a statistically significant difference from the control. We attribute this to the fact
that the majority of our respondents are Republicans. Republicans tend to be fiscally
conservative, and we would not expect them to be persuaded to increase the minimum wage as easily as Democrats. Even though there may be a shift among the nonRepublicans, it may not be enough to be a significant factor in the positive treatment.
As the linear model shows, the negative and combined treatments both had significant effects. This model only accounts for whether or not someone supported or
Figure 1: Percentage of Favor Minimum Wage Increase by Treatment

Figure 2: Do you favor or oppose an increase in federal minimum wage?
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opposed the wage raise. To solve this hole in our analysis, we turned to a multinomial probit. The multinomial probit accounts for respondents that indicated “support,” “oppose,” and “do not know.” As previously mentioned, we expected that the
amount of respondents who cho ose “do not know” would vary based on the treatment. We also expected that respondents who select “do not know” would be systematically different than those who express either support or opposition. As such,
we used a multinomial probit to analyze the effects of the “do not know” option (see
Figure 2).
The negative treatment shows a complete shift in preference when compared to
the control. Support for an increase in the minimum wage was 18 percentage points
lower than the control group. The effect was in line with our hypothesis. This is evidence of the weight of negative information and, particularly, of the type of information we had given. It appears that job loss is an unacceptable thing for many voters.
This also follows with the findings of Roy F. Baumeister et al. Although the number of
those who answered “do not know” rose between the negative treatment and the control, it is not enough to account for all voters, suggesting that many voters who would
have voted to support the minimum-wage raise opposed it specifically because of the
new information we presented.
We expected the combined treatment to trigger more responses of “do not
know”; however, we see results rather comparable to those of the negative treatment. It appears the effect of losing 500,000 jobs is greater than increasing 16.5 million Americans’ income. Negative information seemed to substantially outweigh the
positive information, despite the fact that the positive condition affected more people,
because 16.5 million people would have a higher income compared to the 500,000
people who would be out of a job. This finding is consistent with those of Baumeister
et al. in that the “bad” outweighs the “good.”
Additionally, the unweighted results and the predicted probabilities, both with
and without controls, are strikingly similar. The predicted probabilities from our multinomial regressions are almost an exact mirror of the percentages in the actual data.
The fact that the unweighted results mirror the controlled results demonstrates the
accuracy of randomizing treatments and encourages us to be confident in the validity
of our models and their implications.
Party ID was the most significant factor in our models when included. More
than any other variable, party affiliation predicts the largest percentage of change
for support among respondents. In both the linear and multinomial probit models,
party affiliation was heavily significant, often at the 0.01 level (see Appendix B for
full results).
What we can see in the data is that party follows roughly the same patterns we
might expect; democrats favor wage increase the most, followed by Independents,
and then Republicans. On the other hand, in the negative treatment, the model fails
to accurately predict what happened when Republicans received that treatment
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Table 1: Unweighted results compared to predicted probabilities
The Effect of Party Identification

Unweighted Results

Control

Positive

Negative

Both

Favor

53%

50%

36%

40%

Oppose

38%

41%

50%

48%

Do not know

9%

10%

14%

11%

Predicted Probabilities without Controls

Control

Positive

Negative

Both

Favor

53%

50%

36%

40%

Oppose

38%

41%

50%

48%

Do not know

9%

10%

14%

11%

Predicted Probabilities with Controls

Control

Positive

Negative

Both

Favor

54%

50%

36%

41%

Oppose

38%

40%

50%

48%

Do not know

8%

10%

14%

11%

(see Appendix C for comparison to unweighted results). This failure is because
the multinomial probit has the limitation of not allowing interactive control variables. Fortunately, this does not affect the overall validity of the model in conveying how the treatments affect respondents as we saw in our analysis of the initial
results. Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine the fact that the negative treatment
only caused a minor drop in Democrats’ support in the unweighted data, whereas
it caused a major drop in support among Independents and Republicans. It seems
that when given information about the positive and negative effects of a raise in
the minimum wage, Republicans and Independents do not find the trade-off to be
acceptable and respond with even more opposition than the control group, whereas
Democrats seem to find the trade-off acceptable.

The Effect of Age

Our predictions show age is a substantial factor in support for minimum wage,
with a U-shaped effect following age. People younger than twenty years old are likely
to support a minimum wage increase, but those who are between twenty and fiftynine are less likely to support it by around 4 percent. People who are over sixty are
even more likely to support minimum wage than those who are under twenty. This
suggests that those who are retired have a different view on wages than those who are
in the workforce, as this is most likely to account for these differences. We believe this
increase in wages is because those who are retired are most likely receiving benefits
from government programs (such as social security) and are more likely to favor social
welfare programs, even if those programs do not benefit them directly (one would not
expect minimum wage increases to benefit those over sixty). Also, since older people
are most likely retired, they probably pay fewer taxes and are not as concerned with
the possible increase in taxes that might come because of a minimum-wage increase.
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Figure 3: Predicted Minimum Wage Increase Support by Party ID

Note: It is important to note that in our main predictive model we have used a seven point
scale for party ID, but for simplicity in the graphs we have a used a three point model here to
examine the data and generate the predictions. Independent leaners were categorized according to their partisan leaning. To see the full breakdown, refer to Appendix C.

Figure 4: Predicted Minimum Wage Increase Suppory by Age

Note: In the model, age is a continuous variable, but we collapsed the age categories as shown
above to make for a simpler presentation.

The Effect of Income

The trend for income is as expected, with higher-income voters opposing minimum-wage increases and lower-income voters supporting the minimum-wage
increase (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013). Generally, we observe that the effect
of each treatment is the same for the different groups. A sharp drop still occurs for
the negative treatment, because the effect of negative information is substantial, and
it continues in the combined treatment, although the drop is not as great, which is
attributed to their receiving positive information.
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Figure 5: Predicted Minimum Wage Support by Income

The Effect of Gender

As with many other political studies, the gender of the respondent influenced the
results. Females are much more likely to support the increase, regardless of treatment.
In fact, an average of a five-point difference tends to separate males and females in
each condition. The negative treatment flips the female-support effect, with neither
a male nor female plurality expected to support it. Instead, we see females are also
likely to oppose the wage increase, though at a lower level than males. Females
oppose this measure 44% to 38%, a 6% point gap, while males oppose the measure
55% to 34%, an 11% gap. This gap is because 6% more females than males chose the
“do not know” option.
The importance of the “do not know” option is especially prominent when the
responses are broken down by gender. Females select “do not know” nearly twice
as often as males. This finding is congruent with the literature, most of which states
that when respondents are unsure of an answer, males are more likely to mask their
uncertainty and randomly pick an option, while females are more likely to show
their uncertainty and pick the “do not know” option. Especially given that economics
and finances are considered more of a “man’s game” in politics, it is not surprising
that more females opted for “do not know” (Lawless 2004; Meeks 2010; Dolan 2014).
In the negative treatment, part of the reason we see closer “favor” and “oppose” rates
among females than males is because a larger proportion of the female respondents
selected “do not know.” Because of this, a smaller group of women remain to choose
favor or oppose, resulting in the closer gap.
Interestingly, both men and women are affected almost equally by the negative
treatment and the combined treatment regarding the “do not knows,” and the per93
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Figure 6: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Employment Status

centage of respondents choosing neither “favor” nor “oppose” increases in both men
and women. From this, we can gather that the negative treatment places an inquisitive burden on both genders at about the same rates and that the higher “do not
know” rate among females in response to the negative treatment is more of a function
of female uncertainty consistent with the literature rather than a specific burden from
the question itself.

The Effect of Religious Activity

In addition to other demographics, we decided to see how religious activity
affects support for increasing the federal minimum wage. In the state of Utah, where
the survey was fielded, approximately 65 percent of voters in 2014 identified with The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS)—otherwise known as the Mormon Church. Given the prominence of the Church in Utah, we generated a religion
index for members of the LDS faith. This index combines peoples’ religious identification and their religious activity. The scale spans from “Active LDS” to “Non-LDS”
(see the graph below for the full scale breakdown).
As it turns out, there is a strong correlation between activity in the Church and
support for the minimum-wage laws. A possible reason for this could be that when
one becomes more active in the LDS religion, one becomes much more likely to
oppose new laws. The opposite is true as well, in that less active and non-members
of the LDS Church in Utah usually support creating new laws. One of the most striking findings is that the level of support in relation to the other points on the religious
index does not change. Rather, support is either suppressed or increased among all
groups per each treatment, while the slope from “Active LDS” to “Non-LDS” remains
virtually the same. Overall, support for the wage increase was significantly hampered
with the negative treatment, including among Non-LDS respondents, whose support
and opposition we expected to be about the same regardless of treatment.
While in other demographic categories “do not know” responses are important
in the analysis, they do not play such an important role in religion. For the most
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Figure 7: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Religion Index

part, “Active LDS” and “Non-LDS” alike selected “do not know” at similar rates.
As with the overall treatment effects, the respondents who selected “do not know”
increase with the negative treatment and go back down slightly on the combined
treatment, though the effects are not statistically significant. Because a large majority of LDS members are conservative and identify with the Republican Party, active
LDS members and conservatives often mirror each other’s response rate, since they
tend to be the same group. When we look at the effect of party identification, we see
that, excluding Independents, Democrats and Republicans selected “do not know”
in a pattern similar to the patterns of the religious index. “Do not know” increases
on the negative treatment and drops slightly on the combined treatment. While
their “do not know” percentages are fairly similar, they differ slightly. Non-LDS
respondents tend to report “do not know” at a slightly lower rate, and such is the
case with Democrats. As such, we can draw a parallel between party identification
and the religion index.

The Effect of Employment Status

In our research, we found that employment status does not affect support
for an increase in the federal minimum wage. Though not significant, we chose
to explore this variable, since its lack of results ignites some interesting thought.
The Utah Colleges Exit Poll asks respondents what their employment status is,
and respondents are asked to choose from a list of seven options, including selfemployed, employed, unemployed, homemaker, and retired. For the purposes of
analyzing this data, we have chosen to collapse self-employed and employed into
the “employed” category and to collapse unemployed, retired, and homemaker1
into the “unemployed” category.
When we compared the response rate for both the employed and unemployed,
we found there is no significant difference in their response choice per condition;
they actually respond with virtually the same choices through all conditions. We see
that the negative treatment has the largest effect and significantly lowers support.
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Firgure 8: Minimum Wage Increase Support by Employment Status

While in the control and first treatment the majorities of both the employed and
unemployed supported the increase, support drops by more than 10 percent among
those same groups in the negative and combined treatments, with the largest effect
occurring in the negative treatment. The “do not know” rates are also very similar,
further showing that employment status does not matter. Regardless of employment status, these numbers once again show the strong effect of the negative treatment
and slightly less strong effect of the combined treatment.

Conclusion

Overall, the negative treatment places a significant toll on all respondents,
regardless of gender, income, or other demographic variables. The combined treatment also lowers support rates more than the control and first treatment. As demonstrated in the significant drop in favor in the negative treatment, maintaining jobs is
important to many Utahans. Although people are told that others will have a greater
income, they are still influenced by the job loss that would take place, even though
the percent affected by the job loss is fractional compared to those for whom income
would increase.
One large limitation is our question presentation. In the combined treatment, we
could not randomize the order of the treatment information. Due to logistical limitations, the positive treatment was always listed before the negative treatment. While
both pieces of information were included, we recognize the possibility that we are
seeing the effects of recency bias (Ornstein 2013). In other words, the respondent’s
mind sticks with the last piece of information they were given, which in this case is
the negative information. We thought we might see more support on the combined
treatment because of the inclusion of the positive information, but we see in the combined treatment a plurality still opposes the wage raise. However, we do not see a
significant effect in the positive treatment, indicating the positive treatment itself was
not strong enough. This leads us to believe this limitation does not inhibit our results.
The control question mirrors a question from a CNN/ORC poll conducted from
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late May into June 2014. In the data, we see a noticeable difference between their
reported responses and our reported responses. In the CNN poll, we see 18 percent more
support for increasing the federal minimum wage. There is only a 9 percent difference
between levels of opposition, though. We attribute this difference to the drastically
different “do not know” responses: 1 percent in the CNN/ORC poll, but 9 percent in
the UCEP poll. While these differences may seem alarming, we must remember that
Utah is a highly conservative state, and the CNN poll was a national sample that has
many more Democrats and Independents than Utah.2
Figure 9: Control

"As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. Do you
favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?"

Note: Percentages for UCEP 2014 represent the weighted survey data, not predicted values, in
order to create a fairer comparison to the poll. CNN/ORC Poll: n=1,003; UCEP 2014: n=1,066.

The base of the information for the treatments comes from a Bloomberg National
Poll run in March 2014.3 The trend of decreased favor and increased opposition continues in the Bloomberg poll, just as it does in ours, suggesting that the weight of
losing 500,000 jobs is greater than the weight of raising the incomes of 16.5 million
Americans. The Bloomberg poll asks whether the tradeoff is acceptable or unacceptable, and the response options are “acceptable,” “unacceptable,” and “unsure.” While
not an exact comparison, it provides a general idea of Utah compared to the rest of
the nation. We would hypothesize that the wording of the question as acceptable or
unacceptable increases the amount of opposition further than our question does, as
a person could say it is unacceptable but still support a raise in the minimum wage.
The importance of maintaining jobs is an important theme across the nation, not
just in Utah. As such, we expect these results would be similar if this experiment were
run in other states. Since Utah is a very conservative state, we believe the starting support level would be lower than that of a more liberal state. However, we feel the effect
of the negative information in the negative and combined treatments would be just as
strong in other states. As such, we would get the same statistical effect per treatment but
with different numbers. Baumeister et al., show that bad impressions “are quicker to
form and more resistant” to change than good impressions, and we expect the bad information of job loss would be just as relevant and have as much impact in other states.
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Figure 10: Combined Treatment Effects: Bloomberg vs. UCEP

Note: Percentages for UCEP 2014 represent the weighted survey date, not predicted values,

in order to create a more fair comparison to the poll. Bloomberg National Poll: n=1,001; UCEP
2014. n=1,066.

The Baumeister et al., piece adds a plea at the end for researchers to find places in
which the bad does not outweigh the good. Unfortunately, we would have to report to
Baumeister and his fellow researchers that we have also found that the bad outweighs
the good. Our results show that preventing job loss is important to Utahans. Without
knowing the trade-offs of the minimum wage increase, the public is willing to support
it; as soon as jobs are on the line, however, support is dramatically cut.
NOTES
1. We tested collapsing the employment variable with homemakers being considered both employed and unemployed. There was no significant difference whether the homemakers were
considered employed or unemployed.
2. In the 2014 Utah Colleges Exit Poll, the partisan breakdown was as follows: 28% Democrat,
62% Republican, and 10% Independent. In the CNN poll, the partisan breakdown was as follows: 30% Democrat, 23% Republican, and 47%Independents.
3. Bloomberg poll question stem: “A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that
raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over the next three years would increase the incomes of
16.5 million Americans while eliminating 500,000 jobs. Does that tradeoff seem acceptable or
unacceptable to you?” Response options: acceptable, unacceptable, and unsure.
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APPENDIX A: Original Question Text
Control:
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. Knowing
this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Treatment 1 (positive):
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. A recent
report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over
the next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans. Knowing this, do
you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Treatment 2 (negative):
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. A recent
report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over
the next three years would eliminate five hundred thousand jobs. Knowing this, do you favor or
oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Treatment 3 (positive and negative):
As you may know, the federal minimum wage is currently set at $7.25 an hour. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office says that raising the minimum wage to $10.10 over the
next three years would increase the incomes of 16.5 million Americans, and eliminate five hundred
thousand jobs. Knowing this, do you favor or oppose an increase in the federal minimum wage?
Response Options
a. Favor
b. Oppose
c. Unsure
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APPENDIX B: Statistical Models
Table 1: Linear Regression
Dependent Variable: Support for Minimum Wage (1=favor, 0=oppose)
(1)

(2)

-0.0303

-0.0329

(0.0226)

(0.0219)

-0.163***

-0.156***

(0.0230)

(0.0215)

-0.127***

-0.118***

(0.0229)

(0.0219)

VARIABLES
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Gender

-0.0821***
(0.0159)

Age

0.00135***
(0.000507)

Not-so-strong Democrat

-0.0865**
(0.0389)

Independent leaning Democrat

-0.0193
(0.0190)

Independent

-0.320***
(0.0336)

Independent leaning Republican

-0.569***
(0.0269)

Not-so-strong Republican

-0.487***
(0.0326)

Strong Republican

-0.584***
(0.0251)

Other

-0.559***
(0.0373)

Do not know

-0.346***
(0.0830)

High school graduate

0.186*
(0.105)

Some college

0.108
(0.102)

College graduate

0.0815
(0.102)
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Post-graduate

0.108
(0.103)

Somewhat active LDS

0.0668*
(0.0374)

Less active LDS

0.0744*
(0.0392)

Non-LDS

0.117***
(0.0209)

Employed

-0.0141
(0.0178)

Income

-0.00981**
(0.00384)

Constant

0.581***

0.839***

(0.0159)

(0.108)

Observations

3,717

2,918

R-squared

0.018

0.339

Adjusted R-squared

0.016

0.334

Note: Dependent variable is Support for a Raise in Minimum Wage where 1 is support and 0 is oppose. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. A * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent
level. A ** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. A *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

Table 2: Multinomial Probit
Dependent Variable: Support for Minimum Wage (1=favor, 0=oppose, 2= Do not know)
(0) Oppose
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Gender
Age
Not-so-strong Democrat
Independent leaning Democrat
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(1) Favor

(2) Do not know

-0.137

0.0460

(0.102)

(0.128)

-0.770***

0.0345

(0.104)

(0.123)

-0.573***

-0.0302

(0.102)

(0.125)

-0.411***

-0.598***

(0.0759)

(0.0900)

0.00568**

-0.00122

(0.00243)

(0.00281)

-0.896***

-0.441

(0.264)

(0.320)

-0.413**

-0.0343

(0.204)

(0.252)

SIGMA
Independent
Independent leaning Republican
Not-so-strong Republican
Strong Republican
Other
Do not know
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Post-graduate
Somewhat active LDS
Less active LDS
Non-LDS
Employed
Income
Constant
Observations

3,268

-1.883***

-0.718***

(0.198)

(0.244)

-2.794***

-1.424***

(0.189)

(0.232)

-2.461***

-1.116***

(0.197)

(0.242)

-2.866***

-1.375***

(0.186)

(0.227)

-2.789***

-1.635***

(0.216)

(0.279)

-2.054***

-0.480

(0.343)

(0.409)

0.788*

-0.533

(0.471)

(0.454)

0.422

-0.549

(0.459)

(0.433)

0.301

-0.700

(0.458)

(0.433)

0.425

-0.801*

(0.463)

(0.441)

0.230

0.00421

(0.154)

(0.183)

0.333*

0.223

(0.184)

(0.218)

0.548***

0.187*

(0.0912)

(0.111)

-0.0814

-0.0815

(0.0843)

(0.0955)

-0.0459**

-0.0326

(0.0180)

(0.0215)

2.054***

1.188**

(0.516)

(0.508)

3,268

3,268

Note: Dependent variable is Support for a Raise in Minimum Wage where 0 is oppose, 1 is support and 2 is do not know. Column
1 is used as the base case and all coefficients are generated using column one as the base. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are given in parentheses under estimated coefficients. A * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. A **
indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. A *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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APPENDIX C: Party Identification Graphs
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Effects of Scandals on Voter Turnout
in Canada
by Terrance Kutney

Although there has been much research done regarding the effects of political scandals on the
voting share won by a political party, little research has been done on the effect of political
scandals on voter turnout. This is especially true in the context of Canadian politics. This
work analyzes the effect of the Canadian sponsorship scandal on voter turnout, primarily
using the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Study. It finds a positive relationship between anger about the sponsorship scandal and the probability of voting. Closer
analysis of the 2004 election shows that voters who were angry about the sponsorship scandal
increased their political activity leading up to the election and were thus more likely to vote.

Introduction

On 19 May 2013, Nigel Wright resigned his position as chief of staff to the Canadian Prime Minister, having been implicated in what is now known as the Canadian
Senate Expenses Scandal. The year before, the auditor general of Canada found that
Conservative Party Senator Mike Duffy had violated Senate expense claim rules, and
the prime minister’s office had intervened in an attempt to limit fallout. This entailed
cutting a deal with Senator Duffy, who was required to reimburse $90,000 in claimed
expenses. Further inflaming the public, news sources later revealed that Chief of Staff
Nigel Wright had cut Duffy a $90,000 check to cover expenses on the deal that Wright
helped to arrange. Critics alleged that Wright violated criminal law and was guilty of
bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Certainly, the Wright-Duffy affair served to compound negative public perceptions of governmental corruption and further damage
trust in Parliament.
The Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal is only one of a string of scandals affecting Canadian politics. In Toronto, Mayor Rob Ford was captured on video smoking
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crack cocaine and stands accused of being an alcoholic who has driven while under
the influence. In 2004, in an episode known as the Sponsorship Scandal, broad corruption was uncovered in a federal government program in Quebec, which involved
millions of dollars that were awarded without a proper bidding process and sometimes without any work required. The sponsorship scandal is widely thought to have
resulted in the historic defeat of the Liberal Party of Canada in 2006, which was
replaced by a Conservative government for the first time since 1993. This election also
marked a reversal in an eighteen-year downward trend in election turnout. This information suggests that scandals, rather than marking the demise of democracy, might
actually invigorate democratic participation in Western countries, such as Canada, by
increasing election turnout.
This work examines the effect of political scandals on election turnout within a
Canadian context. To test this effect, this study presents a possible explanation for election turnout and applies the proposed explanation to data from two Canadian elections.
Specifically, it considers the theory that a political scandal galvanizes the voter base and
leads to greater turnout as voters attempt to replace wayward politicians. Thus, it is
hypothesized that the sponsorship scandal in 2004 increased voter turnout in subsequent Canadian elections by angering voters into political activity. This theory may
seem counterintuitive, as there is a strong tendency to believe that political scandals
will lead to a disappointed electorate that sees little point in voting. This article shows,
however, that the anger-response theory, as applied to Canada, provides a reasonable
explanation for increased election turnout. The elections examined here have been
largely ignored by academic studies and provide convincing support for this theory.
To examine the hypothesis that political scandal leads to greater election turnout, this work will analyze relevant literature, examine the theoretical basis of the
hypothesis presented, review the historical context of the Sponsorship Scandal, and
then discuss the methodology of the statistical tests performed. Through analyzing
relevant literature, it is apparent that experts on election turnout have not definitively
determined the causes of election turnout nor the effect of political scandals on election turnout. This section also provides a foundational understanding of the causal
relationship that exists between the sponsorship scandal and increased voter turnout
in subsequent elections. The section that outlines the historical background of the
sponsorship scandal provides a brief overview of the scandal and establishes valuable
context for the statistical tests performed. The methodology section explains three ways
in which the effects of the sponsorship scandal on election turnout are examined.
This work highlights general trends in Canadian election turnout, uses statistical tests to determine individual voting behavior in two Canadian elections,
and demonstrates through data analysis the causal relationship described in the
hypothesis. It concludes that the general trends in Canadian election turnout partially support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal increased election turnout. This finding is further substantiated by a test of individual voting behavior
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using election surveys from the 2004 and 2006 elections. A test of the causal relationship further supports the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters
and increased voter turnout.

Literature Review

Prominent academics have long puzzled over why people choose to vote.
According to a rational choice model, the vast majority of people should decide not to
vote. This model suggests that a person should only vote when the expected benefit
of voting, which is a function of the probability that the vote cast will be decisive, is
greater than the cost of voting (generally viewed as the opportunity cost of spending
time and effort to become informed and then physically voting). Since the probability
of casting a decisive ballot is extremely low, the cost of voting will almost always be
greater than the expected benefit. However, people do vote and in large numbers
(Blais 2000: 2). In the 2012 U.S. election, less than 55 percent of eligible voters cast their
ballots, but this still meant that over 129 million people voted (Woolley and Peters
2013). To resolve this discrepancy, some academics have suggested the rational choice
model cannot fully explain voting behavior.
Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen offer an alternative theory based
on the concept of mobilization (1993). Central to this concept is the idea of social
networks—groups of friends, colleagues, politicians, and interest groups—that exert
pressure on individuals to vote. These social networks work through social pressure.
People want to be valued, and social networks fulfill that need. Politicians have an
incentive to use social networks to mobilize voters in “get out the vote” campaigns
(Blais 2000: 13). Various studies and field experiments have found that social pressure, including communication that encourages voting, can have a significant, positive impact on voter turnout (Mann 2010: 388; Amaro de Matos and Barros 2004: 239).
Interestingly, too much social pressure can also be a bad thing. Research suggests
that politicians who overuse social pressure experience backlash (Matland and Murray 2013). According to one study, a politician who uses social pressure may inadvertently increase voter anger and hostility toward him/herself. Such resentment
then increases the probability that people will vote against the candidate (Matland
and Murray 2013). This concept of mobilization offers a key insight into the possible
causal relationship, tying political scandals to increased election turnout.
Daniel Stockerner and Patricia Calca support this relationship by finding that
political scandals cause higher election turnout (2013: 535). Stockerner and Calca
argue that a political scandal operates as a mobilizing agent. That is, political scandals
anger the public and cause people to vote who would not usually engage in politics.
This theory posits that people vote because they hope to “throw out the bums.” This
causal logic seems reasonable when applied to a country like Canada, which does not
suffer from highly visible endemic corruption. Politicians in Canada are not expected
to be corrupt, so political scandals may be unexpected and shocking, thus angering
the public.
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Other explanations for election turnout include theories that focus on the phenomenon of voter fatigue. Margit Tavits argues that election turnout depends on
institutions. Tavits finds that having a direct election for a president has the effect of
fatiguing voters, which lowers voter turnout. In fact, she finds that having a direct
presidential election lowers voter turnout by 7 percent (2009: 42). In line with Tavits’
work, Richard Boyd suggests that increasing the frequency of elections also reduces
turnout. According to Boyd, countries with more frequent elections will experience
lower voter turnout, as frequent elections fatigue voters (1989: 730). Further expanding on the concept of voter fatigue, Christopher R. Berry and Jacob Gersen argue
that the timing of the election plays a crucial role. The authors found that municipal
elections that coincided with federal elections had substantially larger voter turnout.
Essentially, the authors explain low municipal election turnout using a variation of
voter fatigue; they argue that only the most fervent and dedicated voters will vote
in municipal elections not held in tandem with federal elections (Berry and Gersen
2010: 37).
Furthermore, Maciej A. Gorecki finds that more competitive elections have greater
voter turnout. Studying the multiple rounds of voting that take place during Polish
elections for city president, Gorecki found that the political elite increased the intensity
of their campaigning during competitive elections, which persuaded the public to vote
(2009: 291). Although many academics have focused on voter fatigue, some have also
explained voter turnout by drawing on more atypical causal relationships.
Many alternative explanations of voter turnout focus on less conventional
causes. Brad Gomez, Thomas Hansford, and George Krause argue that the small
things are what count. Through a study of U.S. presidential elections, the authors
found that rainy weather decreases election turnout by almost 1 percent per inch of
rain. The authors also found that snow can depress election turnout, although only
by about 0.5 percent per inch of snowfall (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007: 649).
This finding is substantiated by Steve Knack, who also found that inclement weather
depressed election turnout (1994: 187). Additionally, Joseph Robbins, Lance Hunter,
and Gregg R. Murray look at the effect of terrorism on election turnout, finding that
terrorism is positively correlated with election turnout (2013: 495). Robins, Hunter,
and Murray acknowledge that their findings run counter to conventional wisdom.
Their analysis is substantiated, however, by the work of Valentina Bali, who found
that the Madrid train bombing effectively mobilized segments of Spanish society that
were otherwise less likely to participate in elections (2007: 669). Clearly, there are
many unconventional explanations of election turnout.
Little work has been done specifically examining the causes of election turnout
in Canada. Descriptions tend to center on the competitiveness of Canadian elections but some address other factors as well. Howard A. Scarrow offers a few explanations, suggesting that inclement weather and competitiveness both play a role
(1961: 351). James Endersby, Steven Galatas, and Chapman Rackaway also attribute
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Canadian election turnout to competitiveness, finding that the closeness of elections explained turnout in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections (2002). Furthermore,
Donley Studlar presents a pattern of Canadian voter turnout in which provincial
elections have greater turnout than federal elections. Studlar finds that region, population density, and the amount of time elapsed since the last provincial or federal
election have the greatest effects on voter turnout (2001: 299). Michael Martinez and
Jeff Gill highlight a particularly troubling trend in Canadian elections: the decline
in election turnout. They show that between 1979 and 1998 there was a systemic
decline in election turnout but fail to offer specific explanations for this trend (Martinez and Gill 2006). In contrast to the lack of academic studies regarding election
turnout in Canada, there has been notable work dealing with the general effects of
political corruption on election turnout.
Some research argues that political corruption will increase election turnout by
either galvanizing voters to “throw out the bums” or, inversely, to claim benefits
from rent-seeking politicians. Stockerner and Calca find that in Portugal, political corruption is positively correlated with election turnout. The authors find that
municipalities with high levels of corruption have election turnout several percentage points higher than municipalities with low levels of corruption. The authors
suggest that political corruption is a mobilizing agent, because news about corruption angers the public enough to incite them to vote (Stockerner and Calca 2013:
535). Gokhan Karahan, Morris Coats, and William Shughart also find that political
corruption increases election turnout, although their explanation of the causal relationship is much more cynical. Karahan, Coats, and Shughart suggest that corrupt
politicians are willing to distribute the gains of holding office to voters in return for
votes. Therefore, as corrupt politicians gain greater power, they are willing and able
to buy more votes. The authors substantiate these claims with a finding in Mississippi’s 1987 county supervisor elections (which took place after an FBI investigation
resulted in the conviction of 55 of 410 county supervisors). They determined that
Mississippians voted more in corrupt than non-corrupt counties (Karahan, Coats,
and Shughart 2006: 87).
Conversely, some academics also argue that political corruption will decrease
voter turnout. Using a broad sample of democratic countries, Daniel Stockerner,
Bernadette LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs find that political corruption is inversely
correlated with election turnout (2012: 74). In a study of Mexican voting, James
McCann and Jorge Dominguez found that widespread suspicions of fraud and
corruption made it less likely that opposition supporters voted, thus depressing
election turnout (1998: 483). It is clear that political corruption is related to voter
participation, though the nature of this relationship remains controversial.

Sponsorship Scandal

Following the 1995 Referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the governing Liberal
Party established a fund to raise Canada’s profile in Quebec. Revelations of corrup108
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tion involving this fund later became known as the “federal sponsorship scandal.”
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reports that the sponsorship scandal all
started with “rumours and whispers about the fund” (CBC 2006). Although the fund
was distributing federal money in Quebec, there were no application forms, and it was
unclear how the money was being used. In 2000, initial indications of government
corruption came to light as Public Works Minister Alfonso Gagliano faced public
criticism for awarding contracts to a company which hired his son as an executive.
Two years later, newly appointed Public Works Minister Don Boudria came under
fire for failing to find a report on cultural and sporting activities for which the government had paid $550,000. In time, the report was found. However, the Globe and Mail
asserted that this report was nearly identical to another report produced by a firm
which received $575,000 in government payment. Eventually, public pressure forced
Prime Minister Chretien to ask the auditor general of Canada to investigate.
Auditor General Sheila Fraser released reports in 2002 and 2004 that were highly
critical of the government, and the government responded by forming a Commission
of Inquiry in the lead up to the 2004 election. In 2002, Fraser released a preliminary
report accusing the government of breaking “just about every rule in the book.” Fraser then proceeded to ask the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to investigate
Groupaction, a firm that had been heavily involved with the sponsorship fund. The
RCMP raided Groupaction and began to investigate the Public Works Department. In
2004, Fraser released her second report on the sponsorship fund. This report implicated several senior government officials; Fraser discovered that government officials
had shown blatant disregard for rules and had mismanaged millions of dollars in
advertising and sponsorship money. The report detailed how the government had
paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, through contracts that were never officially
assigned, to firms that were not required to do any work. According to the report, the
corruption was “such a blatant misuse of funds that it is shocking” (CBC 2004).
Under public pressure, and having already contemplated it, Prime Minister Jean
Chretien retired from public office. Chretien’s successor, Paul Martin, promptly fired
the former public works minister, Gagliano, from his ambassadorship post. Martin
also suspended the heads of three Crown corporations and vowed to resign if any
evidence surfaced which linked him personally to the scandal. Perhaps the most
significant action Martin took was to ask Justice John Gomery to head an official
Commission of Inquiry into the sponsorship program (CBC 2006). The Gomery Commission, as it came to be known, did not begin hearing testimony until after a scheduled federal election in June 2004, which the Liberal Party only narrowly survived
(CBC 2008).
The Liberal Party retained a minority government in 2004, although the Gomery Commission’s report triggered another election in 2006. Prior to the sponsorship
scandal, the Liberal Party was heavily favored, with many expecting the Liberal Party
would retain its majority. But the Liberal Party dropped heavily in the polls in the
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lead-up to the election. On Election Day 28 June 2004, the Liberal Party managed to
win only enough seats to form a minority government, the first in twenty-five years
(CBC 2008). The Liberal Party respite was short-lived; in February 2005, the Gomery Commission issued hundreds of subpoenas and heard testimony throughout
the year (CBC 2008). On 1 November 2005, the commission released its first report,
absolving Jean Chretien and Paul Martin of personal wrongdoing. However, the
report stated that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) did bear some responsibility,
because the PMO was responsible for running the sponsorship program. Regardless,
the opposition parties demanded that the government resign and call a new election
(CBC 2006). Initially, Martin refused to resign, but after the Liberal Party lost the support of the NDP (New Democratic Party of Canada), the opposition parties joined
together in a vote of non-confidence in late November 2005. This triggered the election held in 2006 (CBC 2008).
The 2006 federal election, held on 23 January, was a disaster for the Liberal Party.
The Liberals managed to win only 103 seats in Parliament while the Conservatives
won 124 seats. For the first time in twelve years, the Liberals were unable to win
enough seats to form the government, and the Conservatives formed a minority government. This election was followed by the release of the second part of the Gomery
Commission’s report. The report included a series of recommendations for reforms
to increase transparency and accountability in government (O’Neal and Smith 2006).

Methodology

To test the hypothesis that political scandals increase voter turnout, the effect of
the sponsorship scandal on voter turnout in the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections is studied. Although a quantitative test on the effect of the sponsorship scandal
in subsequent Canadian elections would be preferable, a quantitative test that examined elections generally would have too few observations to have statistical significance. Therefore, this article first looks at general trends in voter turnout in Canada
across a series of elections from 1984 to 2011. This information is then complemented
by a quantitative analysis of voter turnout, using survey data from the 2004 and 2006
iterations of the Canadian Election Study (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011).
Using this dataset, the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior in both the 2004 and 2006 election is tested, followed by a test of key components
in the causal relationship between the variables.
Variables
To determine general trends in voter turnout, data from Elections Canada is
used. This source is run by the Canadian federal government and includes official turnout for every election since 1867. This analysis focuses on the most recent
trends, so only elections from 1984 to 2011 are examined. It should be noted that the
1992 election was the referendum on Quebec sovereignty. Results from Quebec are
not included for that year, as Quebec held its own referendum. Furthermore, elec110
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tion turnout from the 1993 and 2000 elections were adjusted after the election following maintenance on the National Register of Electors that removed duplicates
(caused by electors moving) and electors who were deceased (Elections Canada
2013). These updated numbers are used, as they are the numbers officially used by
the Canadian government.
To determine the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, data is taken from the Canadian
Election Study that was run during both years. These two Canadian election surveys are cross-sectional surveys, meaning new respondents were selected for both
years. However, about half of the 2006 survey sample also participated in the 2004
Canadian Election Survey. Respondents to the survey were interviewed exclusively
by phone. The respondents were selected randomly from a directory of phone numbers generated by the Canadian Election Survey to represent all possible phone
numbers in Canada. Once a household was identified, the interviewer asked for
the number of adults in the household. If there was more than one adult in the
household, the adult with the closest birthday was selected. As the Canadian Election Survey is intended to represent all eligible Canadian voters, only Canadian
citizens eighteen years of age or older were eligible to participate in the survey. Furthermore, the sample was weighted by household size and province to ensure the
results were representative of the population of Canada (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka,
and Stolle 2011).
The Canadian Election Study had three components: a Campaign-Period Survey
(CPS), a Post-Election Survey (PES), and a Mail-Back Survey (MBS). The 2004 election
survey consisted of all three of these portions; however, the 2006 Canadian Election Study consisted of only the first two components, meaning that the MBS portion
of the survey was excluded. The CPS was conducted during the official campaign
period of the election. In the 2004 election, the campaign period lasted the thirty-six
days leading up to 28 June 2004. In the 2006 election, the campaign period was 30
November 2005, until the election on 22 January 2006 (a period of fifty-four days).
The PES survey started a week after the 2004 election and a day after the 2006 election. The MBS survey commenced one week after the PES survey had started, and
responses were accepted until the end of November of that year. Responses to each
of the portions of the survey vary, with the CPS portion of the survey receiving the
highest response rate. Below is a summary of the number of completed interviews for
each portion of the survey:
CPS

PES

MBS

2004

4,323

3,138

1,674

2006

4,058

1,684

___
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From the Canadian Election Study Documentation
To determine individual voting behavior during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, questions from the CPS portion of the Canadian Election Survey are the primary source, but some responses are drawn from the PES and MBS portions of the
Canadian Election Survey. In the following sections, the dependent, independent,
and control variables are described. These are the variables used to test the general
hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters during the 2004 and 2006
election. Following this section, the method for testing the causal relationship (as
described in the hypothesis) is also outlined.
Dependent Variable
For both the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Survey, respondents were asked
in English or French the question, “Did YOU vote in the election?” Respondents
were given the option of answering “yes,” “no,” or “do not know” (Fournier, Cutler,
Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Out of all of the respondents to the PES surveys for both
years, only five people refused to answer. It is possible that some respondents lied
about voting in the election or forgot if they had voted or not.
Independent Variables
Data is taken from the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Survey
to measure attitudes toward the sponsorship scandal. During the campaign period
(in the CPS portion of the survey), the Canadian Election Survey asked respondents
the question “Does [the sponsorship scandal] make you very angry, somewhat angry,
not very angry, or not angry at all?” These responses were recoded in ascending order
so that “not angry at all” was coded as a 0, and “very angry” was coded as a 3. The
interviewer also coded for respondents that did not know anything about the scandal
or did not know how they felt about the scandal. Those respondents were omitted in
this analysis (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Ideally, respondents that did
not know about the scandal would be coded as being “not angry at all.” However,
since those respondents could not be separated from people that responded by saying
they did not know how they felt about the scandal, it was necessary to omit them.
Across both surveys, a total of 458 respondents were omitted.
Control Variables
Attempts are made to control for other factors that could explain variation in voting behavior. Control variables for demographics include age, gender, and education.
The Canadian Election Study data includes the year of birth. This allows the age of
each of the respondents at the time of the 2004 and 2006 federal elections to be easily
calculated. The Canadian Election Study data also included the gender of the respondent. Education was controlled for using the question “What is the highest level of
education that you have completed?” This question was asked during the CPS survey, so all of the respondents to both the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Study
survey were asked. There were eleven possible answers to this question. No school112
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ing through completed elementary school was coded as 1–3, some secondary/high
school through completed high school was coded as 4–5, some technical education,
community college, CEGEP, or college classique through a professional or doctoral
degree was coded as 6–11 (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). All respondents
who refused to respond to this question or who answered “do not know” were omitted.
Region and partisanship were also controlled, using data from the Canadian
Election Study. Respondents were coded for region depending on the Canadian province in which they resided. Respondents were also asked how they felt about each of
the major political parties in Canada. This question was asked during the CPS survey.
Interviewers were instructed to emphasize that the question was about the respective
federal parties as opposed to the provincial or local version of the party. The question
used in this analysis was about the federal Liberal Party and looked like this: “How
do you feel about the FEDERAL Liberal party.” Interviewers were then instructed
to ask the respondents to rate the federal Liberal Party on a 100 point scale, with a 0
being coded as “really dislike” and a 100 being coded as “really like.” Respondents
that refused to answer or answered that they did not know any of the parties were
coded as 50.
To test the causal relationship between the sponsorship scandal and voter turnout, data was taken from the MBS portion of the Canadian Election Study. Unfortunately, the MBS survey was not conducted during the 2006 election. As such, the
causal relationship described in the hypothesis can be tested only for the 2004 election. It is hypothesized that that the sponsorship scandal angered voters who then
became increasingly politically active. These galvanized voters then voted in greater
numbers in an effort to “throw out the bums.” To test this hypothesis, the relationship
between the sponsorship scandal and political activity and the relationship between
political activity and voting are both examined. Political activity is operationalized
by using the question, “During the most recent election how often did you talk to
other people to persuade them to vote for a particular party or candidate?” Respondents were given four possible answers: “Frequently,” “Occasionally,” “Rarely,” and
“Never.” These responses were recoded in ascending order with “Never” coded as a
“0” and “Frequently” coded as a “3.” This question was also used to test the relationship between political activity and voting, with voting being measured as previously
discussed (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011).

Test Results

Canadian election turnout from 1984 to 2011 was used to look at general trends
in election turnout surrounding the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. Then a series of
statistical tests were run to determine the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior during those respective elections.
The general trends in election turnout suggest that the sponsorship scandal
played a role in increasing election turnout. Graph 1a demonstrates that from 1984
to 2004, election turnout was steadily declining. Martinez and Gill also noticed
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this decline in election turnout, although they failed to offer an explanation for this
decline (2006). Interestingly, the 2006 election saw a major spike in election turnout.
This is especially significant given that the increase in election turnout was counter
to an eighteen-year trend of declining election turnout. This spike in election turnout
may be attributable to the sponsorship scandal, as the 2006 election was triggered by
the opposition, using the sponsorship scandal as justification. Graph 2a illustrates
this spike in election turnout. Perhaps election turnout in 2004 was not as heavily
influenced by the sponsorship scandal as the official Gomery Commission report had
not yet been published. In fact, voters waiting for the official inquiry into the sponsorship scandal to conclude before drawing conclusions would not have been ready
to punish politicians at the polls until the 2006 election, as the official investigation
concluded between the two elections in 2005.
The analysis of individual voting behavior suggests the sponsorship scandal
caused election turnout to increase in the 2004 election. During the 2004 general election, voters’ attitudes about the sponsorship scandal had a statistically significant
effect on election turnout, as illustrated in Table 1a. A one-unit increase in how angry
voters felt about the sponsorship scandal (for example, going from “not angry at
all”to “not very angry” or from “somewhat angry” to “very angry”) increased the
Graph 1a: Canadian Federal Election Turnout 1984–2011

Graph 2a: Canadian Federal Eection Turnout 1997–2001
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Table 1a: 2004 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Sponsorship Scandal

-0.0239***
(0.002)

0.015***
(0.005)

Gender(Male)

__

0.005
(0.013)

Age

__

0.003***
(0.000)

Education

__

0.017***
(0.003)

British Columbia

__

___

Alberta

__

0.015
(0.027)

Saskatchewan

__

0.017
(0.032)

Manitoba

__

-0.016
(0.033)

Ontario

__

0.018
(0.021)

Quebec

__

-0.019
(0.022)

New Brunswick

__

0.001
(0.041)

Nova Scotia

__

0.033
(0.044)

PEI

__

-0.024
(0.040)

Newfoundland

__

-0.088**
0.038

Political Affiliation

__

0.000
(0.000)

N

3004

1904

Pseudo

0.033

0.114

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:

Note: The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for
“did not vote” and a 1 for “voted.” The results are reported at the 90 percent*, 95 percent** and
99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

probability of voting by 1.5 percent. Although this effect is small in absolute numbers,
compared to other statistically significant factors that affect voting, the sponsorship
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Table 1b: 2006 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Sponsorship Scandal

0.022***
(0.005)

0.016***
(0.005)

Gender(Male)

__

0.015
(0.012)

Age

__

0.002***
(0.000)

Education

__

0.000
(0.000)

British Columbia

__

___

Alberta

__

-0.020
(0.027)

Saskatchewan

__

-0.005
(0.035)

Manitoba

__

-0.062**
(0.030)

Ontario

__

-0.018
(0.021)

Quebec

__

-0.029
(0.022)

New Brunswick

__

0.031
(0.050)

Nova Scotia

__

-0.043
(0.035)

PEI

__

-0.042
(0.038)

Newfoundland

__

-0.080**
0.036

Political Affiliation

__

0.000
(0.000)

N

1673

1639

Pseudo

0.017

0.095

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:

Note: The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for
“did not vote” and a 1 for “voted.” The results are reported at the 90 percent*, 95 percent** and
99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

scandal has reasonably strong substantive significance. An increase in education, for
instance, only increases the probability of voting by 1.7 percent. Likewise, a decade
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in age only increases the probability of voting by 3 percent. Accordingly, it seems
that attitudes toward the sponsorship scandal were positively correlated with voting probability. These results support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal
mobilizes voters.
The analysis of individual voting behavior during the 2006 federal election also
suggests that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters, leading to greater election
turnout. During the 2006 election, a one-unit increase in how angry voters felt about the
election increased the probability of voting by 1.6 percent. In comparison, a one decade
difference in age only increased the probability of voting by 2 percent. Interestingly,
in 2006, education did not have a statistically significant effect on voting. As shown in
Table 1b, these results suggest that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters.
The test of the causal relationship suggests the sponsorship scandal did in fact
mobilize voters during the 2004 federal election in Canada. Table 2a contains the
results of a test of the relationship between attitudes about the sponsorship scandal
and political activity. The first test returned a statistically significant result that indicates a positive relationship between the sponsorship scandal and political activity,
meaning that the more angry voters were, the more politically active they became.
When run without control variables, the test indicated that a one-unit increase in anger
Table 2a: 2004 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Sponsorship Scandal

1.175***
(0.026)

0.076**
(0.034)

Gender(Male)

__

0.163***
(0.051)

Age

__

0.005***
(0.001)

Education

__

0.063***
(0.012)

Province

__

0.003**
(0.001)

Political Affiliation

__

0.003
(0.001)

1583

1583

0.000

0.032

Yes

Yes

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:
N
Robust Standard Errors

Notes: Regression. The dependent variable is political activity coded in ascending order from
“never” politically active to “frequently” politically active. The results are reported at the 90
percent,* 95 percent, ** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.
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about the sponsorship scandal is associated with a corresponding increase in political
activity. Adding control variables does not drop the result out of statistical significance, but does lower the substantive significance of the result—a one-unit increase in
anger is now associated with only a small increase in political activity. Regardless, the
results support the causal relationship hypothesis, indicating a positive relationship
between anger about the sponsorship scandal and political activity.
The relationship between political activity and voting behavior was tested next.
The results of this test are reported in Table 2b. These results indicate a statistically
significant positive relationship between political activity and voting. In fact, as political activity increases by one unit, the probability of voting increases by about 4.5
percent. A person that is very politically active is thus 18 percent more likely to vote
than someone who is not at all politically active. As both parts of the test of the causal
relationship gave statistically significant positive results, it is concluded that the tests
of the causal relationship support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters during the 2004 Canadian federal election.

Conclusion

Results of the statistical analysis indicate the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters, since anger about the sponsorship scandal is positively correlated with increased
voter turnout. The results confirm that political scandals in Canada have an overall
Table 2b: 2004 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Political Activity

0.050***
(0.007)

0.045***
(0.007)

Gender(Male)

__

-0.013
(0.013)

Age

__

0.002***
(0.000)

Education

__

0.014***
(0.003)

Province

__

0.000
(0.000)

Political Affiliation

__

0.000***
(0.000)

N

1583

1583

Pseudo

0.055

0.122

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:

Notes: Probit. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded
with a 0 for “did not vote” and a 1 for “voted.” The results are reported at the 90 percent,* 95
percent, ** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a probit model.
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positive effect on voter turnout. Common sense may dictate that political scandals
have a detrimental effect on democracy. Many Eastern European countries have
experienced endemic corruption and political scandals, which have lowered citizens’ expectations for democracy. Recently in Egypt, the inefficiencies and imperfections of politicians led to the reinstallation of a military dictatorship, a dictatorship
tolerated and even supported by Egyptian liberals. However, in a country such as
Canada, with a long history of democracy, scandals may have an overall positive
effect. According to the tests performed in this analysis, anger over the sponsorship
scandal contributed to the reversal of a decade-long trend of decreasing voter turnout. In effect, the sponsorship scandal served to reinvigorate the electorate. It may be
that a succession of serious political scandals could weaken and erode democracy.
But in a rich, Western country such as Canada, the occasional political scandal—such
as the ongoing Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal—may infuse much needed energy
into the system. Indeed, the Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal may be just what the
doctor ordered.
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Gender, Corruption, and Culture:
Evidence from the American States
by Luke Bell

Introduction

In recent years, several influential studies have reported that high levels of
female representation in national legislatures seem to correspond with low levels
of countrywide corruption. Scholars have expressed excitement at the prospect that
simply adding women to government will “diminish the need for a painful, expensive, and politically difficult process of rooting out corruption via oversight and
prosecution” (Esarey and Chirillo 2013: 364). Some governments have launched
initiatives to increase the number of women in positions of public responsibility as
a means of combating corrupt behavior. Peru, for example, recently created an allwomen police division in an attempt to curb instances of extortion in traffic ticketing, and Mexico took similar action several years later (Karim 2011; Keating 2013).
Does the mere presence of female public officials truly ward off corruption, or are
other factors at work?
This paper focuses on whether female representation in American state legislatures is negatively correlated with levels of state corruption, controlling for institutions and other state characteristics. I begin by reviewing existing explanations for
the association between female participation and corruption, after which I lay out
my theory and hypotheses. Next, I describe the variables, data sources, and quantitative models I used to test my hypotheses and present empirical results. Overall, I
find that the proportion of women in state legislatures is significantly and negatively
correlated with corruption in cross-sectional models. I argue that state corruption is
better explained by broader political cultural factors that vary between states, such as
female opportunity in general, education, and other within-state dynamics.
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Literature Review

The debate over whether women bring a purifying presence to the public sphere
is not new. Orestes Brownson, a prominent anti-suffragist, summarizes a common
suffragette argument, stating “We have heard it argued that, if women were to take
part in our elections . . . her presence would do more than a whole army of police officials to maintain order, to banish all fighting, drinking, . . . venality, and corruption”
(Brownson 1869). Recent research by World Bank scholars has rekindled the debate
about whether women really are the “fairer sex.” In a 2001 study, David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti find a persistent negative correlation between the
proportion of women in national legislatures and perceived corruption. These findings, replicated with three distinct corruption measures on a cross-sectional sample
of over one hundred countries, retain significance in the presence of controls for
civil liberties, population, GDP, region, and ethnic fractionalization (Dollar, Fisman,
and Gatti 2001). A contemporaneous study using several cross-national corruption
measures, micro-level surveys of Georgian businesses, and attitudinal data from the
World Values Survey also produces evidence of a link between gender and corruption (Swamy et al. 2001). The authors find that “greater participation by women in
the market and government is associated with lower levels of corruption” and that
women are less likely than men to condone hypothetical scenarios of corrupt behavior (Swamy et al. 2001: 27).
Scholarly studies on female political representation and corruption offer several
explanations for the correlations observed in the studies mentioned above. In general,
academic explanations for the apparent association between gender and levels of corruption can be grouped into four categories: gender gap in corrupt behavior, democratic institutions, institutional deterrence, and political culture. I discuss each of these
schools of thought in turn, drawing on literature from various behavioral disciplines.
Gender Gap
Those who subscribe to the “gender gap” argument, broadly speaking, tend to
claim that female participation in government is negatively correlated with corruption, because women infuse honesty into the public sphere. These explanations draw
on attitudinal studies, which, on the whole, suggest that women are more ethical than
men. One such study finds that female U.S. Coast Guard employees score significantly higher than their male counterparts on “Defining Issues Tests,” questionnaires
that confront respondents with various moral dilemmas (White Jr. 1999: 467). Similarly, a meta-analysis of fifty-six tests of this type finds that women are substantially
more likely to volunteer ethical responses than men at all age and education levels
(Thoma 1986). Business ethics studies also assert that women hold to higher ethical
standards in inter-personal situations (Dawson 1997) and express greater intolerance
for unethical practices (Franke, Crown, and Spake 1997; Glover et al. 1997).
Regarding corruption specifically, Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti use gender gap logic
to explain their results, tracing the relationship between female representation and
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corruption to the female propensity to exhibit “higher standards of ethical behavior
and be more concerned with the common good” (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001: 427).
Using this same line of reasoning, Swamy et al. conclude “there is indeed a gender
differential in tolerance for corruption” (Swamy et al. 2001: 51). Citing original experimental evidence, Rivas, too, claims women are less corrupt than men and “increasing
participation by women in . . . politics would be expected to help in fighting corruption” (Rivas 2008: 32).
Democratic Institutions
Rejecting the gender gap explanation for the correlation between female representation and corruption, other scholars argue that the connection can be explained
by variation in political institutions between countries. Hung-en Sung, for instance,
argues that “both female participation in government and lower levels of corruption
are dependent on a liberal democratic polity” (Sung 2003: 703). That is, he asserts,
the relationship between female political involvement and low levels of corruption
is spurious in that both variables are caused not by gendered differences in behavior,
but macro-level features of liberal democracy such as a free press, independent judiciary, and the rule of law (Sung 2003). In a separate panel study, Sung reveals further
evidence that liberal democracy mediates the link between female participation and
corruption, concluding that the strength of democracy is a significant predictor of
both corruption and women in government (Sung 2012: 213).
Institutional Deterrence
A third thread of research modifies individual-level gender gap explanations of
corruption to account for institutional deterrence. Experimental studies suggest that
women’s willingness to engage in corruption may depend on perceptions of monitoring and risk (Schulze and Frank 2003: 16; Armantier and Boly 2011). An experiment
in Burkina Faso, for instance, examines how participants instructed to grade papers
react when offered a bribe in exchange for a passing grade. The researchers find that
female graders are less likely to accept bribes than their male counterparts but only
when the risk of detection is high. Women are more likely to accept the bribe in the
absence of risk (Armantier and Boly 2011). Likewise, Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo
argue that because they are held to higher ethical standards and are more likely to
be punished than men, women in corruption-averse societies respond to systemic
discriminatory incentives to avoid corrupt behavior (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). Similarly, Anne Marie Goetz argues that women in liberal democracies do not have the
same opportunities for corrupt behavior as men; given the opportunity to abuse
power, she argues, women “will not passively conform to the idealized notions
of their finer moral nature” (Goetz 2007: 102). In brief, these arguments find that
individual-level female characteristic interact with systematic incentives such as
monitoring and enforcement, and that this interaction effectively explains the gendercorruption connection.
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Political Culture
In contrast to the gender gap, democratic institutional, and institutional deterrence explanations described above, I argue that the relationship between high
female representation and low corruption is driven by the existence of political cultures characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness, as evidenced by high levels
of overall female opportunity. International studies have found that countries with
an “egalitarian culture” are significantly more likely to have large proportions of
women represented in parliament (Kenworthy and Malami 1999: 24; Matland 1998:
121). Moreover, countries where public support for gender egalitarianism is high are
substantially more likely to exhibit lower levels of corruption overall (Seleim and
Bontis 2009). Corroborating the importance of political culture, a survey measuring
corruption-related attitudes of public officials in Ghana suggests that an infusion
of female officials does little to curb corruption when opportunities, networks, and
social expectations for corruption remain in place (Alhassan-Aloho 2007: 236). Taken
on the whole, the political cultural hypothesis suggests that simply adding women to
government may not alleviate corruption unless the increase in female representation
corresponds with more fundamental cultural changes.
Of course, the demarcation between institutions and political culture is vague, if
not completely fluid. Institutions are, in many ways, a reflection of the cultures that
adopt them, and cultural values can be influenced by institutional forces. That said,
both democratic and deterrence institutional arguments focus on how the presence
of institutions themselves affects the gender-corruption relationship, whereas my
research attempts to examine gender, culture, and corruption, holding institutions
constant. Consequently, while political culture is connected to the institutions present
in a given society, I treat the two as separate concepts in my analysis.

Case Selection

With these potential explanations—gender, democratic institutions, institutional
deterrence, and political culture—in mind, I attempt to add to the debate on whether
the presence of women in politics has an independent negative effect on corruption.
To do so, I analyze overall state corruption and female participation in the legislatures of the fifty U.S. states. The setting of the U.S. offers several advantages. For one,
government structure is relatively standard across the country, and each state has an
independent judiciary and well-established respect for principles such as the rule of
law and freedom of the press. State electoral systems are also quite similar. The vast
majority of states have bi-cameral legislatures and independent executive branches
(though there is some interstate variation in branch power).
Additionally, as part of the U.S., the states share a liberal democratic heritage
that encourages citizens and elites to frown on abuses of public power. Since my
entire universe of cases resides within a democratic context, my research will evaluate whether an increased female presence in government tends to reduce corruption,
absent of significant variation in levels of liberal democracy. My results will also yield
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insight into whether the number of women in government affects corruption within
a country where, on the whole, corruption is highly stigmatized. In short, this paper
contributes to existing literature by examining the link between gender and corruption within the purely democratic context of the American states.

Theory and Hypotheses

Because observational and experimental studies yield mixed evidence about
the link between female representation and corruption, my research has two principal objectives:
1. Determine whether the negative correlation between female political representation and corruption holds within the liberal democratic context of the
American states.
2. Determine whether the correlation can be attributed primarily to a gender gap in
corrupt behavior, state institutions, institutional deterrence, or political culture.
With regard to the first objective, I postulate that the correlation between gender and
corruption will persist among the American states. Stated formally:
H1: There is a negative cross-sectional correlation between female representation and
state corruption.
Given that both this and cross-national studies evaluate the relationship between
individual legislator characteristics and overall corruption among public officials
(rather than corruption in the legislature alone), the relationship cannot simply be
traced to a feminine Midas touch for reducing unethical behavior. Even if women are
significantly less corrupt than men at the individual-level, using individual legislator
characteristics to make inferences about an aggregate-level phenomenon is logically
inappropriate. As Sung notes, this type of reasoning causes researchers to “risk aggregative error associated with the individualist fallacy” (Sung 2003: 705). This is especially true because the gender makeup of the legislature may not reflect the gender
composition of the vast pool of other public officials. Consequently, evaluating the
proportion of women in the legislature does not lend itself to individual-level inferences about overall corruption among public officials. Given that individual legislator
traits and the overall number of corruption convictions are not on the same logical
plane, the gender gap explanation does not seem to hold water.
While it is possible that differences in political institutions are important determinants of cross-national variation in corruption, I do not believe that aspects of
liberal democracy are the missing nexus between gender and corruption in the
United States. For one, the American political arena, unlike the international political atmosphere, features government institutions that are extremely similar across
states. Minute institutional fluctuations such as campaign finance initiative, referendum, and recall laws are also unlikely to have discernible effects on corruption
rates (Meier and Holbrook 1992: 145). What is more, differences in institutions fail
to account for meaningful interstate variation in female representation (Hill 1981:
159). Hence, I argue that the presence of democratic institutions does not adequately
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explain the relationship between female representation and corruption, leading to
my second hypothesis:
H2: The relationship between female representation and corruption remains statistically
significant in the presence of institutional controls.
If neither gender gap nor democratic institutional theories adequately explain
the relationship between female political involvement and corruption, does institutional deterrence? On one hand, experimental studies provide evidence that women
may behave more or less ethically than men depending on levels of risk. And the
American corruption literature shows that deterrence is a strong predictor of state
corruption (Alt and Lassen 2011; Goel and Nelson 1998). While institutions that discourage corruption may alter individual female behavior, deterrence likely does not
explain the macro-level relationship between corruption and female representation
for the same reasons that gender gap theories are unconvincing: individual-level
reactions to institutional incentives do not logically aggregate to statewide reductions
in corruption. Although deterrence is associated with lower overall corruption rates in
the U.S., I argue that the relationship between female representation and corruption
will remain largely the same when deterrence is taken into consideration. Thus:
H3: The relationship between female representation and corruption remains statistically
significant in the presence of controls for institutional deterrence.
The Importance of Political Culture
Departing from the gender gap, democratic institutional, and institutional
deterrence explanations, I argue that the correlation between corruption and female
representation is best explained in terms of the political culture (of which female representation is a part) in which corruption and gender interact. This assertion raises
the question: what is political culture? Admittedly, political culture is a somewhat
amorphous concept that has been broadly construed to encompass a host of different
variables, particularly in relation to corruption. David C. Nice, for example, traces
much of the interstate variation in corruption convictions to political culture, which
he defines as levels of education and urbanization (Nice 1983). In the international
context, Seymour Lipset and Gabriel Lenz discuss political culture in terms of country characteristics like income inequality, education, social diversity, and ethnic fractionalization (Lipset and Lenz 2000).
Political culture has also been used to describe a country’s religious environment.
Treisman, argues that the moral individualism stressed by protestant denominations
may be partially responsible for the formation of “legal cultures” that discourage
corrupt behavior (Treisman 2000). Others use a more attitudinal approach; studies of
female participation in state legislatures discuss political culture in terms of public
attitudes toward female involvement in government and sex roles more generally
(Hill 1981). American public-opinion research, on the other hand, emphasizes the
importance of ideology and partisanship as indicators of “unique political cultures of
individual states” (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987L: 798).
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I again note that the distinction drawn between political culture and institutions
may be overly fine. Political institutions reflect the underlying values of the society
that adopts them, and cultural attitudes may change or be reinforced by institutional incentives. This is particularly true of deterrence. A strong societal emphasis
on exposing illicit behavior is an element of political culture, but usually manifests
itself in institutions that deter corruption. That said, because this paper attempts to
parse out whether the relationship between female representation and corruption is
an explicit function of institutional incentives or is somehow reflective of state political values, I sacrifice a certain degree of complexity for the sake of theoretical clarity.
Elements of State Political Culture
In any event, the examples articulated above illustrate that, to some extent, the
definition of political culture is contingent upon the context in which it is used. In
my research, I do not presume to offer an exhaustive definition of political culture.
Truly, any attempt to do so would extend well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
I emphasize specific elements of political culture conceivably related to corruption
in the American states, namely, opportunities for women, education, legislative professionalism, citizen and elite ideology, political competition, and deterrence. In the
paragraphs that follow, I justify my use of these variables in relation to their potential
bearing on state corruption.
The opportunities available to women in both public and private spheres, a central concern of this paper, are an essential part of political culture as it relates to corruption. Female opportunity may be a reflection of the values and social norms of a
given state and, therefore, may be linked to ideas about fairness, egalitarianism, and
the individual in relation to society and government. Put differently, high proportions of women in public office may be associated with a political culture that stresses
inclusion and equal opportunity, which are in turn associated with low tolerance for
violations of public trust. Several studies mentioned previously find that egalitarian
cultures tend to have strong female political representation (Kenworthy and Malami
1999: 24; Matland 1998: 121) and that countries that support gender egalitarianism
experience low levels of corruption (Seleim and Bontis 2009).
Popular conceptions of state government and society may also relate to attitudes
about corruption as well as gender. Drawing on the categories of political culture
pioneered by Daniel Elazar (Elazar 1972), John G. Peters and Susan Welch find that
legislators in states with a “moralistic culture” that emphasizes the common good
over personal interests tend to be less tolerant of corruption than those in more individualistic or traditional cultures (Peters and Welch 1978). Likewise, Diamond argues
that moralistic cultures offer more female opportunity, since states with such cultures
are more “receptive to the values and style that have been associated with women—
concern with the public welfare rather than private enrichment” (Diamond 1977: 165).
Because political cultures in which the public good is placed at a premium are likely
to simultaneously encourage female inclusion and frown on corruption—an obvious
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threat to collective welfare—I assert that states with a political culture that fosters
greater female opportunity will exhibit lower levels of corruption. That said, I note
that while the proportion of female legislators is a useful proxy for female opportunity and progressive political culture more generally, a more broadly applicable measure for female opportunity will provide a better estimation of state political values.
Accordingly, I present my third and fourth hypotheses:
H4: A state’s overall levels of overall female opportunity will have a more meaningful
effect on corruption than does the proportion of women in the state legislature.
H5: In the long term, female legislative representation will not be significantly correlated
with corruption, though overall female opportunity will remain significant over time.
While measures of female opportunity may prove to be useful gauges of state
attitudes, political culture clearly encompasses more than attitudes about gender and
equality alone. Though not directly related to my hypotheses per se, levels of citizen
education and legislative professionalism are also relevant aspects of political culture.
Scholars find that high levels of public education correspond to both increased female
legislative representation (Camboreco and Barnelo 2003) and decreased levels of corruption (Nice 1983). Similarly, legislative professionalism, measured in terms of a state
legislature’s session length, salary, and staff, often result in lower levels of female representation (Squire 1992). Professionalized legislatures could provide more opportunities for corruption, since legislators who are drawn to a professional political career
may be more motivated by self-interest than are those in citizen legislatures. At the
same time, the direction of the effect of professionalism on corruption is not clear,
since legislators with higher salaries, prestige, and resources may have more incentives
to avoid removal from office than citizen legislators, who might be tempted to supplement their meager state salaries with proceeds from illicit political favors.
Though not obviously related to female legislative representation, I also consider
citizen and elite ideology and political competition to control for factors commonly
understood to have a significance on a state’s political dynamic. State political environments marked by stiff political competition may discourage corruption, since the
risk of exposure and consequent removal from office is higher when elections are
close and rival candidates are actively seeking campaign material. Ideology, which
varies in distinct patterns between states, also has important ramifications for public
attitudes and could relate to tolerance for unethical behavior in government (Erikson,
McIver, and Wright 1987).

Data

Measuring Corruption: Dependent Variable
For the purposes of my research, I define corruption as the “misuse of public
power for private gain” (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91). In the American corruption literature, scholars traditionally utilize one of two operational strategies to measure
corruption. The first relies on the number of convictions of public officeholders, as
reported the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department of
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Justice 2014). The corruption conviction count for a given state reflects all indictments
of public officials, elected or appointed.
The second strategy attempts to replicate the expert surveys used to measure
perceptions of corruption in the cross-national context. The only such survey for the
American states is a questionnaire distributed to reporters covering the House of
Representatives in each state during legislative sessions in 1999. The survey data is
limited to the forty-five states where reporters responded and is only available for
one year (Boylan and Long 2003). In contrast, corruption conviction data are publicly available for every state in each year dating back to 1976. I use the number of
U.S. Department of Justice corruption indictments within a given state, normalized
by state population as the primary dependent variable in my analysis. By doing so,
I significantly increase the number of cases in the sample and allow for panel analysis. Moreover, the conviction-based corruption measure facilitates comparison with
a large body of state corruption literature, since the majority of relevant studies use
normalized convictions as a dependent variable (Nice 1983; Meier and Holbrook
1992; Goel and Nelson 1998; Maxwell and Winters 2005; Glaeser and Saks 2006;
Alt and Lassen 2008; Alt and Lassen 2011). In any case, the convictions variable
correlates positively with the Boylan and Long measure, consistent with comparable research (Alt and Lassen 2008: 40). Even so, I test the robustness of my results
using the survey data, as reported in the New York Times (Boylan and Long 2003;
Marsh 2008).
Like any proxy for actual corruption, the conviction-based measure has limitations, foremost among which is that it only accounts for overt abuses of power
detected and found to be illegal. Since the conviction count variable is inherently
limited to illegal activities, it fails to capture behavior that is unethical, but not illegal.
Consequently, the scope of my analysis will inevitably leave out some “politically
interesting activities” that many Americans would likely perceive as corrupt (Meier
and Holbrook 1993; Peters and Welch 1978). That said, the conviction-based measure tends to produce results that match common perceptions about which states are
most corrupt (Maxwell and Winters 2005). Moreover, the list of most and least corrupt
states produced by this measure matches reasonably well with rankings produced by
other studies in the state corruption literature (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Conviction
counts also provide a relatively objective measure of corruption, unlike the surveybased measures that capture only perceptions of graft. This objectivity helps prevent
misspecification due to survey non-response error, measurement error, inconsistent
responses, and variation between samples (Glaeser and Saks 2006: 1058). Furthermore, because indictments are made by the U.S. Department of Justice, a centralized
federal agency insulated from state influence, enforcement is likely to be consistent
across the fifty states (Nice 198: 508).
As stated above, I normalize the number of corruption convictions by state population. While deflating convictions by the number of state public officials might be a
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more appropriate specification (Maxwell and Winters 2005), the U.S. Census Bureau
discontinued the report providing this data as of 1992 (U.S. Census Bureau 1995).
Consequently, the normalized variable would be outdated for cross-sectional studies of corruption in 2010 and distorted in years after 1992 due to lack of variation in
the variable denominator. Given that other studies of American state corruption normalize by population (Alt and Lassen 2011; Glaeser and Saks 2006) and that related
data is available on a yearly basis (U.S. Census Bureau 2014), I use conviction counts
divided by the state’s annual population in my analysis.
Independent Variables: Political Culture
For my primary independent variable, I use the proportion of women serving in
the state legislature. This proportion reflects the share of women in both chambers
of the state’s legislature (with the exception of Nebraska, which has a unicameral
legislature) and is available on an annual basis through the Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics (Center for American Women and Politics 2014). Another
important variable, the percentage of women with a college education, is available
through the U.S. Census Bureau, while female participation in the labor force can
be located in the U.S. Statistical Abstract (U.S. Census Bureau 2014; U.S. Statistical
Abstract 2012). Overall education, defined here as the percentage of the state population with a college degree, is also obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). To measure legislative professionalism, I employ the widely used
“Squire Index,” a composite variable that accounts for session length, legislator salary, and staff resources (Squire 2007) and is available through State Politics and Policy
Quarterly (State Politics and Political Quarterly 2014).
For other aspects of political culture, I turn to several indices commonly used in
state electoral studies. To quantify political competition, I employ the Ranney index,
which accounts for each party’s share of legislative seats and the gubernatorial vote,
as well as the occurrence of divided government. The index ranges from zero to one
(with zero signifying complete Republican control and one complete Democratic
control) and is available as a rolling average through Indiana State political scientist
Carl Klarner (Klarner 2013). Measures for citizen and elite ideology rely on the Berry
ideology index, which synthesizes ideological positions of congressional candidates
and district-level election results into statewide measures of citizen and elite ideology
(Berry et al. 1998: 331). These data are made available by Richard Fording (Fording 2014).
Control Variables: Institutions and Deterrence
To account for interstate variation in political institutions, I use variables for term
limits, direct initiatives, open primaries, recall laws, and transparency laws. I retrieve
data on term limits, open primaries, and recall laws from the website of the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), a nonpartisan organization that provides
interstate research on various policy initiatives for state legislators and staff. The term
limits variable is a binary field that indicates whether or not a law limiting legisla131
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tive terms has taken effect in a given state, recognizing only those states where the
term limits law has restricted a legislator’s ability to run for office (NCSL 2014a).1 I
operationalize direct initiatives as the presence of a law that allows state citizens to
directly propose either a statute or Constitutional amendment (NCSL 2014b). The
variable for open primaries is also dichotomous and specifies whether a state’s primary nomination system is open to voters of all parties, while the binary variable for
recall laws indicates whether a state has legislation that allows voters to remove state
legislators from office (NCSL 2014b). I account for state transparency policies using
the 2008 Better Government transparency index, which rates states based on freedom
of information, open-meetings, whistleblower protection, and conflict of interest laws
(Better Government Association 2008).
To measure the effect of institutional deterrence on corruption, I use the ratio of
average state-worker to average private-worker salary and state police expenditures.
The ratio of public to private salary is an institutional practice that deters corruption
because public workers may be discouraged from corrupt behavior when they have
more salary to lose (Goel and Rich 198: 274). I calculate this ratio by dividing the average public worker salary by the average private worker salary for each state. The
average public employee salary is the total amount paid in state government salaries
divided by the total number of state employees, while the average private worker salary is the total salaries paid to private sector employees divided by the total number
of private sector workers. I obtain all data for these calculations from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA 2014). State police expenditures may also deter corruption
(Goel and Nelson 1998) and are measured using annual census estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2014).
Finally, in order to ensure that my models do not suffer from omitted variable
bias, I include controls for a series of additional state economic and demographic variables, including income inequality, GSP per capita, household income, unemployment,
urbanization, and government revenue. I measure income inequality using state-level
Gini coefficients calculated by Mark Frank (Frank 2008). Information for Gross State
Product per capita and household income per capita are taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2014), while variables for annual unemployment percentages,
percent population living in urban areas, and government revenue (a proxy for government size) are again informed by U.S. Census Bureau data.2

Quantitative Framework and Results

As mentioned previously, this paper proposes to test the relationship between
corruption and female legislative representation in the American states, as well as
the underlying institutional and political cultural factors that could be responsible for this correlation. Accordingly, my quantitative analysis proceeds in the
following stages:
1. Replication of models from cross-national studies of female representation and
corruption using cross-sectional data from the United States.
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2. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female legislative representation on corruption in the presence of institutional and demographic controls.
3. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female representation on corruption, controlling for institutional deterrence.
4. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female representation on corruption, controlling for elements of political culture not directly related to
female representation.
5. Cross-sectional models that substitute a measure for overall female opportunity for the female representation variable.
6. Fixed-effect models to account for latent determinants of corruption that vary
between states.
Unless otherwise specified, the dependent variable in each of the models is
the five-year lagged average of corruption convictions as of 2010, normalized by
state population. Lagged variables are advantageous because the averages reduce
the possibility that a single year with abnormally high (or low) corruption convictions will bias the regression estimates. This insulation from yearly fluctuation
is particularly beneficial because the American setting yields a relatively small
cross-sectional sample of only fifty cases. Second, the use of averages allows for
maximum comparability with the Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) study, as well
as studies in the American corruption literature, which also use variables averaged
across years (Meier and Holbrook 1992; Maxwell and Winters 2005; Glaeser and
Saks 2006). Because conviction counts are heavily right skewed, I take the log transformation of indictment counts after applying a simple shift parameter (n+1) to the
variable. The resulting dependent variable is normally distributed and produces
corruption rankings similar to those produced by measures in comparable studies
(Glaeser and Saks 2006).
Replication of International Models
In order to determine whether the same correlations observed in international
corruption studies occur among the American states, I use five ordinary least squares
regression models that include the state equivalents of the variables employed in the
specifications put forward by Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001). Models 1, 2, and 4 in
Table 1 illustrate that the proportion of women in state legislatures has a negative
impact on public official corruption conviction that is statistically significant at a 99
percent confidence level. Substantively speaking, the exponentiated coefficient for
women in the legislature indicates that a 1 percent increase in female legislators corresponds with a 4.7 percent decrease in corruption. This relationship holds in the presence of controls for education, gross state product, and region, in both 2010 and 1999.
While the inclusion of controls for region reduces the significance of female representation as a predictor of corruption in 2010 (see model 3), female representation
retains high levels of statistical significance in 1999, suggesting that the relationship
may vary over time. As a robustness check, I test the basic model again using Richard
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Table 1: Corruption and Female Legislators in the U.S.
Variables

Women in
Legislature

(1) 2010

(2) 2010

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (FiveYear Lagged Average)

Expert
Survey

-.0368***
(.0132)

Ln (GSP)
Ln(GSP)2

(3) 2010

(4) 1999

(5) 1999

-.0457***

-.0275*

-.0400***

-.0517**

(.0168)

(.0154)

(.0124)

(.0218)

-2.131

-2.644**

-5.173***

7.345***

(1.422)

(1.307)

(1.366)

(2.157)

.0817

.102*

.219***

-.280***

(.0583)

(.0530)

(.0594)

(.0999)

-.0808

.0276

-1.540**

(.222)

(.184)

(.652)

.126

-.0581

-1.060

(.240)

(.197)

(.701)

-.296

-.158

-.595

(.228)

(.210)

(.626)

Midwest
South
West
% College

.0186

-.0633

(.0210)

(.0583)

Ln (Population)

-.546
(1.281)

Constant

2.065***

15.51*

18.83**

32.22***

-32.31*

(.336)

(8.681)

(7.942)

(7.750)

(16.81)

Observations

50

50

50

49

46

R-squared

.17

.26

.30

.44

.35

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

T. Boylan and Cheryl X. Long’s survey-based corruption measure and find that the
number of women in the legislature continues to have a significant, negative effect
on corruption rates. Thus, the results from my replication of the Dollar, Fisman, and
Gatti models suggest that despite the universal existence of liberal democracy in the
U.S., there is a non-trivial negative relationship between female participation in government and instances of state corruption.
Institutions, Economics, and Demographics
With the existence of a negative correlation between females in the legislature
and corruption in the American states relatively established, I proceed to examine
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whether the relationship holds in models that control for state economic, demographic, and institutional variables. The first model in Table 2 features controls for
state characteristics such as urbanization, real gross state product (GSP) per capita,
the log transformation of government revenue, and education. Consistent with other
studies, the sign and significance of the real GSP per capita variable suggest that more
affluent states tend to observe more corruption convictions (Alt and Lassen 2003).
Notably, the proportion of women in state legislatures continues to have a significant,
negative effect on corruption rates in the presence of demographic and economic
controls, providing further evidence for a cross-sectional link between female representation and corruption. Other models (not shown) that control for state income
inequality and unemployment support the same conclusion.3
Table 2 also indicates that the female representation variable retains statistical and substantive significance when I consider variation in political institutions
across states. The first model, which features institutional factors alone, achieves a
relatively poor fit, explaining only about 20 percent of the variance in corruption
convictions. When other state economic and demographic characteristics are also
included in the regression specification, the fit of the model improves substantially,
achieving a higher R-squared than the models that include either demographic
or institutional variables alone. Model 4 in Table 2 indicates that the presence of
term limits seems to correspond with higher rates of state corruption. Although
this finding seems counterintuitive, it may be that those states that adopt term
limits do so in response to already high levels of government corruption. The presence of direct initiatives, on the other hand, has a negative effect on corruption
that achieves modest levels of statistical significance. Likewise, high transparency
scores are negatively related to the number of corruption convictions in a state,
though the variable achieves only borderline levels of statistical significance. Taken
on the whole, the results from the four models in Table 2 suggest that the number
of women in the legislature maintains significance in the presence of institutional
controls, purely institutional models fail to achieve good fit, and institutional variables such as direct initiatives and transparency laws are associated with modest
reductions in corruption.
Institutional Deterrence
The first two models in Table 3 attempt to gauge the effect of state practices that
deter corruption by including variables for the ratio of public to private sector
worker salaries and state police expenditures. Neither variable comes close to conventional levels of statistical significance, nor do interaction terms that multiply
each deterrence variable on the percentage of female legislators (not shown). In
this model, state police expenditures and public official salary are not significantly
related to corruption. That said, the salary ratio and police expenditure variables do
not seem to fully capture the concept of deterrence. Despite this limitation, my analysis can still comment on the validity of institutional deterrence theories because
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Table 2: Corruption: Gender, Demographics, and Institutions
Variables

Demographics

Institutions

(1) 2010

(2) 2010

(3) 2010

(4) 2010

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (Five-Year Lagged Average)
Women in
Legislature
% Urban
Real GSP Per Capita
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)

-.0405**

-.0330**

-.0388***

(.0168)

(.0155)

(.0135)

-.0123*

-.00820

-.00264

(.00652)

(.00790)

(.00701)

.0288*

.0296**

.0235*

(.0146)

(.0144)

(.0135)

.0296

.0344

.0156

(.0339)

(.0343)

(.0370)

-.0444

-.101

(.0904)

(.0866)

% College Graduates .00416
(.0233)
Open Primaries

.0580
(.187)

Recall Law

-.144
(.216)

Term Limits
Direct Initiative
Transparency

.590**

.573**

(.259)

(.217)

-.488*

-.365

(.272)

(.229)

-.0204**

-.0124

(.00930)

(.00907)

Ln (Population)

-.0847
(.0793)

Constant

1.493

1.594

2.278***

2.852*

(1.305)

(1.266)

(.475)

(1.653)

Controls for Region

No

Yes

No

No

Observations

50

50

50

50

R-squared

.32

.34

.24

.42

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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enforcement is overseen by the Department of Justice, a federal agency independent from state governments, making the threat of enforcement relatively consistent
across states.4 In other words, because female representation is still a significant predictor of corruption when monitoring and enforcement are held constant, it appears
that institutional deterrence arguments fail to explain the link between gender and
corruption in the United States.
Table 3: Corruption, Political Culture, and Deterrence
(1) 2010

(2) 2005

(3) 2010

(4) 2005

Variables

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (Five-Year Lagged
Average)

Women in Legislature

-.0485***

-.0491***

-.0481***

-.0495***

(.0178)

(.0111)

(.0173)

(.0110)

.233

.258

.229

.254

(.607)

(.748)

(.604)

(.735)

.00417

.00153

.00546

.00163

(.00725)

(.00682)

(.00734)

(.00675)

-.0110

.00240

-.0112

.00235

(.00676)

(.00532)

(.00671)

(.00522)

.0280**

.0115

.0263**

.0119

(.0131)

(.00980)

(.0130)

(.00957)

.0228

-.0277

.0193

-.0281

(.0373)

(.0285)

(.0360)

(.0284)

-.0480

-.351**

-.0688

-.330***

(.0968)

(.138)

(.0907)

(.117)

Political Competition
Citizen Ideology
% Urban
Real GSP Per Capita
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)
Legislative Professionalism
Ratio of public/private
salary

1.305

1.382*

(.788)

(.744)

.687
(.837)

Police expenditures

1.30e-07
(3.45e-07)

Constant

.924

5.262***

1.922

5.084***

(1.777)

(1.494)

(1.320)

(1.322)

Observations

49

47

49

47

R-squared

.35

.42

.34

.42

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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Political Culture
Now that I have analyzed the relationship between female representation and
corruption in the context of state demographics and political institutions, I examine
the effect of other political cultural factors on corruption convictions. Models 3 and 4
in Table 3 show the effect of cultural variables such as citizen ideology, political competition, and legislative professionalism on corruption. Because neither citizen ideology nor political competition have significant effects on indictment rates in either
2005 or 2010, it seems that differences in ideology and party heterogeneity between
states do not contribute meaningfully to the corruption equation.
As in previous models, the percentage of college-educated citizens does not
reach statistical significance in any model of corruption and political culture and is
not reported in Table 3. However, because overall levels of education correlate highly
with the percentage of women in the legislature, I revisit the importance of education
in the fixed-effects analysis described below. The addition of legislative professionalism
to the 2005 specification alters the fit of the model and dramatically influences the size
and significance of the coefficient for government revenue (since professionalism and
government size are closely related), though it achieves only marginal significance
in model 2. The positive coefficient suggests that a more professionalized legislature
corresponds with higher state indictment rates.5 Additional models (not shown) that
control for elite ideology, the percentage of Democrats in the state House of Representatives, and a binary field for divided government produce similar results. Overall,
models 3 and 4 indicate that ideology and political competition do not significantly
affect corruption, professionalized legislatures are modestly associated with higher
rates of indictment, and the percentage of female legislators continues to coincide
with statistically and substantively significant decreases in these rates.
Having assessed the relationship between gender and corruption in light of state
demographic and economic characteristics, institutions, and political culture, I present
models that simultaneously consider cultural and institutional factors. By including
both types of variables in a single model, I can make inferences about which variables
seem to have the strongest effect on corruption rates. To facilitate comparison with subsequent models, I rescale the percentage of women in the legislature variable to run
from zero to one. As has been the case in all of the models previously displayed, models 1 and 2 indicate that female representation has a significantly negative effect on
corruption, with a 1 percent increase in female representation corresponding to a 5.3
percent decrease in conviction indictments in 2010 (when the coefficient is exponentiated).6 The term limits coefficient remains positive and significant but seems to have
a weaker effect on corruption relative to female representation.
To better understand whether female representation or political cultural factors in
general are more strongly correlated with corruption rates, I introduce a measure that
accounts for a wide range of societal opportunities for women. This variable combines
the percentage of female legislators with the percentage of the female population par138
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ticipating in the labor force and the percentage of women with a college degree. The
resulting standardized index achieves an alpha coefficient of .84, and exploratory factor
analysis indicates the three variables load highly on a single factor. For ease of interpretation, I rescale the variable to run between zero and one. From a theoretical perspective,
I feel that by including variables that account for female participation in the workforce,
higher education, and political office, I produce a measure that encompasses three highly
relevant categories of civic life, even if the measure is not exhaustive.
Models 3 and 4 indicate that the coefficient for the female opportunity index
has a significantly larger substantive impact than every other variable in the model,
suggesting that relatively high levels of female opportunity correspond with dramatically lower levels of corruption. While I cannot include the female opportunity index
and female representation variable in the same model due multicollinearity, comparing the coefficients across otherwise identical models suggests that overall female
opportunity has a substantively larger negative effect on corruption than representation alone. I argue that because the index accounts for female opportunity in general
rather than focusing solely on political representation, the index is a better indicator
of political culture and, ultimately, a stronger predictor of corruption.
To put this difference in perspective, the female legislative representation variable produces a coefficient of -2.08 in 2010, more than one and a half times smaller
than the -3.35 coefficient value achieved by the female opportunity index in the same
year. In 2005, the female opportunity index coefficient was more than twice as large as
the female representation variable. Although I cannot formally test the difference-indifferences for the two variables (via an interaction term) due to collinearity, I argue
that the markedly consistent differences in magnitude provide at least suggestive evidence that the female opportunity variable has a larger negative effect on corruption.
I am further encouraged by the results of robustness checks that replicate the Table 4
models using the expert survey measure (see Table 5). These alternative models yield
similar results, with the female opportunity index registering an even larger negative effect on state corruption levels relative to female representation. Based on these
findings, I assert that female opportunity in general has a stronger negative impact
on corruption than female legislative representation alone. Moreover, because female
opportunity, inherently bound up in a state’s political values, norms, and ideas about
gender roles, is a representation of political culture, models 3 and 4 suggest that cultural factors have a substantively stronger cross-sectional effect on corruption than
the institutional factors that I consider in my empirical tests.
Fixed-Effect Models
Of course, it is highly plausible that the female opportunity measure serves as a
proxy for underlying societal constructs also related to corruption. In order to further
evaluate the relationship between corruption, gender, and the latent cultural factors
that female representation and opportunity may represent, I use fixed-effect regressions
to analyze panel data that spans between 1983 and 2010. Fixed-effect regressions cre139
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ate a series of dichotomous variables, designating the state to which each observation
pertains, allowing me to control for omitted independent variables that vary between
Table 4: Corruption: Combined and Female Opportunity Models
(1) 2010

(2) 2005

(3) 2010

(4) 2005

Variables

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (Five-Year Lagged
Average)

Women in Legislature

-2.077***

-1.970***

(0.533)

(0.435)

Female Opportunity Index
Real GSP Per Capita
% Urban
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)
Term Limits
Direct Initiative
Transparency
Political Competition
Citizen Ideology

-4.117***

(0.891)

(0.741)

0.025*

0.024**

0.038**

0.038***

(0.014)

(0.001)

(0.014)

(0.009)

-0.004

-0.003

-0.012

-0.009

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.008)

(0.006)

-.0047

-0.014

-0.012

-0.022

(0.039)

(0.029)

(0.043)

(0.025)

-0.099

-0.348***

-0.137

-0.352***

(0.092)

(0.113)

(0.095)

(0.090)

0.604***

-0.040

0.565**

-0.0795

(0.208)

(0.175)

(0.226)

(0.181)

-0.218

0.450**

-0.176

0.279

(0.223)

(0.202)

(0.245)

(0.207)

-0.015

-0.011

(0.011)

(0.011)

0.411

0.851

-0.341

-0.796

(0.599)

(0.696)

(0.689)

(0.713)

0.008

0.001

0.010

0.007

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.006)

Legislative Professionalism
Constant

-3.346***

1.305*

1.147*

(0.722)

(0.620)

2.762*

4.525***

4.715**

6.989***

(1.467)

(1.194)

(1.874)

(1.304)

Observations

49

47

49

49

R-squared

0.47

0.51

0.45

0.53

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Robustness Check: Combined and Female Opportunity Models
(1) 1999

(2) 1999

(3) 1999

(4) 1999

Variables

State Corruption: Survey of House of Representatives Reporters

% Women in Legislature

-2.155**

-2.167**

(Rescaled 0–1)

(0.936)

(0.947)

Female Opportunity Index
Real GSP Per Capita
% Urban
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)
Term Limits
Direct Initiative
Political Competition
Citizen Ideology
Legislative
ism
Constant

-6.627***

-6.613***

(0.888)

(0.945)

-0.020

-0.017

0.019

0.022

(0.033)

(0.035)

(0.023)

(0.025)

0.038**

0.040***

0.039***

0.040***

(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.011)

(0.011)

0.020

0.050

0.030

0.059

(0.059)

(0.062)

(0.051)

(0.054)

0.010

0.183

-0.208

-0.043

(0.213)

(0.255)

(0.176)

(0.206)

-1.943***

-1.944***

-1.503**

-1.509***

(0.633)

(0.597)

(0.574)

(0.523)

0.208

0.138

0.191

0.114

(0.367)

(0.379)

(0.292)

(0.281)

3.321***

3.174***

1.946**

1.798*

(1.008)

(1.084)

(0.901)

(0.933)

-0.003

-0.001

0.003

0.005

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.010)

(0.011)

Professional-

-1.309

-1.203

(1.271)

(1.118)

0.646

-1.698

4.949**

2.717

(2.372)

(2.738)

(2.209)

(2.425)

Observations

45

43

45

43

R-squared

0.50

0.52

0.69

0.72

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

states but do not vary over time (Stock and Watson 2003). In addition to fixed effects
for state, I use cluster robust standard errors based on the state variable and include
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dichotomous variables indicating the five-year period to which each observation pertains. Panel regression is useful for this analysis, because it provides a way to determine
whether the relationships between female representation and corruption and female
opportunity and corruption are significant across time, controlling for omitted withinstate variables. These results will also help me determine whether the variables for
female representation and female opportunity are mere proxies for other within-state
cultural values, institutions, and characteristics I cannot include in my models.
The fixed-effect regressions in Table 6 include variables similar to those in the
cross-sectional models, though some variables are omitted because data are not available over the course of the entire panel.7 Instead of using the lagged average of normalized corruption, the dependent variable used in the cross-sectional regressions,
I use the log transformation of yearly corruption counts, normalized by population.
Model 1 shows that controlling for time period and fixed-effects for states, the proportion of female legislators ceases to have a significant negative effect on corruption
convictions. Instead, most of the variation between states is explained by unobserved
state factors, as evidenced by the large and highly significant constant value. While
female legislative representation is no longer significant, the female opportunity
index continues to have a significant negative impact on logged conviction rates,
though the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly lower than in cross-sectional
models. Based on the large, significant constant values (which represent the impact of
between-state differences for which the model does not account), it seems that female
opportunity may serve as a proxy for other within-state factors in cross-sectional
models. The variable for overall education is also significant when regressed against
corruption rates over time, suggesting that states with higher-than-average percentages of college graduates tend to have lower corruption conviction counts over time.
That the variables for both overall education and female opportunity (which is
partially comprised of a measure for female education) remain statistically and substantively significant over time, while female political representation does not suggests that education may have the largest impact on corruption counts. Indeed, when
I replace the female opportunity index with the female education variable (Table
6, model 5), the coefficient of the female education variable (-1.47) alone is nearly
identical to the female opportunity index variable. That said, a similar model (not
shown) indicates that the percentage of women in the labor force is also a significant (p=.06) and substantive (β=-1.11) correlate of low corruption levels.8 Moreover,
an index measure that combines the female education and women in the labor force
variables has a substantively large coefficient (β=-1.87). The discrepancy between
this two-item index and the three-item female opportunity index illustrates the need
to find additional measures of female opportunity. That said, the continued significance of female labor participation and female education suggests that low levels of
normalized corruption convictions cannot be attributed to overall education alone.
Rather, uniquely female factors appear to be strongly related to low levels of cor142
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Table 6: Fixed Effect Regressions: 1983–2010
Log of Corruption Convictions
Variables

(1) Gender

% Women in Legislature

0.218

(Rescaled 0–1)

(0.328)

Female Opportunity Index

(2) Female
(3) EducaOpportunity tion

(4) Female
Education
& Labor

(5) Female
Education

-1.488**
(0.720)

Education

-1.293***
(0.407)

Female Education & Labor

-1.874***
(0.603)

Female Education

-1.467***
(0.346)

Real GSP per capita
Income per capita
Ln (Population)
Term Limits

0.005

0.009

0.012

0.012

0.010

(0.009)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.0104)

-0.0003

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0000

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.854***

-0.928***

-0.834***

-0.834***

-1.211***

(0.308)

(0.329)

(0.301)

(0.301)

(0.337)

0.140

0.133

0.142

0.142

0.154

(0.092)

(0.095)

(0.093)

(0.093)

(0.099)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.001

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

13.64***

15.62***

13.98***

20.08***

15.71***

Citizen Ideology
Government Ideology

0.001
(0.002)

Constant

(4.540)

(4.963)

(4.458)

(5.098)

(4.419)

State Fixed-Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Controls for Time Period

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

1,190

1,190

1,190

1,190

1,190

R-squared

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.40

0.40

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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ruption.9 In short, while the variable representing the proportion of women in state
legislatures ceases to be significant over time, female education and the percentage of
women in the labor force remain strong predictors of corruption convictions.
While the female opportunity index, education, and modified index variables
are significantly related to corruption convictions, much of the variation in indictments can be attributed to within-state factors that I cannot capture in my quantitative models. Since the factors that contribute to the large constant values in the
panel analyses cannot be observed, it is unclear whether the remaining variation in
corruption convictions can be explained by institutional or cultural factors or something else. However, because the female opportunity index and overall education
variables are significantly related to lower levels of corruption, it seems that political
culture has an important effect on indictment rates, controlling for many important
state institutional, demographic, and economic traits.

Discussion

To recap the results of my empirical tests, I revisit my initial hypotheses. I first
postulated that the cross-sectional relationship between the proportion of females in
the legislature and corruption would be statistically significant among the American
states. Evidence from cross-sectional regressions for two years and two distinct corruption dependent variables suggests that corruption and female legislative representation are significantly related. Next, I hypothesized that the correlation between
corruption and the proportion of female legislators would hold in the presence
of institutional controls. My results offer support for this hypothesis and suggest
that institutional factors alone fail to explain substantial variation in corruption convictions. Furthermore, because the association between female representation and
corruption remains statistically and substantively significant within the highly democratic context of the U.S., democratic institutional factors alone do not adequately
explain the relationship between gender and corruption.
I also speculated that institutional deterrence would not have an independent negative effect on corruption. Models with controls for institutional corruption disincentives,
combined with the inherent controls of independent federal enforcement, suggest that
accounting for deterrence does not alter the relationship between gender and corruption. Finally, I hypothesized that overall female opportunity would have a stronger
negative correlation with corruption levels and that the significance of the female representation variable would diminish in longitudinal models. My analysis suggests that
female opportunity has a stronger impact on corruption in both the short and long term.
I contend that a broader conception of female opportunity that considers female opportunity in education, politics, and the labor force is a more comprehensive representation
of political culture, with female education and labor force activity being the most powerful drivers of the correlation between female opportunity and low levels of corruption.
I stress that this study does not assert that the number of women in government
influences corruption because of innate feminine superiority, since the data I use does
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not lend itself to these types of inferences. Instead, I argue that state political cultures
that encourage women to participate equally in various aspects of community life
tend to support other values that discourage corrupt behavior. Thus, while achieving
higher levels of female political representation is a goal that should be pursued for its
own sake, artificially adding women to government may not prove a viable solution
to corruption unless accompanied by corresponding shifts in cultural values. Future
attitudinal research may provide insights into whether American states with higher
support for gender egalitarianism are actually less corrupt. The enormous amounts of
variance attributable to between-state differences in the fixed effects regression models indicates that unique local dynamics have a profound effect on rates of corruption.
At the same time, the significance of female opportunity as a negative correlate of
corruption suggests that measures of overall female opportunity are a useful way to
evaluate the effect of political culture on corruption conviction rates.

Conclusion

In sum, after analyzing the relationship between female legislative representation
and corruption in the U.S., I have introduced evidence suggesting that the correlations
observed in cross-national studies hold within a highly liberal democratic context in the
presence of various institutional, demographic, and cultural controls. I have also introduced an original index to measure female opportunity and found that this index has
a meaningful, negative relationship with state corruption. My analysis indicates that
significant variation in corruption rates can be traced to between state factors that go
unobserved in the models I present. Though the link between gender and corruption is
far from clear, my research suggests that levels of female opportunity are a useful way
to understand the effect of political culture on corruption in the United States.
NOTES
1. I focus on term limit laws that have taken effect, because after term limits are enacted, there
is often a significant lag between passing and implementing the actual limit, during which
time several laws have been stricken down or repealed (NCSL 2014a).
2. The following variables were obtained through both the U.S. Census Bureau and the State Politics and Policy Quarterly data center: percent population living in urban areas, education, gross
state product, state revenue, and police expenditures. Data in years 1983–2005 are provided by
SPPQ, while data from later years is collected from the census. The percentage of females in
the labor force was collected by SPPQ for years before 1999; I retrieved later data from the U.S.
Statistical Abstract.
3. Omitting the variable for percentage of college graduates in the state actually improves the fit
of the model, suggesting that education correlates highly with another variable in the model.
I provide further discussion of the education variable in subsequent models.
4. In line with previous research, I would like to control for variables that explain degrees of
enforcement such as the number of U.S. attorneys per capita and state U.S. attorney office
prosecutorial expenditures (see, for example, Alt and Lassen 2011). Unfortunately, I cannot
include these variables due to a lack of publicly available data.
5. I do not test legislative professionalism in the 2010 model due to data availability constraints.
6. In order to report the exponentiated coefficient in percentage terms, I first run the model using
the original the percentage of women in the legislature (not rescaled). Because the variable
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has the same relative values, other coefficients are identical for both versions of the female
representation variable.
7. Because no new states adopted a new open primary or direct initiative measure after 1983, the
binary fields representing these statutes are not included in the panel analysis, since they do
not vary over the years covered by the panel sample.
8. For purposes of comparison, I rescale the female political representation, female education,
overall education, and female participation in the labor force variables to run between zero
and one.
9. Ideally, I would compare the relative magnitude of these coefficients directly via an interaction term in the same regression model. Due to multicollinearity concerns, however, I cannot
include the variables in the same model.
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